Symbolic vs substantial corporate restructurings by WANG PENGJI
  

































A thesis presented by 
Pengji Wang 
to 
The Department of Strategy and Policy 
NUS Business School 















First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Ishtiaq Mahmood, for 
his continuous support in the Ph.D. program. Prof. Ishtiaq Mahmood was always 
considerate and willing to offer advice and help on my research and my life. He 
taught me how to ask questions and express my ideas. He showed me different ways 
to approach a research problem and the need to be persistent to accomplish any goal. 
He taught me how to write academic papers in a more scientific way. He has been 
most responsible for helping me complete the writing of this dissertation as well as 
the challenging research that lies behind it. Without his expert guidance, 
encouragement and constant guidance, I could not have finished this dissertation. 
I also would like to thank the two committee members during my Phd thesis 
proposal: Prof. Chi-Nien Chung for his insightful suggestions and warm 
encouragement, and Prof. Jane Lu, who have given me valuable comments which help 
to improve my dissertation.  
Many people on the faculty and staff of the NUS Business School assisted and 
encouraged me in various ways during my course of studies. I would like to thank to 
the friendly professors in business faculty: Prof. Qiang Fu, Prof. SangChan Park, Prof. 
Meijun Qian, and Prof. Xiaohui Lu. They were so kind as to spend a lot of time with 
me discussing my dissertation and giving me good ideas and guidance on how to 
proceed with my research.  
Last, but not least, I thank my family: my husband and my parents. They have 





When organizations restructure their business portfolio, capital structure, and 
organizational structure to respond to external pressure, the restructurings may be 
genuine in that they are aimed at improving efficiency, or be merely symbolic in that 
they are aimed at satisfying institutional pressure and do not change the firm’s internal 
routines. Despite of the popularity of the symbolic restructurings in both developed 
and developing economies, relatively less attention has been directed to how the 
institutional environment shapes firms’ symbolic restructuring choice and its 
implications on post-restructuring performance. To address such important issues, this 
dissertation investigates when and how institution environment shapes the decision 
and performance of firms’ substantial and symbolic restructurings. The empirical 
analysis of this dissertation is based on the listed firms that report negative net profit 
in Chinese securities market from 1998 to 2004.   
After giving measurement for the substantial restructuring and symbolic  
restructuring, as well as providing the institutional background in China in chapter II, 
I further conduct two empirical studies in the context of China with institutional 
variations across 31 provinces in chapter III and chapter IV. In chapter III, I draw on 
transaction cost theory and institutional theory to understand the underlying channels by 
which the institutions (including local legal system and local government support) 
across provinces in China shape firms’ choice between substantial vs. symbolic 
restructuring. The results suggest that the choice is actually a combination of legitimacy and 
efficiency concerns. 
In chapter IV, I examine the performance implication of substantial restructuring 
and symbolic restructuring in emerging economies, as well as how the local 
government support moderates the performance after substantial and symbolic 
3 
 
restructurings. Drawing on transaction cost theory, institutional theory and soft-budget 
theory, the study unravels the mechanisms through which local government 
participation leads to the success or failure of corporate restructuring.  
The findings have implications for research on the corporate restructuring, 
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Chapter I  
Introduction 
Organizations often restructure their business portfolio, capital structure, and 
organizational structure to respond to external pressure (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Hitt, 
Harrison, & Ireland, 2001; Markides, 1992). However, although some restructurings 
may be genuine in that they are aimed at improving efficiency, others are merely 
cosmetic in that they are aimed at satisfying institutional pressure and do not change the 
firm‘s internal routines. While there has been a considerable research focus on 
attempting to understand the antecedents and outcomes of restructuring, little work has 
been done to investigate if the causes and results of restructuring vary according to 
whether the restructuring is substantial or symbolic.  
In theory, a failure to differentiate between substantial restructuring and symbolic 
restructuring may result in an important contingency between corporate restructuring 
and firm performance being missed. Moreover, while more substantial or fundamental 
restructurings are expected to lead to better firm performance, they are also associated 
with higher implementation costs (March, 1991; Tushman & Nelson, 1990). Hence, it is 
difficult to pinpoint exactly how the performance implication varies between substantial 
and symbolic restructuring. Accordingly, it is unclear whether the choice between 
substantial and symbolic restructuring is merely a legitimacy concern, is an efficiency 
concern, or is a combination of the two (Martinez & Dacin, 1999). In practice, if firms 
use symbolic restructurings as a ceremony to attract support from the regulatory agency 
and investors, rather than to improve actual efficiency, they will lead to information 
2 
 
asymmetry and the misallocation of resources within firms or even across the market as 
a whole (Miglo, 2007; Misallocate & Stubben, 2008). As a result, understanding the 
nature of symbolic restructuring is the first step in establishing laws and policies that 
recognize and regulate this form of restructuring and in protecting investors from 
inefficient investment.  
This dissertation examines the antecedents and consequences of substantial 
restructuring and symbolic restructuring in the context of China, where a significant 
number of listed firms use restructuring plans as a symbolic response to delisting 
pressure rather than to improve the efficiency of their operations. It makes several novel 
contributions to the literature.  
First, it considers how best to measure the symbolism and substant iveness of 
restructurings. Little effort has been made to investigate symbolic corporate 
restructurings due to the difficulty of identifying them. Prior studies mainly consider 
whether or not the policy has been implemented after being adopted to define and 
measure substantial or symbolic actions (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Stevens, 
Steensma, Harrison, & Cochran, 2005). This method cannot be applied to the case of 
symbolic restructuring, which represents a continuum: firms not only adopt a 
restructuring strategy, but also implement it as they come under institutional pressure; 
yet the implementation phase is superficial as it does not address the internal routines 
that are pertinent to the spirit of the institutional requirement. This type of continuum of 
symbolic action is more prevalent than substantial restructuring because it is hidden 
from constituents to a greater degree. Hence, it is necessary to formulate a new way to 
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define and measure such a continuum of symbolic action. In this dissertation, corporate 
restructurings conducted within one year are defined as more symbolic when they bring 
about fewer changes to internal routines related to efficiency. Such changes to internal 
routines include a refocusing of the firm‘s business portfolio, a change o f ultimate 
controller, avoiding related party transactions, and avoiding manipulation of end-of-year 
earnings. Factor analysis is used on these items to develop a measure of the symbolism 
of corporate restructuring. The reverse of the symbolism index is the substantiveness 
index that describes the substance of corporate restructurings.  
Second, this dissertation focuses on the role of institutions as a predictor of 
symbolic vs. substantial restructuring. The institutional context can affect both the 
choice of form of restructuring and restructuring performance. There are two alternative 
institutions: market and government. The market facilitates and monitors transactions 
through the legal system, which includes codifed laws and formal enforcement 
mechanisms. In transitional economies where there is no well-developed market 
institution, the government controls and allocates resources, as well as is intimately 
involved in economic decisions. Failure to consider either of them as a predictor would 
bias the effect of restructuring on performance.  
I focus on local- level institutions rather than central- level institutions. This is 
because large economies often have more than one layer of institutional arrangements 
(e.g. China, India, and Indonesia in Asia, Mexico in Latin America, Nigeria in Africa, 
the USA, etc.), as central government decentralizes power to local governments to a 
greater or lesser degree to enable them to develop local policies. Local government can 
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therefore shape organizations‘ responses to the central authority. Yet most research 
focuses solely on country- level institutions established by the central government to 
understand symbolic actions or corporate restructuring performance (Claessens & 
Djankov, 1997; Earle & Estrin, 1997; Levin, 2006). Institutional variation across 
different regions of the same country is ignored due to data availability. The question of 
why organizational restructurings show different patterns in response to the same 
state- level policy remains unanswered. It is therefore more interesting to investigate the 
institutions formed by the local government.  
This dissertation takes advantage of the institutional variation across 31 provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions in China to investigate how the choice of 
substantial vs. symbolic restructuring at the provincial level is shaped by (a) the 
provincial- level legal system; and (b) provincial- level government support in terms of 
subsidies to local firms, preferential credit access, and local protectionism. Moreover, I 
examine how the choice of substantial vs. symbolic restructuring at the firm level is 
shaped by the interaction between firm-level characteristics and provincial- level 
institutions. Specifically, I examine how the effect of provincial- level institutions on 
firms‘ restructuring choice is contingent on: (1) the complexity of the restructuring, 
which refers to the complex issues that prevent firms from exiting their existing 
production arrangements and establishing new production arrangements. Such issues 
include diversified input, redundant labor and obsolete physical assets; and (2) auditor 
independence, which refers to the independence or objectiveness of the external auditor 
employed by the firm. Examining the interaction between provincial- level institutions 
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and firm-level characteristics such as these two enables us to understand the underlying 
channels by which institutions shape firms‘ choice of substantial vs. symbolic 
restructuring.  
I show that both the legal system and local government support shape firms‘ 
substantial/symbolic restructuring choice by affecting implementation costs and 
supervisory pressure. The local legal system promotes more substantial restructurings 
among firms that have more complex issues involved in restructurings and less 
independent auditors. In contrast, local government support promotes more symbolic 
restructurings among firms with more complex issues involved in restructurings and 
more independent auditors. Thus, I address the conundrum of how firms choose between 
substantial and symbolic restructuring by showing that the choice is actually driven by a 
combination of legitimacy and efficiency concerns.  
Finally, I investigate the performance implication of substantial vs. symbolic 
restructuring in emerging economies. More importantly, I investigate how the local 
government support moderates the performance implication of substantial and symbolic 
restructurings. Recognizing that the substantial vs. symbolic restructuring choice is 
endogenous, I employ a propensity score matching method to obtain a matched 
symbolic restructuring as the counterpart for each substantial restructuring. I examine 
whether their post-restructuring efficiency scores diverge using the 
difference-in-difference approach. The results show that substantial restructurings leads 
to greater efficiency improvements than symbolic restructurings only when there is a 
well-developed legal system or when the firm has obtained local government support. 
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Furthermore, I investigate those aspects of the firm‘s arrangements in which local 
government support contributes to the success of substantial restructuring. The results 
show that local government support enhances substantial restructuring only when it 
deals with ownership arrangements, rather than business refocusing. Henc e, the study 
unravels the mechanisms through which local government participation leads to the 
success or failure of corporate restructuring.  
Overall, this dissertation advances our understanding of symbolic and substantial 
restructurings. I show that the choice between substantial and symbolic restructuring is 
driven by a combination of legitimacy and efficiency concerns, at least in transitional 
economies. This is because substantial restructuring is associated with high 
implementation costs that cannot be offset without well-developed legal institutions and 
appropriate government intervention. This result sheds light on research on both 
corporate restructuring and symbolic action, suggesting that it is important to 
incorporate institutions into the analysis in seeking to understand the corporate 
restructuring choice, restructuring performance, and symbolic action.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II defines and measures 
the substance/symbolism of corporate restructuring. I then provide some background on 
the Chinese institutional context before giving some evidence that both symbolic 
restructurings and institutions vary across provinces and over years in China and that 
there are some links between them. Chapter III draws on transaction cost theory and 
institutional theory to investigate how institutional variation across provinces in China 
shapes firms‘ choice between substantial and symbolic restructuring. In Chapter IV, I 
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examine the performance implications of substantial restructuring and symbolic 
restructuring. Chapter V summarizes the key findings of this dissertation and highlights 
its theoretical contributions and managerial implications. I also suggest several 





Symbolic vs Substantial Restructuring: Evidence from China  
INTRODUCTION 
Symbolic action refers to a firm adopting a policy as a symbol to meet the 
institutional requirement while keeping internal routines away from the external 
institutional requirement (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). There is a fair amount of institutional 
theory literature on symbolic action. Prior studies have defined and addressed symbolic 
action in the form of decoupling, selective adoption and modification.  
In early studies, scholars held an economic perspective. They suggested that 
institutional requirement has nothing to do with, or even is conflicting with the technical 
efficiency of the firm. Symbolic action is defined in terms of decoupling or separation of 
institutional requirement and internal technical concerns (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985: 
516-517; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Gupta, Dirsmith, & Fogarty, 1994). In recent studies, 
scholars from a behavioral perspective proposed that to protect their interests or po litical 
concern, managers may symbolically adopt some strategies by completely decoupling 
the implementation and the adoption of the strategies required by institutional pressure. 
For example, Westphal and Zajac identified the symbolic adoption of long-term 
incentives in executive pay (1994) and stock repurchases (2001) in which managers adopt, 
but do not implement, plans in these areas. In either of the cases, symbolic action is a 
complete decoupling between the institutional requirement and the firms‘ 
implementation of the requirement. Symbolism is thus measured by a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the plan is not implemented after adoption and 0 otherwise.  
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Another type of symbolic actions is that firms sometimes selectively adopt only 
several dimensions of a strategy (or a new practice). But it is not always because they 
simply want to adopt it symbolically, but because they need to choose only specific 
dimensions that work in their firm specific (or institution specific) context. For example, 
Levin (2006) showed firms symbolically adopt Total Quality Management (TQM) by 
selectively implementing several, but not all, dimensions of the TQM required by the 
regulation. The extent of symbolism is thus measured by the ratio of the number of 
dimensions implemented to the total number of dimensions of the strategy mandated by 
the institutional environment.  
The premise underlying both the complete decoupling and the selective adoption is 
not continuous. They just consider the issue of ―implementation or not‖ in one or multiple 
dimensions. However, there is the third type of symbolic action, in which firms act 
symbolically by modifying the required strategies or practices to suit their own context. 
For example, Westphal and Zajac (2001) suggested an example as earnings manipulation. 
Firms implement the accounting standard pressured by regulation in their operation and 
accounting practice. However, they modify the value of some accounting items to 
manipulate their earnings. Another example is in China, listed firms appoint independent 
directors to meet the requirements of regulation (Guiding Opinions On The 
Establishment Of Systems Of Independent Outside Directors By Listed Companies 
(August, 2001)) and market investors. Independent directors are required to supervise 
managers and protect minority shareholders by issuing opinions on important decisions. 
However, in many listed firms, although independent directors issue opinions, their 
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opinions do not really challenge managers‘ decisions. Thus, the listed firm superficially 
implements the governance requirements by modifying the activity of the independent 
director. In the two cases, the firm‘s symbolic action is a continuum rather than discrete. 
Such a continuum of symbolic action may be more favored by firms, as it is complex 
and difficult to identify. Examining it is therefore likely to be an interesting exercise. 
However, tools that can be used to define and measure this continuum of symbolic  
action have not yet been developed.  
In this study I investigate one symbolic action of continuum modification: symbolic 
corporate restructurings conducted to manipulate earnings rather than to improve 
efficiency. In the real world, complete decoupling, selective adoption and modification 
are difficult to separate clearly. No matter which types are involved, there is one rule that 
has been followed by those firms who have done some symbolic actions: there is 
discrepancy between the spirits of institutional requirement and firms‘ real behavior. 
Therefore, I differentiate more symbolic corporate restructurings from more substantial 
corporate restructurings and give definitions and measures for the 
symbolism/substantiveness of corporate restructurings based on this rule. 
I then introduce the institutional background that has led to the popularity of 
symbolic corporate restructurings in China. I argue that symbolic restructurings are not 
easily prevented because they are rooted in the central- level and local- level institutional 
arrangements that prevail in China. At the central level, the delisting system established 
by the central government creates a contradiction between legitimacy and efficiency. 
Although the spirit of the delisting system is to push firms to restructure to improve 
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efficiency, the delisting decision is simply based on firms‘ accounting performance. 
Firms have the incentive to use symbolic restructurings to polish their accounting 
performance and respond to the immediate legitimacy crisis. At the local level, 
decentralization in China allows local governments to establish local institutions 
including legal and government support systems. These institutions can reshape the 
contradiction between efficiency and legitimacy, thus affecting the substantiveness of 
corporate restructurings. 
In the final part of this chapter, I give some evidence on symbolic restructurings 
and its potential link with institutions. I give evidence of symbolic restructurings over 
the years and across provinces in China, showing that in comparison with substantial 
restructurings, symbolic restructurings lead to better accounting performance in the short 
term but result in less pronounced efficiency improvements and poorer accounting 
performance in the long term. As for the link between symbolic restructuring and 
institutions, I find that a well-developed state-level legal system or local enforcement 
mechanism will alleviate the efficiency- legitimacy contradiction and thus promote more 
substantial restructurings among firms. Financing support from local government 
triggers more symbolic restructurings, while non-financing measures taken by local 
government may promote more substantial restructurings.   
Defining Symbolic vs Substantial Corporate Restructurings 
Corporate restructuring has been a popular means for organizations to respond to 
threats and opportunities in their business environments (Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Hitt, 
Harrison, & Ireland, 2001; Markides, 1992). The restructuring can be conducted within 
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or beyond a firm‘s boundary. Within the boundary, a firm can use internal resources to 
manage its budget and capital structure, or to reconfigure its processes, procedures, and 
organizational structure. Alternatively, firms can draw in external resources to 
restructure their operations. To draw in external resources, a firm needs to participate in 
transactions beyond its boundary. Restructurings conducted beyond the firm‘s boundary 
can involve different types of transactions such as divestment (including sell ing assets, 
divisions, or subsidiaries to another corporation or a combination of corporations or 
individuals), acquisition (including buying shares or assets), ownership restructuring 
(including transferring the equity of the main shareholders and equity expansion), and 
debt restructuring (including debt forgiveness, debt rescheduling, and/or conversion of a 
portion of debt into equity). In this study, I focus on restructurings conducted beyond the 
firm‘s boundary.  
Most of the prior studies in the literature show that firms can conduct restructurings 
to respond to technological opportunities or threats. For example, firms conduct 
restructurings to update their technology, to refocus on more promising sectors, and for 
similar purposes (Singh & Chang, 1992). Some studies suggest that restructurings have 
also been used as a response to institutional pressure over the last several decades. For 
example, Bartov (1993) shows that managers conduct assets sales to smooth earnings, 
thus satisfying the requirements of market investors. Levin (2006) shows that hospitals 
conduct internal procedure restructurings to adopt total quality management practices 
and thus meet regulatory requirements. This study follows the second strand of the 




When corporate restructuring is used as a means to respond to institutional pressure, 
the nature of the restructuring undertaken can range from substantial to symbolic. On the 
one hand, firms can restructure substantially to make fundamental changes to inefficient 
internal routines, thus conforming to the spirit of institutional requirements for 
restructurings. For example, firms participate in acquisitions and divestitures to develop 
new business lines, to achieve economies of scale, to increase market share through 
geographical diversification, to realize vertical integration, or to reduce risks (Singh & 
Chang, 1992). These steps allow the firm to improve its inefficient operations. The firm 
reshapes its organizational structure, including its management teams and ownership 
structure, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the management (Bowman & 
Singh, 1993). These fundamental changes improve firms‘ productive efficiency and 
accounting performance in the long term. However, fundamental changes of this type are 
associated with high implementation costs. For example, firms that seek to improve their 
inefficient business portfolios need to cut obsolete production lines, shed labor, and get 
rid of non-productive assets. They also need to make a major investment in the 
introduction of new product lines, processes, and technologies. To improve their 
organizational structure, firms need to break the political balance among their 
entrenched powerful parties. This necessitates not only financial and technological 
support, but also managers with good judgment of investment opportunities, adequate 
incentives, and the entrepreneurial skills required to support new projects.  
On the other hand, firms can restructure superficially for the sole purpose of 
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manipulating earnings. For example, firms can sell peripheral assets or stock held by 
their subsidiaries to generate sufficient cash to meet their debt obligations (Kaplan & 
Weisbach, 1992). Firms may sell stock or assets or acquire profitable assets from 
affiliates solely to increase their below-the- line items such as non-operating revenue and 
investment revenue (Ding, Zhang & Zhang, 2007; Jiang & Wang, 2003; Jian & Wong, 
2006; Liu & Lu, 2007). By doing so, they can increase their profit and avoid accounting 
loss. This allows them to provide a symbol to the regulatory agency, market investors, 
and other stakeholders indicating that they are improving performance through 
restructuring while leaving the internal routines that hurt their efficiency untouched. In 
this sense, there is a degree of divergence between the symbolism and substance of 
corporate restructurings. As symbolic restructurings do not bring fundamental changes 
to the firm‘s portfolio or management, they are associated with a lower implementation 
cost than are substantial restructurings. However, to carry out a symbolic restructuring, 
the firm needs to undertake the risk of being detected by the regulatory agency or market 
constituents (Levin, 2006). When there is a high degree of supervisory pressure on firms 
to restructure, it is costly for firms to undertake symbolic restructurings.  
To summarize, I define corporate restructurings as more symbolic if they are 
conducted to polish the firm‘s accounting performance and allow it to meet the 
institutional requirement; however, restructurings of this type do not change the internal 
routines that really hurt the firm‘s efficiency, which is the spirit of the institutional 
requirement. In contrast, I define corporate restructurings as more substantial if they are 
conducted to address the inefficiency of internal routines, thus conforming to the spirit 
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of the institutional requirement, i.e., improving firm efficiency.  
EMPIRICAL SETTING: CHINA 
In China, corporate restructuring is a commonly used means of responding to 
institutional pressure, especially among poorly performing listed firms. According to 
Tan (1999), many of the poor performers in the Chinese securities market undergo 
symbolic restructurings to polish their accounting performance. These symbolic 
restructurings lead to information asymmetry and misallocation of resources (Miglo, 
2007; Misallocate & Stubben, 2008). Although the regulatory agency has established a 
series of laws and rules to regulate symbolic restructurings, restructurings of this type 
are not easily prevented. Symbolic restructurings are rooted in the institutional 
arrangements that prevail in China.  
Institutional Arrangements from Central Government: Delisting System 
In China, the first cause of the decoupling of substance from symbolism in 
corporate restructurings is the delisting system established by the central government, 
represented by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)1. The Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges were launched in 1990 and 1991 respectively. To assure 
stable and manageable stock market development, the central government imposed a 
quota system in regulating the listing of firms in the market. Under the system, the 
central government set a target for total proceeds to be raised in the stock market, and 
then this total amount would be allocated across provinces who have the authority to 
                                                                 
1
 Init ially, the governments of Shanghai and Shenzhen were principally  responsible for the supervision of 
the exchanges. At this stage no national supervisory body existed. In 1992 the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) was created to address perceived failings of the prev ious supervision. However, it 
was not until 1998 that supervision was fu lly  centralized in the CSRC as part  of securities reform that led 
to the promulgation of China‘s first Securities Law.   
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recommend the list of public offerings. After April 1 2001, the approval system took the 
place of the quota system. Within the new system, a company must obtain approval from 
CSRC to be listed in the exchanges. Within the tight listing system, the listing quota is a 
valuable and scare resource for the firms.  
To protect the investors and encourage listed firms to improve their operational 
efficiency, the central government had established a delisting system based on firms‘ 
accounting earnings since 1994. According to the Article 157 of The Firm Law of the 
People’s Republic of China that started to take effect from January 1 1994, the firms 
with losses for three consecutive years should be suspended from trading by the 
securities regulatory body under the State Council. In 1996, firms with losses for two 
consecutive years began to emerge. From January 1 1998, the Listing Rules by 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges prescribed that such firms should be under 
special treatment (ST). Trading in the shares of ST firms is regulated such that price 
volatility is limited to within +5% daily. ST firms‘ interim reports should be audited. In 
1998, firms with losses for three consecutive years appeared. To address the new 
problems, Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges promulgated the Regulations 
Concerning Suspension of Trading on June 16, 1999, requiring that all firms with losses 
for three consecutive years should be suspended from trading and their shares should be 
labeled as "PT" (i.e. particular transfer). PT shares can be traded only on Fridays. The 
price increase in a PT share is limited to no more than 5% on any trading day to prevent 
insider manipulation. However, the price of a PT share is allowed to fall without limit. 
Moreover, PT shares can be removed from listing at the discretion of the Stock 
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Exchange manager. From Dec. 4, 2001, the PT system was abolished. Instead, firms 
with losses in three consecutive years are delisted automatically within 10 days of 
announcing the final loss in their annual report.  
The rationale for basing ST, PT and delisting decisions on accounting earnings is 
that firms reporting consecutive losses are poor performers in the long run. It is 
necessary to restrict or delist them to enhance market liquidity and to guarantee the 
allocation of resources to productive undertakings, thereby protecting investors‘ interests. 
Ideally, the delisting system would tend to pressure listed firms into performing well 
over the long term, an outcome that can be achieved only through improving productive 
efficiency.  
However, basing the delisting decisions on firms‘ accounting performance actually 
generates a contradiction between efficiency and institutional legitimacy. On the one 
hand, a considerable number of loss-makers have lost competitiveness in their core 
businesses. Although these loss-makers would like to undertake more substantial 
restructurings to improve their productive efficiency, substantial restructurings are too 
costly and risky for them and must be implemented over a long period (Lee & Xue, 
2004). On the other hand, the pressure the delisting system placed on loss-makers to 
achieve legitimacy is never far from the surface. This contradiction between efficiency 
and legitimacy encourages firms simply to report better accounting performance in a 
symbolic gesture designed to meet the institutional requirement and protect the listing 




Institutional Arrangements from Local Government 
China is characterized by its decentralized economic structure (Cai & Treissman, 
2006; Clarke, 1991; Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005). Local government has been delegated 
economic and political powers to create local institutional arrangements (Dong, 2007). 
Therefore, enterprises operating in different regions are subject to different institutional 
environments. This section reviews decentralization in the economic and political arenas 
in China and shows that decentralization may push local government to help firms in 
their substantial or symbolic restructurings.  
Decentralization of economic power  
The decentralization of economic power is firstly reflected by the decentralized 
fiscal system. A tripartite tax system took effect in China from 1994 in which taxes are 
classified into three categories: central, local, and shared. A more detailed division of 
taxes is shown in Appendix 1. Under this system, local revenue includes budgetary 
revenue from local taxes and the local portion of shared taxes, as well as extra-budgetary 
revenue consisting of tax surcharges and user fees levied by central and local 
government agencies and some SOE earnings2 (Bahl, 1999; Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 
2005). Although this system of fiscal decentralization specifies how revenue is to be 
assigned, it does not specify how expenditure is to be assigned. Therefore, the fiscal 
decentralization process has increased budgetary imbalances and imposed further fiscal 
stress on local governments (Wong, 2000). Evidence of this can be seen in Figures 2.1a 
and 2.2b. Figure 2.1a shows the ratio of budgetary expenditure to budgetary income 
                                                                 
2
 Ext ra-budgetary revenue emerged in the 1950s, but only became institutionalized after the reform period 
began. Unlike local budgetary revenue, local ext ra-budgetary revenue does not have to be shared with the 
central government.  
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within each province. The Y axis is the ratio of budgetary expenditure to budgetary 
income. Figure 2.1b shows the average ratio of provincial budgetary expenditure to 
provincial budgetary income from 1994 to 2006. As Figure 2.1a shows, the ratio of 
budgetary expenditure to budgetary income within each province is always higher than 
13. Figure 2.1b shows that the average ratio of provincial budgetary expenditure to 
provincial budgetary income increased continuously from 1994 to 2006. However, as the 
local government cannot set the tax rate, adjust the tax collection base, or introduce new 
taxes, the only way to satisfy the requirements of the public and individuals is to build a 
more solid tax base among enterprises within the region.  




                                                                 
3
 In Xizang, the ratio of budgetary expense to budgetary income is much higher than those in other 
provinces. This is because the economy in Xizang is quite under-developed. The tax base in Xizang is 
quite low. However, to promote Xizang‘s economic growth, Chinese central government has made a lot of 
transfer payment to Xizang to support the projects such as Qinghai-Xizang railway, Ali airport, and other 
infrastructure to provide water, electricity and communication. Over 90% of the budgetary expense is 
supported by the transfer payment from the central government, including general transfer payment, 
special transfer payment and transfer payment to minority region.  
20 
 
Figure 2.1b Budgetary Expenses/Budgetary Income Over the Years  
 
The second aspect of the decentralized nature of economic power is that the careers 
of local government officials are tightly linked to local economic growth to give local 
government more of an incentive to develop the local economy. Local government 
officials in China undergo detailed performance reviews carried out by their superiors. 
Promotions, demotions, and job-related benefits all depend on such reviews, which have 
become increasingly formal (Tsui & Wang, 2004). Li and Zhou (2005) and Maskin and 
Xu (2001) offer evidence that economic growth is one of the most important criteria in 
such reviews. 
The third aspect of the decentralization of economic power is that local government 
is given policy tools enabling it to help local enterprises. The provinces have delegated 
powers to approve investment projects, capital construction projects, technical 
renovation projects, the use of foreign exchange, and the reduction and waiver of taxes 
on business, pricing, and wages (Dong, 2006). Other than these general measures, the 
central government has also implemented some specific policies to encourage local 
government to help firms grow. For example, the Basic Specifications to Build Modern 
Enterprises Systems and Strengthen Management for State-owned Large and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (Trial Regulation 2000) specify that the local government 
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should help to build a modern enterprise system by resolving historical problems such as  
redundant labor or an underdeveloped security system, establishing models of modern 
enterprises, and appointing members of supervision committees. Therefore, local 
governments have the ability to provide various forms of support to enterprises within 
their jurisdiction.  
The decentralization of economic power encourages local government to focus on 
listed firms for several reasons.4 First, given the tight quota system for company listings, 
local governments choose firms that make the largest contributions in determining 
listing nominations. These firms are often the pillars of the local economy and are linked 
with many other unlisted firms. They are the engine of the local economy because they 
pay more tax, provide more employment, and create more investment opportunities. 
Second, the listing quota itself is valuable because it brings in capital from the equity 
market, a form of finance that is less costly than debt. Third, many listed firms are 
among the first batch of firms to have adopted the modern enterprise system pushed by 
the Chinese government (Mooderjee & Yu, 1999). They are regarded as political 
achievements of local government officials. As a result, local governments are interested 
in helping listed firms to recover from losses and thereby protec t their listed status. The 
usual way of helping listed firms is to support their restructuring.  
However, although the decentralization of economic power pushes each region to 
maximize local economic growth, it does not necessarily support national economic  
efficiency. Excessive Concerns over local economic growth often lead to regional 
                                                                 
4
 I do not discuss unlisted firms in detail in this chapter. The contribution of unlisted firms is not trivial, 
although listed firms play a more important role in the overall economy.  
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protectionism, duplicative investment, and misallocation of resources (Young, 2000). 
This issue is particularly serious because the political careers of regional leaders are 
closely tied to the economic performance of their own region vis-à-vis that of other 
regions (Li & Zhou, 2005) and local government budgets are tight. In this study, the 
central government hopes that local government will use measures that improve the 
efficiency of listed firms. The local governments, on the contrary, may be more 
concerned about the listing quota than they are about efficiency. They may use support 
measures to help listed firms avoid urgent crises and obtain immediate benefits while 
tolerating inefficiency.  
Decentralization of Political Power 
In this study, the decentralization of political power refers mainly to the central 
government‘s delegation of legislative and enforcement powers to local government. In 
respect of legislative powers, the Chinese Constitution passed in 1982 gives the People‘s 
Congress and its Standing Committee of each province, autonomous region, and 
municipality the power to formulate local regulations in light of the Constitution, laws, 
and administrative regulations. Further, the Organic Law on the People’s Congresses 
and Governments at All Levels authorizes the provincial capitals and some other large 
cities to formulate local regulations. Under this system, when the central government 
establishes a new law or regulation, it depends on local governments to issue supporting 




In respect of enforcement powers,  the court system must theoretically be 
independent of local government and immune to its pressure. Some scholars even 
suggest putting the entire court system under a vertical system of leadership (Clarke, 
1991). However, in reality, the cooperation of local authorities is needed to facilitate the 
enforcement of central policy and regulations for three reasons (Clarke, 1991). First, 
courts often lack sufficient bureaucratic clout to enforce their judgments against 
administrative units. Second, courts are dependent on local government for their 
financing and personnel. Third, the formal power to appoint and dismiss court personnel 
is lodged with the local people‘s congresses. Sometimes, the central government even 
makes it clear that it depends on local government to enforce policy. For example, the 
CSRC states in almost all of the documents it issues that it depends on representative 
agencies of the CSRC and local government to jointly monitor listed firms on such 
aspects as corporate governance, information disclosure, restructuring procedure, and 
risk disclosures on delisting. Therefore, local government has the power to affect the 
quality of local enforcement.  
In summary, the decentralization of economic and political power has several 
consequences. The first is that local government has the incentive to protect listed firms 
from being delisted. Second, local governments may place a greater emphasis on the 
listing quota than they do on the efficiency of listed firms as they have limited resources 
and need to obtain immediate benefits. Third, local governments have the ability to 
provide support to local enterprises. Fourth, local governments have established their 
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own legal systems (in terms of both legislation and enforcement) as an extension of 
state- level institutions to facilitate and monitor behaviors of firms.  
Therefore, listed firms located in different regions are subject to different 
institutional arrangements. These institutional arrangements will shape the 
implementation costs of and the supervisory pressure brought to bear on corporate 
restructurings and thus determine the substantiveness of corporate restructurings.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I define symbolic corporate restructuring 
and identify the institutional arrangements that encourage restructurings of this type. In 
this section, I develop measures of the symbolism/substance of corporate restructurings 
in the Chinese context, and then provide some empirical evidence of symbolic and 
substantial restructurings in China. I also present evidence of institutional variation 
across provinces and of the potential link between institutional variation and the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings. Before discussing measurement and the 
empirical evidence, I first describe the sample and data used both in this chapter and in 
the rest of the dissertation. 
Sample and Data 
In this study, I use listed firms that report a loss (loss-makers hereafter) in their 
annual financial report in the Chinese securities market as the empirical context. This is 
an ideal context for two reasons. First, in contrast with profitable firms, loss-makers are 
under state- level pressure from the CSRC to be delisted. They have an incentive to 
restructure in response to this pressure. To meet the listing requirements, they have to 
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improve their financial performance as soon as possible. However, they may lack the 
ability to restructure substantially to improve efficiency in a short period. Thus, they 
often manipulate earnings without improving efficiency substantially. Their 
restructurings tend to be symbolic. Second, the loss-makers spread across the 31 
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions of mainland China and are subject to 
pressure from local governments, including governments at the provincial level and 
below. Empirical evidence shows that Chinese institutions differ dramatically over time 
and across provinces in terms of legal system and local government intervention (Brandt 
& Li, 2003). This variance in institutions provides us with an opportunity to examine the 
effect of institutional variation on firms‘ symbolic restructuring.  
A four-step selection process is followed to determine the sample. Firstly, the 
loss-makers in the A-share market5 from 1998 to 2004 are identified from the China 
Stock Market Accounting Research database (CSMAR). Loss-makers are listed firms 
that report a negative net profit in their annual financial report. A restructuring could be 
a response to losses in two consecutive years. I treat the last year in which a firm reports 
a loss (the loss year hereafter) before the focal restructuring year as the unique loss year.  
Second, because loss-makers‘ own assets, technologies, and other resources are 
often obsolete, they are incapable of improving performance by adjusting operations 
                                                                 
5
 There are three types of stock in the Chinese stock market: A, B, and H shares. Both the A and B 
markets are based in main land China. A shares, which are denominated in  RMB, are traded exclusively by 
Chinese citizens. B shares, which are denominated in US dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange  and in 
HK dollars on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, were allowed to be traded by foreign investors only before 
February 2001. From February 2001, the B market was opened up to Chinese citizens who have deposit 
accounts in foreign currencies. H shares are traded on  the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and are 
denominated in  HK dollars. I do not include firms listed on the B-share or H-share market, as these 
markets are for foreign investors and have stricter regulations than those applicable to the A -share market 
in mainland China.  
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internally. Therefore, most of them have to turn to external resources to accomplish 
restructurings. This study thus focuses on restructurings conducted beyond the 
loss-makers‘ boundary. I examine all corporate restructuring announcements made by 
the loss-makers within the first and the second year after the loss year. The restructuring 
announcements are mainly obtained from the CSMAR and China Center for Economic 
Research (CCER) databases and the retrieval system of Chinese listed firms 
(http://220.194.35.3:8080/zq/ggcx/ggcx.htm). Such restructurings include business 
restructurings such as asset sales, asset acquisitions, and asset swaps; organization 
restructurings, such as ownership restructurings; and financial restructurings, such as 
debt restructurings. The two-year window adopted is appropriate for examining the 
strategies firms adopt in response to delisting pressure. According to the Listing Rules of 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, firms with losses for three consecutive 
years face the threat of being delisted (before Dec. 4, 2001) or would be directly delisted 
without warning (after Dec 4, 2001). Loss-makers have an incentive to improve their 
accounting performance through restructurings within two years to avoid a loss for a 
third consecutive year. All the restructuring announcements made in each year are 
viewed as a one-year restructuring plan (restructuring plan hereafter). For example, firm 
A reported a loss in 1999. I treat the 3 restructurings in 2000 as one restructuring plan 
and the 4 restructurings in 2001 as another restructuring plan. This approach is 
appropriate for considering all the decision points. For firm A, the restructuring decision 
in 2000 was made in response to the loss in 1999. The firm was then obliged to face the 
consequence in 2000 (by reporting either a loss or a profit). The restructuring decision 
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made in 2001 was actually based on the outcome in 2000 rather than on the performance 
in 1999. Taking 2 years of restructurings as a whole would result in an important 
decision point being missed, i.e., the decision made at the end of 2000. Examining one 
year of restructurings as a whole does not present such a problem.  
Third, I collect financial data, market performance data, and state pressure data 
from the CSMAR database and corporate governance data from the CCER database.  
Fourth, I choose the province as the unit with which to analyze local institutional 
variation, because the province is the bridge between central and local power in China 
(Dong, 2007). In economic affairs, the central government issues directives or assigns 
tasks at the provincial level to be either directly implemented or relayed to lower levels. 
In the political sphere, the new Constitution passed in 1982 gave the provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities the power to formulate local regulations in 
accordance with the Constitution, laws, and administrative regulations. Therefore, the 
province is an appropriate analytical level at which to examine variation in local 
institutions. I obtain the institution and economic information for each province from the 
CSMAR regional economy database and NERI Index of Marketization of China‘s 
Provinces (Fan & Wang, 1999 & 2006). Moreover, I obtain the information on 
provincial legal system from the China Law Info Database  (Chinalawinfo.com) 
developed by Chinalawinfo Co., Ltd., who is a hi-tech legal information company 
established by the prestigious Peking University on the basis of its Legal Information 
Center. 
The sample comprises 512 unique A-share listed firms from 1998 to 2004. Among 
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these firms, 215 reported losses more than once, while 297 reported losses only once. 
Four hundred and eight firms conducted a total of 666 one-year restructuring plans 
during the first or second year following their reported losses. The distribution of 
loss-makers and restructurings is shown in Table 2.1.  











1998 51 1999 65 30 
  2000 112 30 
1999 58 2000 31 15 
  2001 165 50 
2000 52 2001 71 24 
  2002 113 41 
2001 97 2002 150 58 
  2003 248 77 
2002 100 2003 158 54 
  2004 192 70 
2003 95 2004 104 41 
  2005 239 74 
2004 79 2005 189 64 
  2006 97 38 
Total 532 Total 1934 666 
Note:  1. Loss-makers denotes the number of listed firms that reported negative net income in each loss 
year.  
2. Restructuring year denotes the two consecutive years after each loss year.  
3. Restructuring announcements shows the number of restructurings in each  of the two 
consecutive years after the loss year.  
4. Restructuring plans denotes the number of 1-year restructuring plans in each of the two 
consecutive restructuring years.  
5. The total number of loss -makers in the table, 532, differs from the number of unique 
loss-makers because some firms reported a loss in more than one year during the 1998-2004 
period.  
Measurement of Symbolism/Substantiveness of Corporate Restructuring  
As noted earlier in this chapter, symbolic corporate restructuring is a continuum of 
symbolic action in which the restructuring policy has been implemented but the 
implementation process is superficial. Hence, I cannot consider the issue of 
―implementation or not‖ in measuring symbolism.  
Some prior studies avoid addressing the ―implementation or not‖ issue in 
evaluating the symbolism of corporate restructuring. Instead, they use the restructuring 
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outcome, i.e., to what extent the restructuring helps improve below-the- line items, rather 
than operating revenue, to proxy the symbolism of the restructuring or earnings 
manipulation (Lee & Xue, 2004; Jian & Wong, 2004). Such a proxy actually measures 
divergence between the sources of profits earned by firms and the source required by the 
spirit of the institutional requirement. However, to respond to the delisting pressure near 
the surface, firms may conduct restructurings to improve efficiency while at the same 
time manipulating profits. By simply looking at the divergence of the profit source from 
the source demanded by the institutional environment, efficiency improvements could be 
ignored and thus the symbolism of the firm‘s restructuring could be overestimated.  
To solve this problem, a way needs to be found out to directly examine whether the 
restructuring improved efficiency. My solution is to identify the internal routines that 
destroy a firm‘s efficiency, which reflects the spirit of the institutional requirement, and 
then examine whether the restructuring brought about changes to those internal routines.  
To recognize the internal routines that destroy the efficiency of listed firms, the 
meaning of ―efficiency‖ firstly needs to be understood. Efficiency is taken to refer to 
productive efficiency in this study. Productive efficiency, also called technical efficiency, 
refers to the ability and willingness of an economic unit to produce the maximum 
possible output from a given combination of inputs and technology, regardless of the 
market prices of outputs, inputs, and demand (Farrell, 1957). Productive efficiency is 
composed of pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Pure technical efficiency 
(PTE) refers to a firm‘s technological ability to use the given resources. Scale efficiency 
(SE) refers to a firm choosing its production level when the marginal cost equals the 
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output price. Furthermore, X-efficiency theory suggests that productive inefficiency may 
be caused by lack of motivation and pressure (Leibenstein, 1966). Therefore, productive 
efficiency requires that a firm operate using the best technological, scale, and managerial 
processes. By improving these processes, a firm can extend its production possibility 
frontier outward and further increase its productive efficiency.  
In China, listed firms are inefficient because of some of their internal routines. First, 
they suffer from technical inefficiency because they have obsolete technology and 
equipment (Woetzel, 2008). Second, they are subject to scale inefficiency because they 
undertake political tasks (Woetzel, 2008). For example, SOEs have broad social 
obligations in areas such as health care and workers‘ pensions, keeping the employment 
rate high, and developing important industries. These political tasks often lead to firms 
becoming excessively large or over-diversified, resulting in scale inefficiency. Third, 
listed firms suffer from X-inefficiency because most of them are dominated by an 
ultimate controller (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). Nominations to the board of directors, officer appointments, and 
significant business decisions are subject to the approval of the ultimate controller. 
Entrenched ultimate controllers seek to protect their own power and are unlikely to bring 
about fundamental changes to the firm.  
Therefore, if the firm‘s restructuring includes changing these internal routines, the 
restructuring will substantially improve efficiency. If the restructuring does not lead to 
changes to these internal routines, it is likely that it is being used as a symbol to satisfy 
the institutional requirement and diverges from the substance of efficiency. I thus 
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examine several aspects of restructurings and see if they bring about changes in internal 
routines.  
The first aspect to consider is whether the restructuring involves a refocusing effort. 
A firm can upgrade its technology or refocus on a promising sector/market by adjusting 
its core assets through asset divestment, asset acquisition, stock acquisition, or stock 
divestment. The firm‘s pure technical efficiency will be improved as a result. Such a 
refocusing also helps to adjust the scale of a product line and thus improves scale 
efficiency. In contrast, restructurings that do not involve any refocusing effort cannot 
improve the pure technical efficiency or the scale efficiency of the firm.  
The second aspect to consider is whether the restructuring leads to a control power 
transfer. Restructurings involving a control power transfer will improve the firm‘s 
X-efficiency because a new ultimate controller will seek to make more fundamental 
changes to the management and the firm‘s business. In contrast, X- inefficiency cannot 
be overcome if there is no change in the ultimate controller‘s power.  
The third aspect to examine in this context is whether the restructuring is conducted 
between related parties such as insiders, affiliates, or group members. Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-di-Silanes, and Shleifer (2007) argue that related party transactions often provide 
direct opportunities for ultimate shareholders to extract resources from listed companies 
under their control. Such transactions are actually a reflection of the X-inefficiency 
brought by the ultimate controller. Even if the ultimate controller does not use a related 
party transaction as a way to hurt the listed firm, it will not bring about much change in 
inefficient internal routines. For example, restructurings conducted between related 
32 
 
parties will not result in much change to the firm‘s pure technical efficiency because 
related parties often have a similar technology and asset profile. They cannot improve 
the firm‘s X-efficiency because they are under the control of the same ultimate controller. 
Such restructurings will not challenge the ultimate controller‘s power. Therefore, 
corporate restructurings conducted between related parties tend to be more symbolic.  
The fourth characteristic to consider is the timing of the restructuring. Bartov (1993) 
examines the timing of asset sales and presents evidence that publicly traded U.S. firms 
take advantage of the acquisition-cost principle to manipulate earnings. Poitras, Wilkins, 
and Kwan (2002) show that publicly traded Singaporean firms manage earnings through 
the timing of asset sales. Many Chinese scholars agree that restructurings conducted at 
the end of the year are more likely to be used to manage earnings (Jiang, 2004; Zhang, 
2008). Restructurings targeting earnings manipulation cannot improve productive 
efficiency because they cannot bring about change in technology, production scale, or 
the management team. Therefore, corporate restructurings conducted in the final quarter 
of the year tend to be more symbolic.  
Figure 2.1 examines the characteristics of the sample loss-makers‘ restructurings 
from 1999 to 2006. Among the 666 one-year restructuring plans initiated by the 
loss-makers, 80.33% were not associated with a transfer of control, 64.56% did not 
involve a refocusing effort, 42.64% included at least one transaction between related 
parties, and 46.10% involved at least one transaction announced in the fourth quarter of 





Figure 2.2 Distribution of Restructurings According to Different 
Characteristics (1999-2006) 
    
    
 
Table 2.2 shows the T-tests to examine the ROA, PTE, and SE scores over the four 
years after the restructuring with or without each characteristic. ROA refers to the 
Return on Asset, calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets. 
PTE score and SE score are calculated using Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) following 
DEAP procedure (Coelli,  1996). The DEA method and the DEAP procedure are 
presented in Appendix 2. The restructurings involving a transfer of control or a 
refocusing effort, or not involving related party transactions, or not occurring at the end 
of the year address inefficient internal routines. The results in all the panels show that 
restructurings addressing internal routines lead to a lower ROA in the first and second 
year, but a higher ROA in the third and fourth year in comparison with those not 
addressing internal routines, although the difference is not significant. In all the panels, 
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the restructurings addressing the internal routines lead to a significantly higher level of 
PTE than those not addressing internal routines. In panels 2.2a and 2.2c, the 
restructurings addressing internal routines lead to a significantly higher level of SE than 
do those not addressing internal routines. These results suggest that restructurings 
addressing inefficient internal routines lead to a higher level of efficiency than do those 
not addressing inefficiency in internal routines. Therefore, it is appropriate to observe 
whether and how many restructurings have these characteristics in measuring the 
symbolism of restructurings.  
Table 2.2 ROA, PTE, & SE Scores after Restructurings with Different 
Characteristics 
a) Restructuring plans with or without refocusing 
 Refocus (A) No refocus (B) Difference (A)-(B) 
ROAt+1 -.019(.188)  .014(.218)  -.032 
ROA t+2 .001(.460)  .066(.433)  -.056 
ROA t+3 .017(.203)  .006(.356)  .011 
ROA t+4 .006(.142)  .001(.228)  .005 
PTE t+1 .602(.070)  .595(.067)  .007† 
PTE t+2 .613 (.071)  .603 (.070)  .010* 
PTE t+3 .621(.072)  .615(.075)  .006 
PTE t+4 .623(.080)  .616(.073)  .007 
SE t+1 .962(.053)  .964(.038)  -.002 
SE t+2 .962(.055)  .968(.039)  -.004† 
SE t+3 .964(.058)  .966(.032)  -.002 
SE t+4 .968(.052)  .969(.039)  -.001 
N 236 430  
b) Restructuring plans with or without control transfer 




Difference  (A)-(B) 
ROAt+1 -.046(255)  .019(955) -.065 
ROA t+2 .011(.220)  .056(840) -.045 
ROA t+3 .003(186) .012(624) -.009 
ROA t+4 .025(156) -.005(478)  .030† 
PTE t+1 .601(.084)  .596(.060)  .005 
PTE t+2 .611(.075)  .605(.070)  .006 
PTE t+3 .625(.089)  .615(.078)  .010† 
PTE t+4 .622(.074)  .617(.072)  .005 
SE t+1 .961(.046)  .964(.042)  -.003 
SE t+2 .966(.053)  .966(.070)  .000 
SE t+3 .969(.044)  .965(.035)  .004 
SE t+4 .969(.042)  .969(.033)  .000 
N 131 535  
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c) Restructurings with or without related party transaction 
 No related party 
transaction (A) 




ROAt+1 -.034(.178)  -.062(.195)  .028* 
ROA t+2 -.027(.170)  -.001(.363)  .026 
ROA t+3 .024(.576)  -.000(.145)  .024 
ROA t+4 -.013(-.024) .005(.213)  -.018 
PTE t+1 .605(.081)  .594(.071)  .011** 
PTE t+2 .614(.075)  .604(.070)  .010* 
PTE t+3 .619(.070)  .616(.076)  .003 
PTE t+4 .622(.074)  .617(.073)  .005 
SE t+1 .966(.048)  .962(.047)  .004 
SE t+2 .968(.058)  .965(.058)  .003 
SE t+3 .976(.038)  .961(043) .015*** 
SE t+4 .973(.042)  .967(.044)  .006 
N 382 284  
d) Restructuring plans with or without restructurings announced in quarter 4.  






ROAt+1 -.053(.230)  -.049(.185)  -.004 
ROA t+2 -.009(.258)  -.015(.463)  .006 
ROA t+3 .005(.393)  .038(.265)  -.033 
ROA t+4 -.005(.200)  .021(.127)  -.026 
PTE t+1 .599(.071)  .594(.070)  .005 
PTE t+2 .605(.071)  .608(.075)  -.003 
PTE t+3 .620(.081)  .614(.071)  .006† 
PTE t+4 .619(.077)  .617(.069)  .002 
SE t+1 .966(.048)  .965(.052)  .001 
SE t+2 .969(.041)  .964(.065)  .005 
SE t+3 .965(.049)  .968(.065)  -.003 
SE t+4 .969(.046)  .970(.053)  -.001 
N 307 359  
Note:  1. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.  
2. The sample consists of 666 firm-restructuring year observations from 1999 to 2006.  
I thus develop five items based on these characteristics and conduct factor analysis 
on the items. Two factors are obtained to describe the symbolism of a restructuring plan, 
as shown in Table 2.3. Factor 1 is symbolism of ownership restructuring (Cronbach's 
alpha = 0.472). Factor 2 is symbolism of business restructuring (Cronbach's alpha = 
0.405). As the Cronbach‘s alpha values are low, I cannot simply summate the items to 
represent each factor. I thus summate the two factor scores and obtain a symbolism 
index, and use the reverse of that index as the substantiveness index. I use the 
substantiveness index to examine the symbolism/substantiveness of corporate 
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restructuring plans throughout the study. The higher the substantiveness index, the more 
substantial the restructuring plan. The lower the substantiveness index, the more 
symbolic the restructuring plan. The factor analysis is discussed in detail in Appendix 3.  
Table 2.3 Factor Analysis: Measuring Symbolism of Restructuring Plan 






Ratio of ownership restructurings without a control transfer  0.81 -0.09 
Ratio of ownership restructurings announced between 
October and December 
0.80 0.13 
Ratio of business restructurings without refocusing -0.04 0.65 
Ratio of related business restructurings  0.03 -0.62 
Number of business restructurings announced between 
October and December 
0.11 0.57 
Note: KMO measure: .505 
Bart lett's test of sphericity: .000 
Performance after Symbolic/Substantial Corporate Restructuring 
I next examine whether the substantiveness index has an effect on loss-makers‘ 
ROA, PTE and SE over the four years after the restructuring. The results are shown in 
Table 2.4. Restructurings are classified as more symbolic (termed symbolic 
restructurings) where the substantiveness index is lower than the sample mean and as 
more substantial (termed substantial restructurings) where the substantiveness index is 
higher than the sample mean. Resutls show that the mean ROA in the year after a 
substantial restructuring is lower than that after a symbolic restructuring at the 0.1 level. 
In contrast, the mean ROA in the fourth year after a substantial restructuring is higher 
than that in the fourth year after a symbolic restructuring at the 0.1 level. These results 
provide evidence that symbolic restructurings bring about better short-term accounting 












ROA t+1 -.017 .019 -.036+ 
ROA t+2 .007 .014 -.007 
ROA t+3 .002 -.016 .018 
ROA t+4 .008 -.015 .023+ 
PTE t+1 .598 .594 .004 
PTE t+2 .609 .604 .005 
PTE t+3 .617 .613 .004 
PTE t+4 .619 .615 .004 
SE t+1 .965 .965 .000 
SE t+2 .964 .970 -.006+ 
SE t+3 .961 .974 -.013** 
SE t+4 .963 .976 -.013** 
N 351 315  
Moreover, table 2.4 shows that the typical PTE score is far lower than the SE score 
among the loss-makers. These results imply that the inefficiency of the loss-makers is 
mainly attributable to their pure technical inefficiency. The results also show that PTE 
scores from year 1 to year 4 after substantial restructurings are higher than those after 
symbolic restructurings, although the difference is not significant. SE scores from year 2 
to year 4 after substantial restructurings are significantly lower than those after symbolic 
restructurings. These results imply that substantial restructurings may be more effective 
in improving pure technical efficiency, while symbolic restructurings may be more 
effective in improving scale efficiency.  
The results reported in Table 2.4 thus provide evidence that performance after a 
symbolic restructuring differs from that achieved after a substantial restructuring. It is 
reasonable to surmise that loss-makers restructure symbolically to respond to the 
pressure they face from the delisting system because restructurings of this type bring 
38 
 
about better accounting performance than substantial restructurings in the short term. 
However, such symbolic restructurings cannot improve firms‘ long-term performance or 
pure technical efficiency to meet the wishes of the regulatory agency.  
Evidence of Institutional Variation and its Effect on the Substantiveness of 
Corporate Restructurings 
Intuitively, we consider that whether firms restructure in a more substantial or more 
symbolic way depends on the environment. In an environment where implementation 
costs of restructurings are low, firms may be willing to implement more substantial 
restructurings. In an environment where implementation costs of restructurings are high, 
firms have to undertake more symbolic restructurings to avoid a high level of investment. 
In an environment where the possibility of or the cost of being detected taking symbolic 
action is very high, firms are unlikely to take symbolic action. In contrast, if the 
possibility of or the cost of being detected taking symbolic action is very low, but firms 
can still gain a lot from symbolic restructuring, at least in the short-term, they may 
choose to take symbolic action. In this section, I give some evidence that institutional 
arrangements put in place by the central government and local government affect the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings.  
On the central government level, although CSRC recognized symbolic restructuring 
as an important issue in 1997, it did not make much effort to prevent symbolic 
restructuring until 2001. In 2001, the CSRC revamped the legal system in three areas to 
regulate restructurings. First, a better accounting standard system was established. This 
restricted the firms‘ ability of using symbo lic restructuring to manipulate earnings 
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numbers, and made such action easier to be detected. Second, listed firms were required 
to disclose more information on corporate restructuring procedure. Restructurings were 
placed under higher monitoring pressure from both regulatory institutions and market 
investors. I list the new regulations issued around 2001 in Appendix 4. Third, the CSRC 
enhanced their enforcement ability as well. Before 2001, the CSRC only required listed 
firms to keep their restructuring plan as a record after implementation. The listed firms 
were not subject to much supervision from CSRC regarding the implementation of the 
plan. From Jan 1, 2001, the CSRC replaced the recording system with an approval 
system. In the new system, the restructuring plan could not be implemented without 
approval from the CSRC. Figure 2.2 shows the changes in the annual mean of the 
substantiveness index for all restructurings implemented by loss-makers from 1998 to 
2006. It can be seen that after the central government took the aforementioned measures 
in 2001, the substantiveness of corporate restructurings in China increased dramatically. 
The trend suggests that a better state-level legal system prevents loss-makers from 
carrying out more symbolic restructurings. 




However, even with an obvious trend of substantial restructurings increasing on the 
whole, the substantiveness of corporate restructurings still varies a lot among provinces. 
Table 2.5 reports the number of restructurings conducted by loss-makers and the sample 
mean of the substantiveness index in each province during the 1999-2006 period. As can 
be observed, not only the number of restructuring plans among loss-makers, but also that 
the substantiveness of these restructuring plans varies across the thirty one provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions in China. This evidence suggests that the 
substantiveness or symbolism of corporate restructuring may be linked to the provincial 
institutional environment. This could be attributed to the fact that in China, although the 
central government may have established state- level policies or laws in a certain field, 
the implementation of these policies and laws depends on local governments. Therefore, 
firms‘ symbolic action is further shaped by the institutiona l arrangements made by local 
governments. I next give evidence on institutional variation across provinces in China 
















Anhui 34 14 8 0.53 0.16 0.69 
Beijing 103 34 20 0.01 0.27 0.28 
Chongqing 29 11 8 0.31 0.04 0.35 
Fujian 108 32 21 -0.23 0.11 -0.11 
Gansu 43 16 9 0.01 0.32 0.33 
Guangdong 214 79 56 -0.27 -0.12 -0.39 
Guangxi 32 9 6 -0.12 -0.23 -0.35 
Guizhou 15 7 5 0.15 -0.62 -0.48 
Hainan  71 23 10 -0.01 -0.17 -0.18 
Hebei 34 16 8 0.35 -0.14 0.22 
Heilongjiang  66 20 12 -0.14 -0.22 -0.36 
Henan 53 14 7 -0.25 -0.4 -0.65 
Hubei 71 31 19 -0.02 0.19 0.17 
Hunan 58 22 16 0.31 0.25 0.56 
Inner Mongolia 31 9 4 0.9 -0.17 0.74 
Jiangsu 64 25 15 -0.01 0.22 0.21 
Jiangxi 13 7 7 0.64 0.38 1.02 
Jilin  54 19 12 0.16 -0.04 0.12 
Liaoning 85 33 18 -0.22 -0.09 -0.3 
Ningxia  29 8 5 -0.48 0.25 -0.23 
Qinghai 2 2 2 -1.47 0.44 -1.03 
Shaanxi 14 5 4 0.12 0.08 0.19 
Shandong 99 34 20 0.28 -0.13 0.16 
Shanghai 241 78 44 -0.16 0 -0.16 
Shanxi 5 3 3 0.62 0.42 1.03 
Sichuan 132 44 29 -0.25 0.17 -0.08 
Tianjin  55 17 9 0.08 0.04 0.12 
Xin jiang  54 17 9 -0.42 0.09 -0.33 
Xizang  19 8 4 -0.01 0.49 0.47 
Yunnan 18 8 6 0.14 0.24 0.38 
Zhejiang 88 21 12 0.01 -0.23 -0.22 
I first examine the quality of the legal system in each province. To measure the 
quality of provincial legislation, I examine the number of laws, rules and regulations that 
are established by the provincial government and thus are effective throughout the whole 
province. Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), I classify laws into two types: 
contracting laws refer to the laws, regulations and rules regulating the contracting 
behavior of business actors; property right laws refer to the laws, regulations and rules 
that regulate government behavior, restricting the government from expropriating private 
resources. The detailed procedure of categorization is presented in Appendix 5. The 
quality of legislation is measured using the number of each of the two types of laws that 
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are still in effect up to the focal year. The more laws, rules or regulations established by 
a province, the higher the law indices and the higher the quality of legislation in the 
province.6 To ensure comparability over the years, I follow Fan and Wang (2006) and 
adjust the number according to the number of laws in place in 1998 as the base. Thus, 
two law indices are obtained: the contracting law index and the property right law index. 
To measure the quality of enforcement, some country- level studies use the surveying 
index, for example, firms‘ perceptions about the quality of the courts (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2005). I follow this method and use an index that reflects firms‘ 
perceptions of the ability of the judicial system to protect their operations. The index 
was developed by Fan and Wang (1999 to 2005). The higher the index, the better the 
enforcement mechanism in the province. A detailed description of the measures is given 
in Appendix 6.  
Table 2.6 presents the sample mean of the provincial institution indices during the 
period from 1998 to 2006. It shows that the quality of provincial legal systems, 
including contracting laws, property right laws, and enforcement, varies across 
provinces.  
                                                                 
6 Although there is no detailed requirement fo r regular checking on local regulations, it is regulated that 
local governments have the power to enact and promulgate local regulat ions only when the local 
regulations do not contravene the Constitution, laws, and administrative regulations. Besides, both central 
government and local government monitor local ru le systems. All local laws and administrative 
regulations are to be reported to the Standing Committee of the Nat ional People's Congre ss and state 
council for record keeping. Moreover, a nationwide review of the local regulations was conducted in 1987. 
There have also been some nationwide reviews of local regulat ions in specific areas. For example, in  1996, 
when the admin istrative punishment law was issued, the State Council init iated a review of local 
regulations related to the new law. In 2001, to meet the requirements of the WTO, the State Council 
initiated a rev iew of the local regulations on trading. Furthermore, local governments ha ve their own 
province-level or below-province level rev iews of local regulations from time to time. Through the 
reviews, local regulat ions which are against state mandate or are deemed local -protective would  be 
terminated or revised. Up to the end of 2006, 9.99% of local regulations (14,431 out of 144,454 local 
regulations) had been revised or terminated. Th is gives evidence to suggest that in the long -term, the more 
the local regulat ions are kept, the more the local regulations are consistent with the cent ral regulations. 
This is a good indicator of the quality of the legislation.  
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Anhui 4.909 4.051 1.976 7.005 3.353 0.733 
Beijing 18.495 19.874 6.120 3.602 5.293 5.329 
Chongqing 4.765 5.262 3.319 5.782 3.733 0.601 
Fujian 9.644 7.441 5.740 5.744 1.579 0.122 
Gansu 3.079 3.007 1.174 6.343 6.111 10.648 
Guangdong 4.844 5.600 6.628 5.489 2.828 1.019 
Guangxi 6.087 6.059 4.081 6.103 4.219 -0.266 
Guizhou 2.725 2.735 1.572 6.362 6.322 2.818 
Hainan  3.067 3.108 4.844 5.079 3.926 1.612 
Hebei 3.919 2.700 4.630 5.772 2.675 2.108 
Heilongjiang  7.776 5.770 5.078 8.609 7.491 2.073 
Henan 3.399 2.750 2.784 6.441 5.306 1.842 
Hubei 5.054 6.458 4.265 5.606 6.483 0.984 
Hunan 6.567 4.593 3.958 5.735 3.185 0.211 
Inner Mongolia 1.679 1.489 3.532 8.915 5.789 2.523 
Jiangsu 6.525 5.975 6.521 5.839 1.184 4.141 
Jiangxi 2.965 1.946 3.096 6.745 5.241 1.801 
Jilin  3.403 2.091 4.184 10.264 8.171 1.369 
Liaoning 2.536 2.859 4.860 6.704 4.738 5.755 
Ningxia  2.368 2.322 2.693 8.914 3.758 5.923 
Qinghai 1.586 1.110 1.354 6.237 2.814 2.243 
Shaanxi 4.744 4.772 3.801 5.96 3.449 0.818 
Shandong 5.972 4.573 5.762 5.956 3.265 0.196 
Shanghai 9.675 9.892 9.344 8.906 3.299 4.141 
Shanxi 3.049 3.331 0.504 5.386 3.447 0.672 
Sichuan 4.942 5.734 6.043 6.562 3.641 1.803 
Tianjin  4.324 4.819 5.556 8.064 4.057 4.231 
Xin jiang  3.137 2.309 5.423 6.16 3.795 0.777 
Xizang  0.825 0.888 2.862 6.19 3.81 3.453 
Yunnan 3.346 2.131 3.533 6.631 5.729 2.775 
Zhejiang 4.691 4.226 7.357 4.266 0.513 0.735 
Then I use the mean of each provincial legal system index during 1998 to 2006 to 
classify provinces into two categories: provinces with a better legal system and 
provinces with a worse legal system. Table 2.7 shows the T-tests that compare the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings between two categories of provinces. Panel 
2.7a suggests that the substantiveness of corporate restructurings in the provinces with 
well-developed contracting laws is not significantly different from that in the provinces 
with underdeveloped contracting laws. Panel 2.7b shows that the substantiveness of 
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corporate restructurings in the provinces with well-developed property right laws is not 
significantly different from that in the provinces with underdeveloped property right 
laws. Panel 2.7c suggests that in the provinces with better enforcement mechanism, the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings is significantly lower than that in the 
provinces with worse enforcement mechanism at the 0.01 level. These results suggest 
that provincial enforcement mechanism promotes more substantial restructurings. 
Combining the results from Table 2.7 with the observation in Figure 2.3, the implication 
is that the central legal system and the local enforcement system play an important role 
in alleviating the contradiction between efficiency and legitimacy. On the one hand, a 
better legal system reduces the cost of implementing substantial restructurings, which 
depend on external market transactions to a great extent. On the other hand, a better 
legal system provides for effective overseer of the firms‘ restructurings. The cost of 
undertaking symbolic restructurings increases under a stronger legal system. Thus, the 
contradiction between long-term efficiency and short-term legitimacy is reduced and 
firms will be less inclined to engage in symbolic restructurings.  
Table 2.7 Substantiveness of Restructuring and Provincial Legal System 
a) T-test on substantiveness of restructurings and provincial contracting law index 






Substantiveness .026 -.040  .066 
Contracting law index .305 .367  -.062** 
Restructuring plans  402 264   
No. of firms 289 135  
 
b) T-test on substantiveness of restructurings and provincial property right law index 
 Low property 
right law (A) 
High property 
right law (B) 
Difference 
(A)-(B) 
Substantiveness  .019 -.034 .053 
Property right law index  .352 .389 -.037† 
Restructuring plans  451 215  











Substantiveness .055  -.031  .086**  
Enforcement 3.369 6.970 -3.601*** 
Restructuring plans  294  372  
No. of firms 203 235  
Note: 1. The sample consists of 666 firm-restructuring year observations from 1999 to 2006.  
2. The number of firms may  be different from the number of unique firms because I categorize 
provinces based on the mean of the legal system index during the 1999 to 2006 period. Some 
provinces could be in the low-quality legal system category in some years and in the 
high-quality legal system category in other years. Accordingly, one firm located in one province 
could be in both categories. 
I next look into the variation in government support across provinces. The most 
important type of provincial government support is to finance enterprises to settle bad 
debt, to upgrade technology and assets, or to make redundancy arrangements. Provincial 
government can provide such financing by giving fiscal subsidies or preferential access 
to credit. Other than financing, provincial governments also provide non-financial 
support. The local protectionism measure represents one form of non-financial support. 
For example, the government may rescue a firm suffering from sales difficulties by 
imposing administrative restrictions on imports or erecting a deterrent barrier to ease 
pressure from competitors from other areas. Therefore, I use three indices to proxy three 
types of government support: fiscal subsidies, preferential access to credit, and local 
protectionism. I use fiscal subsidies to enterprises divided by provincial GDP to proxy 
fiscal subsidies. Fiscal subsidies to enterprises are calculated by aggregating enterprise 
innovation subsidies, subsidies granted for policy reasons, and subsidies paid to 
loss-making enterprises. The higher the subsidy index, the more support the local 
government provides. I use the marketization index of the financial system developed by 
Fan and Wang (1999-2005) to proxy preferential access to credit. This index is 
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calculated as the ratio of bank loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to total bank 
loans. A higher share of bank loans received by SOEs in a province indicates that the 
local government plays a more active role in helping firms gain access to financial 
resources. I use the local protectionism index developed by Fan and Wang (1999-2005) 
to proxy non-financial support. This index is measured by the number of trade protection 
measures initiated by the provincial government divided by provincial GDP. The higher 
the local protection index, the more support the provincial government provides. To 
ensure comparability over the years, I follow Fan and Wang (2006) and adjust the 
indices according to the indices in place in 1998 as the base. A detailed description of 
the measures employed can be found in Appendix 6.  
Table 2.6 presents the sample means of the provincial government support indices 
in each province during the period 1998 to 2006. It shows that government support 
varies across provinces in mainland China. I then use the mean of each provincial 
government support index to classify the provinces into two categories: provinces with a 
high level of government support and provinces with a low level of government support. 
In Table 2.8, I use T-tests to compare the substantiveness of corporate restructurings in 
these two categories of provinces. Panel 2.8a shows that the substantiveness of 
restructurings in the provinces with high fiscal subsidies is not significantly different 
from that in the provinces with low fiscal subsidies. Panel 2.8b shows that the 
substantiveness of restructurings in the provinces with greater access to credit is 
significantly lower than that in the provinces with less access to credit at the 0.1 level. 
Panel 2.8c shows that the substantiveness of restructurings in the provinces with more 
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local protectionism measures is significantly higher than that in the provinces with less 
local protectionism measures at the 0.05 level. These results suggest that provincial 
government support affects the substantiveness of corporate restructurings. However, the 
effect may vary across different forms of support. As financing support immediately 
brings more cash to the firm, it may trigger more symbolic restructurings. Because 
non-financing measures require a longer period to take effect and address aspects of 
business operations, they may be used to promote more substantial restructurings.  
Table 2.8 Substantiveness of Restructurings and Provincial Government Support  
a) T-test on substantiveness of restructurings and provincial fiscal subsidy index 






Substantiveness  .011  -.023  .034 
Fiscal subsidies  5.556 8.462 -2.906*** 
Restructuring plans  594 280  
No. of firms 341 167  
 
b) T-test on substantiveness of restructurings and provincial credit access index 
 Low credit 
access (A)  
High credit 
access (B)  
Difference 
(A)-(B) 
Substantiveness  .056  -.070  .126† 
Credit access 1.271 6.646 -5.375*** 
Restructuring plans  486 388  
No. of firms 299 253  
 









Substantiveness -.069 .104 -.173* 
Local protectionism .394 4.086 -3.692*** 
Restructuring plans  528 346  
No. of firms 332 205  
Note: 1. The sample consists of 666 firm-restructuring year observations from 1999 to 2006.  
2. The number of firms may be different from the number of unique firms because I categorize 
provinces based on the mean of the provincial government support index during the 1999 to 
2006 period. Some provinces could be in the low-level government support category in some 
years and in the high-level government support category in other years. Accordingly, one firm 




In this chapter, I build theoretical and empirical foundations enabling us to 
understand what a symbolic restructuring is and how a symbolic restructuring is driven 
by the institutional arrangements that prevail in China.  
I first define more substantial restructurings as those addressing internal routines 
related to efficiency and more symbolic restructurings as those not addressing internal 
routines. I further show that symbolic restructurings bring about better accounting 
performance than substantial restructurings in the short term, but lead to lower efficiency 
improvements and worse accounting performance than substantial restructurings in the 
long term. 
I then argue that the central government‘s delist ing system generates an 
efficiency-legitimacy contradiction. This contradiction pushes firms to focus on 
accounting performance to regain short-term legitimacy while ignoring efficiency 
improvements. I next show that the decentralization of power to local government 
allows local government to establish local institutions including legal systems and 
support for listed firms. These institutional arrangements shape the substantiveness of 
corporate restructurings. I show that a well-developed state-level legal system or 
provincial enforcement mechanism will alleviate the efficiency- legitimacy contradiction 
and thus promote more substantial restructurings among firms. Financing support from 
provincial government triggers more symbolic restructurings, while non-financing 
measures from provincial government may promote more substantial restructurings.  
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This study contributes to institutional theory. It examines a continuum of symbolic 
action whereby although economic actors undertaking symbolic restructurings both 
adopt restructuring plans and implement them, they implement them at a superficial 
level in that the internal routines that hurt efficiency are decoupled from the external 
institutional requirement. Prior studies have not addressed this continuum of symbolic 
action because it is complex and difficult to define and measure. This study is among the 
first group of studies to define and measure such a continuum of symbolic action using 
factor analysis.   
The study also has some practical implications for both policy-makers and 
managers. For policy-makers, this study provides evidence that symbolic restructurings 
lead to worse productive efficiency. This offers a rationale for policy-makers to regulate 
symbolic restructurings. Second, the study provides a framework for identifying 
symbolic restructurings that can be used as a basis for establishing laws and policies 
aimed at identifying symbolic restructurings and preventing firms and local government 
from participating in them. Third, the study suggests that the delisting system may not 
be effective in regulating listed firms‘ behavior and protecting investors‘ interests as it 
leads to the contradiction between efficiency and legitimacy. This institutional 
contradiction encourages firms to engage in more symbolic restructurings, which in turn 
hurt investors‘ interests. Hence, there is a need for measures designed to improve the 
delisting system and to enhance supportive regulations in China. Specifically, more 
national level regulations and better local enforcement mechanisms are necessary to 
support the delisting system and prevent symbolic restructurings. 
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For managers, the results suggest that although more substantial restructurings lead 
to worse short-term performance due to their high implementation costs, they lead to 
higher efficiency in the long term. Therefore, when deciding how to respond to 
institutional pressure, managers should balance the benefits of restructurings against 
their costs.  
This chapter offers some basic evidence that the institutional arrangements 
developed by provincial governments may be a predictor of the substantiveness of 
corporate restructurings. In the next chapter, I seek to unravel which provincial 
institutional arrangements play the strongest predictive role and how they affect the 




Institutions and the Substantiveness of Corporate Restructurings  
INTRODUCTION 
When facing external pressures, organizations can undertake substantive reforms to 
conform to social purposes, or they can symbolically adopt formal policies, plans, and 
programs that outwardly appear to have the same effect while persisting with internal 
routines decoupled from external pressures (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Westphal & 
Zajac, 2001). Such disparity between substance and symbolism can range from extreme 
forms—the non- implementation of formal policies that affect the core of the 
organization—to relatively subtle forms—taking actions that are inconsistent with the 
spirit of a formal policy, although are perhaps still consistent with the letter of the plan 
(Westphal & Zajac, 2001). Although much effort has been devoted to examining why 
firms choose symbolism over substantiveness, most prior studies assume the 
institutional environment to be homogenous. Little attention has been paid to whether 
and how institutional variation contributes to the symbolism-substantiveness decision. 
Organizations‘ symbolism-substantiveness decisions are an important theme in 
institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 
1995). Existing studies suggest that managers encourage more symbolic actions to 
respond to external institutional pressure because of two reasons. First, studies from 
economic perspective suggest that symbolic actions are less costly to implement than 
substantial actions (Suchman, 1995). Second, studies based on behavioral perspective 
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symbolic actions protect managers‘ own interests and power from the impact of 
institutional pressure. The literature accordingly shows that some organizational 
factors—managers‘ voting power, networks, educational background, the organization‘s 
experience of conducting symbolic action, and the complexity of organizational 
activities—can predict firms‘ symbolic actions (e.g. Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1995; Stevens, Steensma, Harrison & Cochran, 2005).  
These studies pose a puzzle: if what they predict is true, managers will always 
choose symbolic action over substantial action in responding to institutional pressure. 
However, in the real world, some firms respond to institutional pressure by taking 
symbolic action, while others take more substantial action. This puzzle arises because 
the institutions examined in these studies are homogenous and were simply treated as a 
given research context. However, within different institutional environments, 
organizations are subject to different levels of supervisory pressure and implementation 
costs. Symbolic action is not necessarily less costly than substantial action. The 
manager‘s payoff function is thus affected and constructed by the institutional 
environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Friedland & Alford, 1991). Ignoring the effect 
of institutions would make managers‘ decisions on whether to take symbolic or 
substantive action unwarranted. Therefore, it is necessary to bring institutions into play 
to understand symbolic-substantive decisions among organizations (Friedland & Alford, 
1991).  
Understanding how institutions affect organizations‘ decisions on substantive vs. 
symbolic action requires that a heterogeneous institutional environment be chosen as the 
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research setting. However, most prior studies are based on the US institutional 
environment in which organizations are subject to relatively stable and homogenous 
institutional pressure. Only a few studies examine how institutional variation over time 
affects firms‘ symbolic actions. For example, Levin (2006) uses the change of the 
state- level monitoring system over time as the proxy for institutional variation. He 
shows that firms‘ symbolic use of total quality management is a function of the 
effectiveness of the monitoring system. 
China provides us with an ideal context in which to examine the effects of 
institutional variation on firms‘ symbolic or substantive actions. In China, the Central 
Government sets state- level requirements and establishes the supportive legal system to 
guarantee the local governments and business actors act as the central government 
desires. As the state- level legal system is imperfect, the Central Government depends on 
local governments to implement central policies by allowing the local governments to 
establish a local regulatory system and to provide various forms of support. Thus, the 
institutional arrangements made by the Local Government as reflected in the quality of 
the local legal system and local government support vary across the 31 provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions (provinces hereafter), or even across cities or 
counties. My research is thus embedded in the Chinese context. Drawing upon 
transaction cost theory and institutional theory, I argue that local institutions determine 
the implementation costs of restructuring and supervisory pressure, thus shaping 




The theoretical concerns are tested with a subtle form of symbolic action not 
previously studied in the literature: symbolic corporate restructurings undertaken by 
Chinese firms reporting losses (loss-makers). The corporate restructurings conducted 
within one year are defined as more symbolic when such restructurings bring less 
change to internal routines related to efficiency. Such change to internal routines may 
involve a refocusing of the firm‘s business portfolio, a change of ultimate controller, 
avoiding related party transactions, and avoiding end-of-year earnings manipulation. 
Factor analysis is conducted on these items to develop a measure of the symbolism of 
corporate restructuring. The reverse of the symbolism index is the substantiveness index, 
a measure describing the substantiveness of corporate restructurings.  
I develop and test four sets of hypotheses. The first two sets of hypotheses examine 
the effect of provincial legal system and provincial government support on the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings in a province. I examine three dimensions of 
the provincial legal system. Property right law refers to the laws that regulate 
government behavior. Contracting law refers to the laws that regulate business actors‘ 
behavior. Enforcement refers to the judicial system designed to protect business 
operations. I examine three dimensions of provincial government support: subsidies to 
enterprises, preferential credit access, and local protectionism. I test the hypotheses 
using fixed effect models and instrumental variable estimation based on province- level 
data, and find that the existence of well-developed property right laws and contracting 
laws in a province leads to more substantive restructurings. Provincial government 
support through subsidies promotes more substantive restructurings when property right 
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laws or contracting laws are well developed, while promoting less substantive 
restructurings when property right laws or contracting laws are underdeveloped.  
The third and fourth hypotheses examine the interaction effect of provincial 
institutions and firm-level characteristics. Such firm-level characteristics include (1) the 
complexity involved in restructuring, which refers to the complex issues that prevent 
firms from exiting their existing production arrangements and adopting new production 
arrangements. Such issues of complexity include diversified input structure, redundant 
labor force, and obsolete asset; and (2) the independence of the auditor employed by the 
firm. I use Heckman selection models based on firm-level data to test the hypotheses. I 
find that firms with a higher level of complexity due to diversified input structure will 
benefit more from a well-developed provincial legal system and engage in more 
substantial restructurings. The positive effect of provincial legal system on the 
substantiveness of firms‘ restructuring is weaker for firms audited by 
international-affiliated auditors than for firms audited by domestic auditors. These 
results support the argument that provincial legal system promotes firms‘ substantial 
restructurings by reducing implementation costs and increasing monitoring pressure. 
However, provincial government support enables firms with a higher level of complexity 
due to redundant labor force to undertake less substantial restructurings. The 
international-affiliated auditors will weaken the negative effect of the provincial 
government support in providing preferable credit on the substantiveness of firms‘ 
restructurings. These results suggest provincial government support tend to avoid 
dealing with high implementation cost unless the monitoring pressure from either local 
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legal system or international auditors is high.  
This study makes several contributions to the prior literature. First, most prior 
research has treated institutional pressure as homogeneous and has viewed the decision 
on whether to take symbolic or substantive action as a subjective one made by managers. 
I combine transaction cost theory and institutional theory to unravel the mechanism 
governing how local institutions shape symbolic action among organizations. Thus, the 
study contributes to institutional theory by responding to the call from Friedland and 
Alford (1991) to ―bring institutions back‖ in seeking to enhance the understanding of 
organizations‘ behavior. Second, the study also contributes to the literature on enterprise 
restructuring in a transitional economy. Although local governments have been 
recognized as an important engine promoting enterprise restructuring in transitional 
economies, the overall effect of local government on enterprise restructuring is not clear 
(Boisot & Child, 1996; Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Kornai, 1979, 1980; Kornai, 
1979, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). This study shows the conditions under which a 
local government may help firms to pursue either symbolic or substantive restructuring, 
which adds to our understanding of how local governments help in the process of 
economic transition.  
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
In its 1998 publication Institutions Matter, the World Bank defines institutions as 
―formal and informal rules and their enforcement mechanisms that shape the behavior of 
individuals and organizations in society‖. Formal institutions are legal institutions 
including laws, regulations, and formal enforcement mechanisms (courts, the judiciary, 
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and the legal profession); informal institutions are trust, ethics, and political norms. This 
study focuses on formal legal institutions and one of the informal institutions: local 
government intervention.  
Although it is not a question that has been deeply explored, some of the prior 
literature gives us a number of clues on how institutions shape firms‘ symbolic actions. 
Studies of institutional theory suggest that firms conduct symbolic action because they 
need to conform to various forms of institutional pressure including regulatory pressure, 
normative pressure, and cognitive pressure. Based on this theory, institutions will affect 
firms‘ symbolic restructurings through shaping the monitoring mechanism. For example, 
Levin (2006) shows that firms‘ symbolic use of total quality management (TQM) is a 
function of the effectiveness of the monitoring system. When there is a more effective 
monitoring system, the possibility of being detected and punished for conducting 
symbolic TQM is high, leading firms to engage in more substantial TQM. Stevens, 
Steensma, Harrison and Cochran (2005) show that firms are more dependent on market 
constituents than on non-market constituents for different kinds of resources. If symbolic 
action is detected by market constituents, the firm is exposed to more severe sanctions. 
Therefore, monitoring from market constituents is more effective than monitoring from 
non-market constituents. Accordingly, pressure from market constituents will have a 
stronger effect in pushing firms to substantially implement codes of ethics. Based on 
these studies, I argue that institutions shape firms‘ symbolic action through influencing 
the effectiveness of the monitoring system.  
Suchman (1995) suggests that firms may conduct symbolic action because they 
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cannot undertake the high implementation cost of substantial action. This argument is 
based on transaction cost theory: because substantial actions are associated with larger 
investments and higher uncertainty, they will lead to higher internal and externa l 
transaction costs. Such internal or external transaction costs may arise from obtaining 
and processing market information (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), negotiating contracts 
(Coarse, 1937; Williamson, 1985), monitoring agents (Bardhan, 1989; Eswaran & 
Kotwal, 1985), evaluating performance (North, 1989), and enforcing contracts (North, 
1989; Milgrom, North, & Weingast, 1990; Greif, 1993; Fafchamps, 1996). When there 
are no proper institutions to reduce these costs, the cost of implementing substantial 
action will be too high, especially for firms facing a legitimacy crisis and thus having 
few affiliations through which to obtain resources. In this case, firms have to choose 
symbolic action because they cannot afford either the high implementation cost of a 
substantial action or the ill-effects of doing nothing. In a similar vein, Peng and Heath 
(1996) suggest that when the rules of the game are highly uncertain, organizations are 
not able to invest in new capabilities and skills and will therefore continue in their old 
ways rather than bringing in substantial changes. Whitley and Czaban (1998) maintain 
that in a setting where the state has no coherent set of policies, short-term ad hoc 
adjustments to immediate pressure may be more rational than undertaking relat ively 
large-scale and highly risky changes in pursuit of long-run strategic objectives. 
Therefore, transaction cost theory suggests that institutions affect symbolic action 




In the next section, I integrate institutional theory and transaction cost theory and 
develop hypotheses designed to enhance our understanding of how provincial 
institutions affect both monitoring pressure and implementation costs and thus shape the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings.  
HYPOTHESES 
Do Provincial Institutions Matter for the Substantiveness of Corporate 
Restructuring? 
The first channel through which provincial government shapes business action is 
development of the local legal system. Two aspects of a legal system can be evaluated: 
legislation and enforcement. Legislation provides codified 
resolutions—laws—governing transactions. I follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) by 
classifying laws into two types according to the object of regulation. The first type is 
―contracting law‖ regulating contracting behavior among business actors. The second 
type is ―property right law‖ regulating government behavior. These two types of legal 
institutions will affect the behavior of local business actors through different 
mechanisms. 
When contracting law is well developed, there is a clearer template for participants 
involved in restructuring plans to engage in their evaluation, pricing, contracting, and 
implementation, and in the resolution of disputes over such plans (Ricardo & Mohamad, 
2000). For example, rules and regulations on corporate governance arrangements, 
financial accounting and auditing rules, debt covenants, and bankruptcy procedures are 
established to govern transactions in financial markets. Regulations on the tenure profile 
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of wages, dismissal rules and procedures, or regulations governing collective action are 
established to resolve disputes in the labor market. Firms can depend on the market to 
deal with such issues as obsolete assets, redundant labor, and bad debts, or to obtain 
investment and professional managers at a lower transaction cost. Thus, firms are more 
capable of engaging in more substantive restructurings. The second advantage of 
well-developed contracting law is that restructurings will be implemented under more 
effective supervisory and evaluation arrangements. Firms will be forced to disclose more 
information regarding the procedure of restructurings. Agencies responsible for valuing 
assets will be subject to more objective regulations and be more independent. Thus, 
business actors will have less space to manipulate the state‘s mandate and will be 
obliged to pursue more substantial restructurings. For example, on October 30, 2003, the 
Sichuan Government published and implemented Guidance On Regulating and 
Promoting the Restructuring of Listed Companies. In this guidance, the government 
clarified several issues on restructurings of listed companies: the criteria for selecting 
transaction parties, the procedure for evaluating restructuring plans, the reporting and 
approval procedure, who monitors the restructuring procedure, and what aspects of the 
restructuring procedure should be monitored. The guidance ensured that restructurings 
were conducted, disclosed, and evaluated according to articulated rules. This made it 
much easier for participants to fulfill their transaction obligations within the market. At 
the same time, restructuring plans have been subject to a higher level of supervisory 
pressure from both the regulatory agency and the public. As a result, the number of 
substantial restructurings has shot up since 2004. Based on these arguments, I propose 
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that the existence of well-developed contracting law will push firms to engage in more 
substantial restructurings:  
Hypothesis 1a: The better the contracting law in a province, the more substantive 
corporate restructurings in the province will be 
Well-developed property right law restricts the power of the government, of 
politicians, and of elites, safeguarding private business from predation by the state, for 
example through outright expropriation, or less dramatically, from corrupt officials 
demanding bribes in exchange for favors to the firm or individual (Fernandes & Kraay, 
2007). Most of the listed firms have formal or informal connections to government in 
China (Mooderjee & Yu, 1999; Woetzel, 2008). To engage in substantial restructuring, 
business actors need to make large investments to deal with their government-owned 
assets or to obtain local government approval. Without well-developed property right 
law, it is impossible to write credible contracts with the government to prevent future 
expropriation given that the government, with its monopoly over legitimate violence, is 
the ultimate arbiter of contracts (Acemoglu & Simon, 2003). Substantial investments 
will be too costly for business actors to make. Hence, well-developed property right law 
is necessary to provide private business actors with secure property rights enabling them 
to make investments. For example, in June 2000, the government of Hainan province 
issued the Notice on Managing Arbitrary Fines and Various Fees. This notice prevented 
local governments from expropriating firms‘ resources at their own discretion, thus 
giving firms more of an incentive to make substantial changes to their operations. The 
number of substantial restructurings has increased since this notice was issued. I thus 
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propose that well-developed property right law is important in reducing transaction costs 
and promoting more substantive restructurings among firms.  
Hypothesis 1b: The better the property right law in a province, the more substantive 
corporate restructurings in the province will be  
Having laws on the books is not sufficient in itself. The enforcement mechanism is 
equally crucial as it guarantees that laws will be effectively implemented. The 
enforcement mechanism includes criminal penalties such as imprisonment, as well as 
civil law and financial penalties. It forces individuals and organizations to follow 
resolutions endorsed by the legal system. The effectiveness of the enforcement 
mechanism depends on an independent court structure, an independent and competent 
judiciary, and the legal profession. With an effective and independent enforcement 
mechanism, contracts can be executed in a timely and successful manner at a low cost. 
Restructurings implemented through series of contracts are less costly. Moreover, 
penalties are more likely to be imposed for illegal conduct. The level of supervisory 
pressure will be higher. Hence, I propose that a strong enforcement mechanism is 
needed to promote more substantive restructurings:  
Hypothesis 1c: The better the enforcement mechanism in a province, the more 
substantive corporate restructurings in the province will be  
Other than formulating the legal system, provincial government can also shape the 
payoff function of substantive and symbolic restructuring by providing various forms of 
support. In transitional economies such as China, the legal system has not been fully 
established. There are a number of institutional voids in the labor market, the capital 
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market, and the commodity market. For example, there is no developed set of socia l 
security institutions in China, making it difficult to deal with laid-off workers in the 
labor market. Nor is there any platform for evaluating and exchanging property owned 
by the government. Thus, firms bear high transaction costs in transitional econo mies. 
These transaction costs are magnified even further by the legitimacy crisis faced by 
loss-makers. As loss-makers are often burdened with a lot of bad debt, redundant labor, 
and obsolete assets and technologies, they are viewed as inefficient and incapable of 
providing value, and are regarded as highly uncertain. They therefore face a legitimacy 
crisis. This legitimacy crisis leads transaction partners to disassociate themselves from 
loss-makers to avoid the high degree of uncertainty involved in dealing with them 
(Suchman, 1995). For example, banks will not offer credit to loss-makers, and suppliers 
will be unwilling to meet orders. Therefore, it will be too costly for loss-makers to 
obtain resources from the external market. Loss-makers do not have the ability to 
undertake substantial restructurings. Instead, local government can fill the institutional 
void and alleviate loss-makers‘ burden. For example, local government can use 
executive orders to write off their bad debt. It can also make arrangements for redundant 
labor by providing subsidies or assigning redundant staff to other firms. It can provide a 
platform enabling loss-makers to exchange their equity and thus deal with their obsolete 
technology and assets. With fewer burdens, potential partners will become more willing 
to build connections with loss-makers. Loss-maker can be involved in transactions in the 
external market and bring about substantive changes to their business and organizational 
structures at a lower cost.  
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On the other hand, local government can collude with local firms to shield them 
from monitoring pressure. First, local government can help firms to achieve the outcome 
required by the Central Government. Chen, Li, and Lee (2003) give evidence that local 
governments often help firms to polish their financial reports by providing subsidies. 
Second, local government can reduce the monitoring pressure firms face from 
supervisory agencies. Dai, Lao and Yang (2000) and Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) find that 
in China, local government often push local audit firms to allow local listed firms to fail 
to disclose earnings manipulation to the CSRC. Local government thus provides some 
degree of shelter from state regulatory agencies and allows firms to conduct more 
symbolic restructurings in response to state regulation.  
Therefore, it appears that local government support can lead to either more 
substantive restructuring or more symbolic restructuring. I argue that the effect of local 
government support depends on the quality of the legal system.  
In this regard, I first look at the contracting legal system. As predicted in hypothesis 
1, when contracting law is well developed, restructuring procedures can be monitored 
and evaluated more effectively. Even if the local government provides support to  
business actors, business actors have to follow the articulated procedure. The 
opportunistic tendency of business actors to escape from institutional pressure exerted 
by the state will become less pronounced. For example, although the level of local 
government support in Sichuan was quite high before 2003, loss-makers tended to 
engage in more symbolic restructurings. In 2003, the Guidance was issued and clarified 
several aspects: transaction partners should meet certain requirements; a competitive 
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mechanism was required for the selection of transaction partners; restructuring 
procedures had to be reported in detail. The local government thus had to take more 
substantive measures to help with restructurings. For instance, the local government 
needed to help firms to find more efficient and promising transaction partners rather than 
introducing whoever had the cash. As a result, although the level of local government 
support did not change much after 2003, loss-makers in Sichuan tended to pursue more 
substantial restructurings after that.  
I next consider the property right laws. When property right law is well developed, 
the limit of the local government‘s authority is clearly defined according to the central 
government requirement. Local governments will be restrained from acting contrary to 
the central government‘s wishes. For example, in Sichuan, the 2003 Guidance clearly 
defined the local government‘s obligation to supervise firm restructurings. The local 
government had to follow the guidance and monitor local firms as the central 
government desired. Therefore, although the level of local government support in 
Sichuan did not change too much from 1998 to 2006, loss-makers tended to engage in 
more substantial restructurings after 2003 than they did before 2003.  
Finally, I look at the enforcement mechanism. As local government agencies 
ultimately enforce the law, local government can easily intervene in the execution of 
laws if there is no effective and independent enforcement mechanism. With the 
intervention of local government, business actors are actually buffered from the law 
codes. They can act in a manner contrary to the central regulatory requirement. 
Therefore, an effective and independent enforcement mechanism is required to 
66 
 
guarantee that local government helps business actors with substantive restructurings as 
the central government desires.  
In summary, within a well-developed legal system, the level of supervisory pressure 
on both business actors and local government is higher. Local government has to follow 
articulated codes and be more consistent in implementing the central government‘s 
requirements when supporting restructuring among firms. Hence, I propose the 
following hypotheses:  
H2a: More provincial government support will lead to more substantive restructurings 
when contracting law is well developed in a province than when contracting law is 
under developed. 
H2b: More provincial government support will lead to more substantive restructurings 
when property right law is well developed in a province than when property right 
law is under developed.  
H2c: More provincial government support will lead to more substantive restructurings 
when the enforcement mechanism is well developed in a province than when the 
enforcement mechanism is under developed. 
Which Firms Are More Susceptible to Provincial Institutional Pressure? 
To unravel the mechanism governing how institutions affect the substantiveness of 
corporate restructurings, I next examine the following research question: which types of 
firm will receive a higher level of support from institutions to carry out more substantial 
restructurings over symbolic restructurings? 
According to transaction cost theory, institutions firstly shape firms‘ restructuring 
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decisions by affecting implementation costs. The feasibility of substantial restructurings 
hinges on the existence of sound institutions that provide a proper transactional 
framework. However, not every firm depends on institutions to the same extent to deal 
with transaction costs. To complete a corporate restructuring, a loss-maker needs to exit 
an existing production arrangement before reentering a new production arrangement. 
However, to exit the existing production arrangement, a loss-maker needs to resolve a 
series of complex issues related to obsolete input, including assets or labor, by relying on 
the external market. The more complex issues the restructuring procedure  is associated 
with, the more the loss-maker depends on external institutions to complete a more 
substantial restructuring.  
The complexity firstly comes from the firm‘s diversified input structure. Extant 
studies show when a firm is associated with a more diversified input sources (Blanchard 
& Kremer, 1997; Konings, 1998; Konings & Walsh, 1999; Recanatini & Ryterman, 
2000), it will encounter higher transaction costs when participating in transactions 
beyond its boundary. During normal operation, a firm requiring more diversified inputs 
needs to contract with more intermediate goods producers to deliver its output. When the 
firm is not running well and going to restructure, it needs to deal with more types of 
intermediate inputs, including inventories and fixed assets, in corresponding markets 
through contracting or government arrangement.  In such cases, the firm is more 
dependent on well developed institutions to achieve a successful restructuring.  
Second, the complexity of restructuring further comes from the obsolescence of its 
resources, including major investment in physical assets and redundant labors. Physical 
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assets lead to complexity because they are associated with a certain technology 
(Hambrick & Lei, 1985; Harrigan, 1981). The organization dedicates project resources 
to producing a certain range of goods using a certain process, and therefore builds 
specificity with respect to a certain technology. To fundamentally upgrade its technology 
and business portfolio, the loss-maker needs to find a way to shed its obsolete assets. To 
deal with obsolete physical assets, the firm has to depend to a higher degree on a 
well-developed commodity or asset market supported by the legal system or on financial 
support or executive orders from the government.  
Complexity of restructuring could also be caused by redundant labor force or 
obsolete labor force. In China, most listed firms were originally SOEs. According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994), political control tends to create labor redundancy in firms 
because politicians may require a firm to hire more workers than needed or to maintain 
excess employment in order to avoid the social instability that could arise as a result of 
high unemployment. Therefore, it is not rare for listed firms to have some redundant 
labor, even during periods of normal operation (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2010). Moreover, 
the resources invested in training workers, building a technological base, and building 
up organizational capital are embodied in labor – both individually and as a group 
(Caballero & Hammour, 2000). To substantially change the technology portfolio and the 
organizational structure in the firm, it is necessary to upgrade the labor force. However, 
it is probably not possible to adapt existing human resources and employment 
relationships to the new project, thus making them obsolete and redundant. In this case, 
downsizing is a necessary step for smooth restructurings. However, downsizing would 
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lead to unemployment, which will lead to opposition from employees and government. 
This makes it difficult for labors to exit existing contracts, which in turn makes it more 
difficult to complete a restructuring. Such complexity related to redundant labor force is 
reflected in the regulatory environment in China: restructuring announcements must 
address how redundant staff are to be dealt with. To deal with the redundant labors, the 
firm has to depend to a greater extent on a well-developed labor market and social 
security system supported by the legal system or the government.  
In sum, when the restructuring procedure is associated with a higher level of 
complexity due to diversified input structure and obsolescence of physical assets and 
labor force, the firm depends to a greater extent on the legal system or local government 
support to complete substantial restructurings. Hence, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H3a: Provincial legal system will have a stronger positive effect on the substantiveness 
of corporate restructurings for more complex firms than for less complex firms. 
H3b: Provincial government support will have a stronger positive effect on the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings for more complex firms than for less 
complex firms. 
Institutional theory suggests that symbolic action is promoted by an ineffective 
monitoring system (Levin, 2006; Stevens, Steensma, Harrison & Cochran, 2005). The 
effectiveness of the monitoring system depends on perfect information disclosure, which 
hinges on the independence of the firm‘s auditors. In China, audit firms may depend on 
local government and local clients. Prior to 1998, due to the lack of capital, most audit 
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firms were established and sponsored by local government agencies. Auditors‘ 
assessments and the type of audit report issued were often affected by the local 
government agencies sponsoring them (Tang, 1999; Zhong, 1998). In 1997, the Ministry 
of Finance and the CSRC issued regulations to disaffiliate audit firms from their 
sponsoring government agencies. Since the reform was implemented in 1998, although 
audit firms have severed their official ties with their government sponsors in the areas of 
finance and organizational linkage, their personnel (who are former 
government-affiliated auditors) still maintain close relationships with local governments 
for three reasons. First, many local audit firms are able to find new clients or retain 
existing clients because of their close relationships with local governments (MOF, 2000). 
Second, local governments can also provide administrative advantages to their auditors 
via either government agencies or the public utilities they control. Third, for the majority 
of audit firms that are licensed to provide services to listed companies, their services 
tend to be locally oriented (Chan, Lin & Mo, 2002). The lack of mobility and narrow 
geographical dispersion among auditors reduce their ability to resist client pressure. 
Therefore, auditors in China have incentives to report in harmony with the desires of 
local bureaucrats and local clients (Chan, Lin & Mo, 2002; Hofstede, 2001). These 
incentives are further increased by the rather small probability of legal action against 
auditors for issuing inappropriate audit opinions in China (DeFond, Francis & Wong, 
2000) and the fact that most audit firms in China are limited liability companies.  
In China, audit firms are composed of two types: domestic audit firms and 
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internationally affiliated audit firms.7 I argue that in comparison with domestic audit 
firms, internationally affiliated audit firms should be more independent for two reasons. 
First, international audit firms have a larger stock of resources in terms o f professional 
knowledge, good reputation, and so on. These resources can help them gain access to 
clients without the help of local government. In 2001, the Yin Guang Sha event led to 
the breakup of Zhong Tian Qin, a domestic audit firm. 8 This event led to a loss of 
credibility among the domestic CPA profession as a whole. In contrast, internationally 
affiliated audit firms are more attractive to Chinese listed firms. Hence, the 
internationally affiliated audit firms are less dependent on local government for clients. 
Second, internationally affiliated audit firms have more incentives to maintain a good 
reputation for professional and honest auditing. For these international service 
companies, a good reputation is the most important asset because misconduct will have 
too much of an externality effect on their global market. Therefore, internationally 
affiliated audit firms are less willing to assist with illegitimate behavior among clients.  
Based on the above argument, firms audited by the internationally a ffiliated audit 
firms cannot hide as much information as firms audited by domestic audit firms. The 
international affiliated audit firm thus acts as a substitutive monitor and regulator for 
legal system to push firms to do more substantial restructurings. Legal system will be 
not as important in regulating those firms‘ restructurings. As a substitutive regulator, the 
international affiliated auditor gives firms less space to manipulate the restructuring 
                                                                 
7
 According to China's WTO Commitments on Professional Services, foreign accounting firms are 
permitted to affiliate with Chinese firms and enter into contractual agreements with their affiliated firms in 
other WTO member countries (WTO Web site).  
8
 In 2001, Yin Guang Sha was detected to have inflated its profit. Its auditor, the Zhong Tian Qin 
accounting firm, was accused of issuing an audit report including a serious misrepresen tation. The Yin 
Guang Sha event led to the Zhong Tian Qin accounting firm being broken up.  
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procedure (by, for example, over- or under-valuing debt and assets, or hiding critical 
information related to restructuring). Local government is thus obliged to help firms 
engage in more substantial restructurings. In contrast, firms audited by domestic auditors 
can avoid monitoring pressure at a lower cost. The monitoring through the legal system 
will be more important to push firms‘ more substantial restructurings. Local government 
can put pressure on domestic audit firms to manipulate the restructuring procedure. 
Hence, I propose the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Provincial legal system will have a weaker positive effect on the substantiveness of 
corporate restructurings for the firms audited by internationally affiliated auditors 
than for the firms audited by domestic auditors.  
H4b: Provincial government support will have a stronger positive effect on the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings for the firms audited by internationally 
affiliated auditors than for the firms audited by domestic auditors.  
METHOD 
Sample and Data 
To address the theoretical concern, I select the loss-makers in the Chinese securities 
market as the empirical context. This is an ideal context because firstly, the loss-makers 
are under state- level pressure from the CSRC to be delisted, they often conduct 
restructuring solely to manipulate earnings without improving efficiency substantially. 
Secondly, the loss-makers spread across the 31 provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions of mainland China and are subject to differing institutional 
arrangements from local governments, including local legal system and local 
73 
 
government intervention. This variance in institutions provides us with an opportunity to 
examine the effect of institutional variation on firms‘ symbolic restructuring.  
The loss-makers in A-share market from 1998 to 2004 are identified from the China 
Stock Market Accounting Research database (CSMAR). Loss-makers are listed firms 
who report a negative net profit in their annual financial report. A restructuring could be 
a response to two consecutive years‘ losses. I treat the latest loss year before the focal 
restructuring package as the unique loss year.  
All the corporate restructuring information is obtained from CSMAR, China Center 
for Economic Research  (CCER) database and the retrieval system of Chinese listed 
firms (http://220.194.35.3:8080/zq/ggcx/ggcx.htm). Such restructurings include asset 
sales, asset acquisitions, asset swaps and ownership restructurings. I examine the sample 
loss-makers‘ restructuring announcements in the 2 years following the loss year. The 
restructuring announcements in each year are together viewed as a 1-year restructuring 
plan. For example, firm A reported losses in 1998. Then it announced 3 restructurings in 
1999 and 4 restructurings in 2000. Thus the 3 restructurings in 1999 are treated as a 
restructuring plan. The 4 restructurings in 2000 are seen as another restructuring plan.  
The data on province institutions are obtained from the CSMAR region economy 
database, NERI Index of Marketization of China‘s Provinces (Fan & Wang, 1999 & 
2006) and China Law Info Database. Financial data, corporate governance data, market 






Substantiveness of 1-year restructuring plan.  
As firms often conduct a series of restructurings, I look at the restructuring 
announcements within each year as a package and measure the symbolism of the 
one-year restructuring package. I conduct factor analysis on changes of internal routines, 
including refocusing of business portfolio, change of the ultimate controller, avoiding 
related party transactions, and avoiding using end-of-year earnings manipulation. Two 
factors are obtained: symbolism of business restructuring and symbolism of ownership 
restructuring. The procedure of the factor analysis is described in the Appendix 3. I 
summate the factor scores of business restructuring symbolism and ownership 
restructuring symbolism as the index indicating the symbolism of the restructuring 
procedure.  
Based on the symbolism indices, I develop both firm level and provincial level 
substantiveness indices as dependent variables. The firm level substantiveness indices 
are obtained by taking the reverse of symbolic indices (calculated as symbolism indices 
time -1). The indices are continuous variables. The higher the substantiveness indices, 
the more substantive the restructuring package. The lower the substantiveness indices, 
the more symbolic the restructuring package.  
The province level substantiveness index is calculated as following:  










Where itjS  is the substantiveness index for each 1-year restructuring plan in 
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province i year t. n is the number of the 1-year restructuring plans in province i year t. 
Independent Variable 
Contracting Law Index.  
I examine all the regulations that are established by the provincial government and 
thus are effective throughout the whole province. To measure the quality of contracting 
law, I examine the objectives of regulation and identify the laws, rules and regulat ions 
governing business actors as contracting laws, rules and regulations. I obtain the 
accumulated count of effective province contracting laws, rules and regulations up to the 
focal year. As local legal systems are established based on- and as a support system to 
state legal systems, a larger count measure indicates that the province contracting laws 
are more sufficiently and consistently in accordance with the state- level legal system.  
Property right law Index. 
Similarly, I examine the objectives of provincial laws, rules and regulations and 
identify those regulating the behavior of government as the property rights legal 
institution. I obtain the count of property right laws, rules and regulations.  
Enforcement Index.  
Prior country- level studies use the surveying index. For example, firms‘ perceptions 
about the quality of the courts (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005). I follow this 
method and use an index that reflects the firms‘ perceptions of the judicial system to 
protect their operations. The index has been developed by Fan and Wang (1999 to 
2005)9. 
                                                                 
9
 Fan and Wang calculated the index based on a sampling survey. In the survey, the sample firms are 
required to evaluate the ―quality of the jurisdiction system to protect the firms‘ operation‖. The evaluations 
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To make the legal system indices comparable over the years, I follow Fan and Wang 
(2006) and scale them according to the indices in 1998 as the base.  










 ×10  
tiN ,  is the legal system index in province i and in year t.  
1998,iN  is the legal system index in province i and in year 1998. 
Year 1998 is taken as the base year.  
Legal System Index.  
It is calculated as the sum of scaled property right law index, contracting law index, 
and enforcement index.  
Government support 
The government often helps business actors in three ways. I use three indices to 
measure the three ways of government support.  
Subsidy Index. 
The first type of government support is by fiscal means, in the form of subsidies 
from the state budget or of tax concessions, including remission, reduction or 
postponement of tax obligations (Kornai, Maskin & Roland, 2003). I use fiscal subsidies 
to enterprises divided by the GDP of the province to proxy the fiscal subsidy index. The 
fiscal subsidy to enterprises is calculated by adding together the subsidies on innovation, 
subsidies granted for policy considerations and subsidies to loss-making enterprises. The 
higher the subsidy index, the more support the local government provides.  
Credit Access Index.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
are summated for each province‘s index. Due to data availab ility, Fan and Wang used the frequency of 
lawsuits which is defined as the number of business or economic lawsuits scaled by a location's GDP in 
constant RMB to measure the quality of legal enforcement from 1999 to 2000.  
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The second method of government support involves preferential access to credit. I 
use the marketization index of financial systems developed by Fan and Wang 
(1999-2005) as a proxy. The index is calculated by taking the ratio of bank loans 
received by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the total bank loans. A higher share of 
bank loans received by SOEs in a province indicates that the local government plays a 
more active role in helping firms with their access to financial resources.  
Local Protectionism Index.  
A third method of government support consists of various indirect methods of 
support. For example, the state may rescue a firm suffering from sales difficulties by 
imposing administrative restrictions on imports or erecting a deterrent tariff barrier to 
ease pressure from foreign competitors. I use the local protectionism index developed by 
Fan and Wang (1999-2005) to proxy the indirect methods of local government support. 
The index is measured by the sum of trade protection measures initiated by the local 
government divided by the GDP of the province. The higher the local protectionism 
index, the more support the local government provides.  
To make the government intervention indices comparable over the years, I follow 
the method of Fan & Wang (2006) to scale them into indices:  










 ×10  
tiN ,  is the government support index in province i and in year t.  
1998,iN  is the government support index in province i and in year 1998. 
Year 1998 is taken as the base year.  
Government Support Index .  
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It is calculated as the sum of scaled provincial subsidy index, credit access index 
and local protectionism index.  
Complexity from diversified input structure 
Due to the difficulty to obtain the actual input composition for individual firms, I 
measured the input complexity of each sector that a firm is operating in. The assumption 
is that during normal operation, a firm in a sector requiring n inputs contract with n 
intermediate goods producers to deliver the outputs. When it is not running well and 
going to restructuring, it needs to deal with n types of intermediate inputs, including 
inventories, fixed assets, in corresponding market through contracting or government 
arrangement. 
Data on input complexity comes from the 42-sector input-output table for 200210 
provided by Chinese statistical bureau. I thus measure an industry's complexity by 
computing the Herfindahl index of intermediate use shares in industry j (Levchenko, 































In which, Intermediate usei = intermediate use of sector i product in sector j, 
i=1,2,3,…n. 
                                                                 
10 It is the fourth such I-O table following the 1987, 1992 and 1997 tables. These tables are based on large-scale 
input-output survey across the country and the First Economic Census of China 2004. There are 42-sector and 
122-sector input-output table for 2002. 42 sector I-O table reports the input-output based on a broader categorization 
for sectors (addressing first or second level of industry category in CSRC), while 122-sector I-O table is calculated 
based on a more detailed categorization for sectors (addressing third or fourth level of industry category in CSRC). I 
chose to use the 42-sector I-O table because most of our sample firms report their sectors at the first or second level of 
industry category in CSRC (only 16 out of 666 report their industry in the fourth level of CSRC. This may suggest 
that most of the firms are operating in broader business portfolios in a sector). Therefore, it is more reasonable to 
adopt the 42-sector I-O table based on the broader category. This table is valued at producers‘ prices, which is 
calculated by deducting wholesale and retail margin, and transportation cost from the purchasers‘ prices value.  
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If the firm is operating in an industry with a low input Herfindahl index, it has a 
diversified input structure in terms of sectors or markets. The firm has to come into more 
factor markets when conducting restructuring. The firm will incur higher 
implementation cost. It is less likely to do substantial restructuring. If the firm is in an 
industry with a higher input Herfindahl index, the firm has more concentrated input 
sources in terms of sectors or markets; it needs to participate in fewer factor markets 
when conducting restructuring. It will incur lower implementation cost and can do more 
substantial restructuring. However, if the firm is in an industry with a too high input 
Herfindahl index, it implies that the firm has an extremely concentrated resource 
endowment, making it difficult to divert its operating area substantially. Therefore, I 
predict there is an inverted U-shape relation between the firm‘s input Herfindahl index 
and the substantiveness of restructuring.  
Complexity from obsolete inventories 
It is measured by the inventory turnover rate. Low inventory turnover can indicate 
poor liquidity, possible overstocking, and obsolescence. But it may also reflect a planned 
inventory buildup in the case of material shortages. However, in the case of loss-makers, 
low inventory turnover is more likely an indicator for obsolescence. Therefore, I use the 
relative inventory turnover to proxy the obsolescence of the firm‘s assets. I firstly 










Then I scale it using the industry average level and obtain the firm‘s relative 























In which, i=1,2,…,n, the number of listed firms in industry j. The relative inventory 
turnover is expected to be negatively related with the substantiveness of a firm‘s 
restructuring.  
Complexity from redundant labors 
I measure the labor redundancy using the labor productivity relative to industry 
average labor productivity. Labor productivity lower than industry level suggests either 
the labor has obsolete skills or there are too many excessive labors. In either situation, 
the obsolete labor or excessive labor force needs to be arranged in order to improve the 







In which the value added is the difference between operating revenue and material 
cost. I further calculate the average labor productivity for each industry. The relative 






















In which, i=1,2,…,n, the number of listed firms in industry j. The relative labor 
productivity is expected to be positively related with the substantiveness of a firm‘s 
restructuring.  
Independence of Auditor.  
Prior studies suggest that an economic dependence on clients creates incentives for 
auditors to compromise their independence (DeAngelo, 1981). Most of the studies 
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measure economic dependence based on client size relative to the total clientele of an 
audit firm (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981; Francis & Wilson, 1988; Lys & Watts, 1994; Stice, 
1991). Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) measure independence using a dummy coded as 1 if 
the auditing firm is in the same location as its client, and 0 otherwise. I extend Chan, Lin 
and Mo‘s idea (2006) and argue that international background is a factor affecting 
economic dependence. I use a dummy variable coded as 1 if the auditor is an 
international affiliated auditing firm. It is coded as 0 if the auditor is a domestic auditing 
firm. International affiliated auditing firms are those having an international Big Four 
auditing firm as the partner11. I predict that the international affiliated auditor is more 
independent and will push firms to do more substantial restructuring.  
RESULTS 
H1&H2: Do Provincial Institutions Matter to the Substantiveness of Corporate 
Restructuring?  
I first use the provincial data to test which provincial institutions matter for the 
substantiveness of corporate restructuring in a province. I use a fixed-effect model to test 
the hypothesis. In the fixed-effect models, I introduce one dummy variable for each 
province and suppress the intercept. Fixed-effect models offer a conservative test of the 
hypotheses because they model only within-province variation over time and eliminate 
across-province variation. All across-province variation is captured in the effect 
estimates of the dummy variables. The model is as following.  
Yit = β0  + β1X1it + β2X2it  + β3X1it X2it + β4Zit +αi +μit 
                                                                 
11
 International BIG FOUR audit ing firm include: KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), and Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, and Ernst & Young. 
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Where:  Yit: Annual average substantiveness index in province i in year t  
X1it: legal system in province i in year t  
X2it: government support in province i in year t 
Zit: control variables in province i in year t 
αi, is the unobserved individual effect, and μit is the error term. 
The dependent variable is the annual average substantiveness index from 1999 to 
2006 in each province. Other than the main variables, I also control other variables that 
could affect the substantiveness of corporate restructurings in a province. I first control 
provincial GDP and provincial long-term debt ratio as proxies for the provincial resource 
endowment. Standardized province GDP is controlled because the higher the provincial 
GDP, the more resourceful the province is in general. Provincial long-term debt ratio is 
calculated as the average long-term debt to equity ratio of all the listed firms in each 
province in each year. When the provincial long term debt ratio is high, it indicates that 
firms in that particular province have more difficulties in meeting long term debt 
obligations. The banking system faces a higher risk of liquidity. Hence, banks will have 
stricter policies when approving loans to firms, making it difficult for firms in the 
province to obtain loans for substantial restructurings. I next control the pressure from 
the province. GDP growth is controlled because a higher growth suggests the province is 
promoting more changes. The firm is under higher pressure from local government to do 








titi . I next 
control the average total factor productivity of all the listed firms in each province. I 
predict that the more productive the firms in a province are, the more capable the firms 
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will be of carrying out substantial changes. At the same time, the less productive the 
firms in a province are, the more incentive the firms will have to conduct more 
substantial changes. Off-tax burden is calculated as the ratio of off-tax burden in the 
province to the total sales in the province, developed by Fan & Wang (1999 to 2005). 
The higher the off-tax burden, the more resources will be expropriated from the firm. 
The firm will be less willing and less capable of making substantial changes. The 
dependent variable is measured at the restructuring year t. The independent variables and 
the control variables are measured at the end of year t-1. The measures and the sources 
of the variables are presented in Appendix 6. The descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrices are shown in Table 3.1. Some observations are dropped due to missing 
variables. Finally, there are 197 province-year observations. 
************Insert Table 3.1 around here************ 
The results are shown in table 3.2 and table 3.3.  
************Insert Table 3.2 around here************ 
************Insert Table 3.3 around here************ 
In table 3.2, models 1a, 1b and 1c test the effect of an aggregated provincial legal 
system and aggregated provincial government support. Model 1a is the base model 
showing the main effects of the provincial legal system index and provincial government 
support index. Model 1b incorporates the interaction between the provincial legal system 
index and the provincial government support index. Results show that the main effect of 
provincial the legal system index is positively significant in model 1a (β = 0.04, p < 
0.1). None of the main effects of the provincial legal system index, the provincial 
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government support index or their interaction is significant in model 1b.  
Then I more closely examine the legal system in model 2a to model 4b. Because 
two of the three provincial legal system indices, (i.e., contracting law index and property 
right law index) are highly correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.97), I put them into 
models separately. Models 2a and 2b test how contracting laws affect substantiveness 
index. Models 3a and 3b test how property right laws affect the substantiveness index. In 
model 2a, contracting law index shows a positive significance (β = 0.1, p < 0.05). 
None of the main effects of the contracting law index, provincial government support 
index or their interaction is significant in model 2b. In model 3a, the property right law 
index shows a positive significance (β = 0.15, p < 0.01). None of the main effects of 
the property right law index, provincial government support index or their interaction is 
significant in model 3b. Models 4a and 4b test how the enforcement mechanism affects 
the substantiveness index. None of the main effects of the enforcement index, provincial 
government support index or their interaction shows significant result. The results lend 
support to our hypotheses 1a and 1b, suggesting that property right laws and contracting 
laws promote more substantial restructurings in firms. However, the results fail to 
support hypothesis 1c, which predicts that a better enforcement mechanism promotes 
substantive restructuring. 
In table 3.3, I further unpack the effects of provincial legal system and provincial 
government support simultaneously. Models 5a and 5b test how the contracting law 
index and each provincial government support index affect the substantiveness index. In 
model 5a, the main effect of the contracting law index is positively significant (β = 
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0.10, p < 0.1). None of the main effects of provincial government support indices shows 
significance. In model 5b, the main effect of contracting the law index is not significant. 
The main effect of the subsidy index is negatively significant (β = -0.29, p < 0.05). The 
interaction between the contracting index and subsidy index is positively significant (β 
= 0.03, p < 0.1). Such results lend support to hypothesis 2a, suggesting that when 
contracting laws are well developed, provincial government subsidies encourage firms 
to conduct substantial restructurings. In contrast, when contracting laws are 
underdeveloped, more provincial government subsidies encourage less substantial 
restructurings. Results also show the main effect of the credit access index is not 
significant. However, the interaction between the contracting law index and credit access 
index is negatively significant (β = -0.02, p < 0.1). Such a result is contrary to our 
prediction in hypothesis 2a. 
Models 6a and 6b test how the property right law index and each provincial 
government support index affect the substantiveness of corporate restructurings in a 
province. In model 6a, the main effect of the property right law index is positively 
significant (β = 0.14, p < 0.05). None of the main effects of the provincial government 
support indices shows significance. In model 6b, the main effect of the property right 
law index is not significant. The main effect of the subsidy index is negatively 
significant (β = -0.31, p < 0.05). The interaction between property right law index and 
subsidy index is positively significant (β = 0.04, p < 0.05). None of the main effects of 
credit access, local protectionism or their interactions with the property right law index 
is significant. Such results suggest that when property right laws are well developed, 
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more provincial government subsidies encourage firms to carry out more substantial 
restructurings. In contrast, when the property right laws are underdeveloped, more 
provincial government subsidies encourage less substantial restructurings. Hypothesis 
2b gets supported.  
Models 7a and 7b test how the enforcement index and each provincial government 
support index affect the substantiveness index. In model 7a, the main effect of the 
enforcement index is not significant. The main effect of the credit access index is 
negatively significant (β = -0.06, p < 0.1). Neither the subsidy index nor local 
protectionism index shows significance. In model 7b, none of the main effects of the 
enforcement index, subsidy index, credit access index, local protectionism index or the 
interaction terms is significant. The results fail to support hypothesis 2c.  
Other than the main independent variables, results show that the provincial 
long-term debt ratio shows negative significance in all the models as predicted. GDP 
growth shows positive significance as predicted. Productivity shows negative 
significance in all the models. Thus, the result supports the argument that in less 
productive provinces, firms have more incentive to carry out more substantial 
restructuring. Off-tax burden shows positive significance in several models, conflict ing 
with our predictions. However, this could be explained by seeing the off-tax burden 
index as an indicator for government intervention. It shows how local governments 
expropriate resources from local business actors. Local governments may have funneled 
these expropriated resources to the focal loss-makers, because these firms are the most 
significant for local economies. With more resources, loss-makers can carry out more 
87 
 
substantial restructurings.  
Robustness Test: Instrument Variable Estimation 
Institutions include legal systems and local government support. I measure the 
legislation using the accumulated number of laws up to the focal year. As the local 
legislation is documented and easily monitored by the central government, it is not 
easily manipulated by firms or local governments. To treat it as exogenous to firms‘ 
decision-making is appropriate, at least over a short period. However, some literature 
suggests that enforcement is endogenous. For example, the material view suggests that 
organizations can affect the implementation phase of a law by lobbying the jurisdiction 
(Edelman & Suchman, 1997). In our case, it is possible that to facilitate firms‘ 
substantial or symbolic restructurings, the local jurisdiction will be influenced by local 
firms or the local government to enhance or relax the monitoring on firms‘ restructuring 
procedure. This could cause a simultaneity bias.  
It might be even more inappropriate to treat local government support as exogenous. 
Firstly, there is also simultaneity bias. On the one hand, more local governments may 
affect the firms‘ tendency to do more or less substantial restructurings. On the other hand, 
it could be that a local government provides more support because it expects local firms 
to conduct substantial restructurings. Secondly, there might be an omitted variables bias. 
Local government support can be related to some institutions that are not included in the 
regression. These institutions may also relate to the substance of restructurings in a 
province. Such institutions could be informal institutions such as culture, history, etc. 
These issues cause OLS to be biased and inconsistent. I test the endogeneity problem 
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following the Wu test (1973). The results show credit access is endogenous.  
To deal with these endogeneity problems, I use Instrumental Variable estimation (IV) 
as the robustness test. To be safe, I treat all the provincial government support indices 
and the provincial enforcement index as endogenous. IV estimation requires two 
conditions. First, there is a set of instrumental variables that are correlated with the 
endogenous variables, i.e., enforcement and local government support. Second, the 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated to the dependent variable. Specifically, the 
incentive of provincial government intervention are included as instrumental variables: 
imbalance between budgetary income and budgetary expenditure, budgetary income, 
budgetary off-budget income, administration fee, officers‘ salary compared with 
provincial average salary, number of listed firms, size of government, GDP in year t-2, 
growth of GDP from year t-2 to year t-1, and ratio of managers‘ time in dealing with the 
government to their total working hour in the province. All the instrumental variables are 
measured in year t-2.  
IV estimation consists of two stages. In the first stage, I regress enforcement and 
local government support indices in year t-1 on instrumental variables and covariates in 
year t-2. Because instrumental variables are exogenous and uncorrelated to the 
substantiveness of corporate restructuring in a province, the predicted institution based 
on IV captures the variation in institutions not caused by unobserved variables or 
substantive corporate restructuring. In the second stage, I regress the substantiveness of 
corporate restructuring in year t on the predicted enforcement and local government 
support indices, as well as covariates in year t-1. 
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Table 3.4 shows the second stage results from IV estimation. The main effect of 
legal systems does not show significance as predicted in hypothesis 1. However, in 
model 8b, the interaction between contracting laws and credit is positively significant 
(β = 0.04, p < 0.1). In model 9b, the interaction between property right laws and credit 
is positively significant (β = 0.04, p < 0.1). Such results support the hypotheses 2a and 
2b. 
************Insert Table 3.4 around here************ 
H3&H4: Which Types of Firms Are More Susceptible to Provincial Institutional 
Pressure? 
I use firm-level data to examine which firms are more susceptible to institutional 
pressure to conduct substantial restructurings rather than symbolic restructurings.  
I use the firm-level substantiveness index as the dependent variable. Although more 
than half of the loss-makers have reported losses more than once during the sample 
years, they have often avoided reporting losses in consecutive years. This is because 
firms reporting losses for two consecutive years are labeled ―ST‖ (explain what ST 
stands for) firms. This adds new restrictions to the trading of their shares. Firms 
reporting losses for three consecutive years are delisted. Therefore, I treat the sample as 
pool data, rather than panel data.  
As I only have the substantiveness index for the loss-makers who have restructured, 
the loss-makers who have not conducted restructuring are excluded from the sample. A 
sample bias could exist if firms that conduct restructurings get more government support, 
or if firms in the provinces with better legal systems do not conduct restructurings. The 
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OLS results may not be generalizable. Therefore, I employ Heckman Selection Models 
to correct the potential sample bias (Wesphal & Zajac, 2001). The model is as follows:  
Pit = β0 + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3 X3jt +β4 X4jt +β5 X1it X3jt +β6 X1it X4jt +β7 X2it X3jt +β8 
X2it X4jt +β9Z1jt +β10Z2it+μit 
Yit = β0 + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3 X3jt +β4 X4jt +β5 X1it X3jt +β6 X1it X4jt +β7 X2it X3jt +β8 
X2it X4jt +β9Z1jt +β10Z2it+μit 
Where:  Pit: Adoption of restructuring package 
Yit: Substantiveness index of firm j in province i in year t  
X1it: legal system in province i in year t  
X2it: government support in province i in year t 
X3jt: complexity in firm j in year t  
X4jt: auditor independence in firm j in year t 
Z1jt: control variables in firm j in year t 
Z2it: control variables in province i in year t  
μit : the error term. 
In the Heckman Selection Model, the first (selection) equation estimates the 
likelihood of adoption of restructuring package with an event history model for the full 
sample, and the hazard rate from that model is then included in a second-stage 
regression model to estimate the degree of substance of restructuring (i.e., among the 
reduced sample of firms that have adopted a restructuring package). Thus, parame ter 
estimates from the event history model, which are based on information from all 
firm-years in the sample, are included in the second-stage models. 
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In the Heckman Selection Models, the independent variables include the institution 
indices, complexity and auditor independence. Other than the main independent 
variables, I also control several sets of firm characteristics that could affect the 
substantiveness index following prior studies (Chen, Li, & Lee, 2003; Stevens, 
Steensma, Harrison & Cochran, 2005; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Westphal & Zajac, 2001; 
Zajac & Westphal, 1995). The first set is firms‘ inertia indicator, proxied by age and size. 
Age is calculated as the calendar years since the firm‘s IPO. Size is measured by the log 
of total asset. I predict that the older or the larger the firm is, the less substantial 
restructuring the firm will perform. The second set is the firm‘s connection with local 
government and central government, proxied by two dummies: the provincial or 
below-province government owner dummy and central government owner dummy. The 
third set is the external pressures for substantial change, proxied by ST dummies and 
negative recommendations from financial analysts. The fourth set is the internal 
pressures for substantial change, proxied by ROA, debt ratio, ultimate controller‘s 
ownership, dual role of CEO and board chairman, and a dummy indicating that the 
restructuring is conducted in the second year after the firm reports loss. Besides, I also 
control a dummy variable indicating if the firm is in the regulated industry. The 
regulated industry dummy is 1 if the firm primarily operates in the fields of natural 
resources (the mining, metal, or petroleum industries), public utilities, finance, 
transportation, electricity or the telecommunications industry, and 0 otherwise (Fan, 
Wong, & Zhang, 2005; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Li, Zhang, & Zhou, 2005). If the 
firm is in the regulated industry, it is more subject to the local government‘s pressure to 
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serve social purpose and less likely to go through a substantial restructuring of 
refocusing or control power transfer. I also control the provincial GDP and the number 
of listed firms in the province. If a province has a high GDP, it has a better resource 
endowment and can help with the firm to a greater extent. If a province has many listed 
firms, one single listed firm will be not as important as in those provinces where there 
are only several listed firms. The provincial government will not divert many resources 
to it to protect the listing quota. Finally, I control the industry and the time period.  
When using the Heckman Selection Model, an exclusion restriction is required to 
generate credible estimates. There must be at least one variable that appears with a 
non-zero coefficient in the selection equation but does not appear in the equation of 
interest, essentially an instrument. If no such variable is available, it may be difficult to 
correct for sampling selectivity. Therefore, in the selection model, I incorporate mimetic 
pressure (i.e. the prior restructurings by other firms) and learning effect (i.e. the prior 
restructurings conducted by firms themselves) as predictors. These variables are 
positively correlated with the adoption of restructuring packages, while having no effect  
on the substantiveness of the restructuring package. In the models, there are 1000 
firm-restructuring year observations, with 619 observations by 354 firms who have done 
1-year restructuring plans, and 381 observations by 100 firms who have not done any 
1-year restructuring plans. The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented 
in table 3.5.  
************Insert Table 3.5 around here************ 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the results from the Heckman Selection Model. In table 
93 
 
3.6, ―legal system‖ refers to provincial contracting law index in models 11a and 11b, 
provincial property right law index in models 12a and 12b, and provincial enforcement 
index in models 13a and 13b. In table 3.7, government support refers to provincial 
subsidy in models 14a and 14b, province credit access in models 15a and 15b, and local 
protectionism in models 16a and 16b.  
************Insert Table 3.6 around here************ 
************Insert Table 3.7 around here************ 
Model 11a tests the main effect of the contracting law index. Model 11b tests the 
interaction between contracting law index and complexity indicators, as well as auditor 
independence. In model 11a, the main effect of contracting law index is positively 
significant (β = 0.01, p < 0.1). Among all the complexity indicators, the main effect of 
herfindahl index shows positive significance (β = 4.1, p < 0.05). The squared term of 
herfindahl index shows negative significance (β = -6.08, p < 0.05). In model 11b, the 
main effect and the squared term of the Herfindahl index are positively and negatively 
significant (β = 6.16, p < 0.01; β = -7.5, p < 0.01). The interaction between the 
contracting law index and herfindahl index is negatively significant (β = -0.27, p < 
0.001). Such results suggest that within a province with well-developed contracting laws, 
firms who have more diversified input structure will be more likely to carry out 
substantial restructurings than those with less diversified input structure. The results 
support hypothesis 3a. The main effect of international affiliated auditor is positively 
significant (β = 1.22, p < 0.05). The interaction between contracting laws and the 
international affiliated auditor is negatively significant (β = -0.28, p < 0.001). Such a 
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result suggests that the effect of contracting laws on pushing firms to do more 
substantial restructuring is weaker if firms are connected to international affiliated 
auditors, compared with firms connected to domestic auditors. This result is conforming 
to the prediction in hypothesis 4a.  
Model 12a tests the main effect of the property right law index. Model 12b tests the 
interaction between the property right law index and complexity indicators, as well as 
auditor independence. In model 12a, the main effect of the property right law index is 
positively significant (β = 0.02, p < 0.1). The main effect and the squared term of the 
Herfindahl index are positively and negatively significant respectively (β = 4.12, p < 
0.05; β = -6.09, p < 0.05). In model 12b, the main effect of the property right law 
index is postively significant (β = 0.17, p < 0.1). The main effect and the squared term 
of the Herfindahl index are positively and negatively significant respectively (β = 6.75, 
p < 0.001; β = -7.99, p < 0.01). The interaction between the property right law index 
and the herfindahl index is negatively significant (β = -0.32, p < 0.001). Such results 
suggest that within a province with well-developed property right laws, firms with more 
diversified input structure will be more likely to perform more substantial restructurings 
than those with less diversified input structure. The results lend support to hypothesis 3a. 
The main effect of international affiliated auditor is not significant. The interaction 
between property right laws and international affiliated auditors is negatively significant 
(β = -0.25, p < 0.001). Such a result suggests that the effect of property right laws on 
pushing firms to do more substantial restructuring is weaker if firms are connected to 
international affiliated auditors, compared with firms connected to domestic auditors. 
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This result is conforming to the prediction in hypothesis 4a.  
Model 13a tests the main effect of the provincial enforcement index. Model 13b 
tests the interaction between the provincial enforcement index and complexity indicators, 
as well as auditor independence. In model 13a, the main effect and the squared term of 
the Herfindahl index are positively and negatively significant respectively (β = 4.19, p 
< 0.05; β = -6.17, p < 0.05). In model 13b, only the squared term of the herfindahl 
index is negatively significant (β = -6.35, p < 0.05).  
Model 14a tests the main effect of the provincial subsidy index. Model 14b tests the 
interaction between the provincial subsidy index and complexity indicators, as well as 
auditor independence. In model 14a, the main effect of subsidies is not significant. The 
main effect and the squared term of the Herfindahl index are positively and negatively 
significant respectively (β = 3.95, p < 0.05; β = -5.91, p < 0.05). In model 14b, only 
the squared term of the herfindahl index is negatively significant (β = -6.28, p < 0.05). 
None of the other main effects or interaction effects we are concerned about show 
significance.  
Model 15a tests the main effect of the provincial credit access index. Model 15b 
tests the interaction between the provincial credit access index and complexity indicators, 
as well as auditor independence. In model 15a, the main effect of credit access is not 
significant. The main effect of subsidies is not significant. The main effect and the 
squared term of the Herfindahl index are positively and negatively significant 
respectively (β = 4.09, p < 0.05; β = -6.08, p < 0.05). In model 15b, the main effect 
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of credit access is negatively significant (β = -0.21, p < 0.05). The squared term of the 
herfindahl index is negatively significant (β = -7.76, p < 0.01). Although the main 
effect of relative labor productivity is not significant, the interaction between credit 
access and relative labor productivity is positively significant (β = 0.17, p < 0.05). 
Such results suggest that in a province where the provincial government provides more 
preferable financial access, only the firms who have less redundant labors (indicated by 
a higher labor productivity) tend to do more substantial restructurings, while the firms 
who have more redundant labors (indicated by a lower labor productivity) will do less 
substantial restructurings. The results go against hypothesis 3b. The main effect of 
international affiliated auditors is negatively significant (β = -1.17, p < 0.05). The 
interaction between credit access and international affiliated auditors is positively 
significant (β = 0.22, p < 0.01). Such results suggest that preferable financial access 
pushes firms audited by international affiliated auditors to conduct more substantial 
restructurings. Such results conform to the prediction in hypothesis 4b.  
Model 16a tests the main effect of the local protectionism index. Model 16b tests 
the interaction between the local protectionism index and complexity indicators, as well 
as auditor independence. In model 16a and 16b, the main effect and the squared term of 
the Herfindahl index are positively and negatively significant respectively (β = 3.96, p 
< 0.1; β = 4.13, p < 0.05; β = -5.92, p < 0.05; β = -5.38, p < 0.05). None of the 




Prior institutional theory literature proposes that there are different types of 
institutional pressures, such as coercive pressure, normative pressure, and mimetic 
pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and organizations response to the pressures by 
either taking some cosmetic gesture or conducting substantial changes (Oliver, 1991). 
Despite the importance of institutions in determining firms‘ symbolism-substantiveness 
choices, theoretical and empirical studies that seek to examine how institutional 
variation affects firms‘ symbolism-substantiveness choices are still limited. This could 
be attributed to the fact that most prior studies were conducted in the United States, 
where firms face relatively stable and homogenous institutional pressures. This chapter 
has attempted to add to the understanding of this issue. I focus on one type of pressure, 
i.e., coercive pressure imposed by the government (including local government). This 
type of pressure is expected to have the strongest effect on organizational conformity 
because the government has the legal power to impose sanction for noncompliance. By 
combining transaction cost theory and institution theory, this chapter enhances the 
understanding of which institutions established by government affect firms‘ symbolic 
restructurings undertaken in response to state pressure and how they do so.  
This chapter embeds the research in China, where business actors are subject to 
institutional arrangements from both central and local government. On the one hand, the 
central government wishes to use the delisting system and a supportive legal system to 
pressure firms to improve their efficiency through restructuring. On the other hand, the 
central government delegates power to local government to develop local regulations 
and provide support for local business. Business actors‘ pay-off function for substantive 
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vs symbolic restructurings thus depends on local institutions, which vary across 
provinces. Hence, to gain a better understanding of the substantiveness of corporate 
restructurings, it is important to analyze the sources of institutional variations: local 
legal systems and local government support.  
This chapter first separates laws into contracting and property rights laws, then 
shows that strong local laws promote more substantial restructurings among firms 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). As the two types of laws regulate different actions, they 
affect firms‘ substantive restructuring in different ways. Strong contracting law not only 
reduces the implementation costs of substantive restructurings, but also increases the 
monitoring pressure on symbolic restructurings. Hence, it pushes firms to engage in 
more substantive restructurings. Property rights law protects firms from local 
government expropriation, thus giving them an incentive to engage in more substantive 
restructurings.  
This chapter then shows that the relation between local government support and the 
substantiveness of corporate restructurings hinges on the quality of the local legal 
system. Both contracting and property rights laws provide a clear template for 
monitoring and evaluating the behavior of business actors and local government. Local 
government has less space to help business actors to act against central government 
requirements. Hence, local government support, mainly in the form of subsidies and 
credit access, promotes more substantive restructurings when laws are well developed, 
while promoting less substantive restructurings when laws are underdeveloped.  
This chapter further unravels the mechanism governing how the legal system and 
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local government support shape the substantiveness of corporate restructurings. The 
results show that loss-makers with a higher level of complexity due to diversified input 
structure benefit more from a well-developed legal system: they are pushed to 
implement more fundamental changes than are loss-makers with a lower level of 
complexity. This provides evidence that the legal system promotes more substantive 
restructurings by resolving high implementation cost caused by complexity issues. 
However, this chapter shows that local government financial support promotes less 
substantive restructurings among loss-makers with a more complex restructuring 
procedure due to more redundant labors. This result suggests that out of central 
government‘s expectation, local government support may not really be used as a 
substitutive institution to deal with complexity issues, which is the main hindrance for 
fundamental changes among firms. Rather, local government support helps firms to take 
short cuts in responding to central government pressure by conducting symbolic 
restructurings. This phenomenon is an example of how the policy implementation 
process has not resulted in the satisfactory achievement of policy objectives in China. In 
transitional economies such as China, this could be explained as a result of local 
government acting as a participant in economic operations rather than as an outside 
regulator. Local government has its own interests  to look after. On the one hand, it has 
an incentive to help firms out of delisting pressure and can choose to do so by helping 
them with either substantial or symbolic restructurings. On the other hand, it is limited 
by the resources available to it. To handle immediate crises and protect its own interests, 
local government chooses to help firms engage in symbolic restructurings. These 
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findings help to explain why so many inefficient government-connected firms continued 
to exist during the period of economic transformation. Complex issues related to history 
lead to rigidity in core economic activities. These core rigidities lead to entrenchment 
behavior among incumbents. Such entrenchment is further encouraged by local 
government tolerance. Therefore, many government-connected enterprises in transitional 
economies, especially large state-owned enterprises that have become corporate 
dinosaurs, become entrenched in old behavior and are unable to take the first steps to 
adapt to a radically changed environment (Dixon, Meyer & Day, 2009). 
This chapter also finds that international-affiliated auditing firms provide a 
substitutive institution for legal system in monitoring firms‘ restructuring procedure. 
Therefore, the positive effect of legal system on the substantiveness of firms‘ 
restructuring becomes weaker when the firm is under the co-regulation from 
international-affiliated auditors. International-affiliated auditors further act as a 
substitutive monitor and regulator for domestic legal system to orient provincial 
government support to help firms do more substantial restructurings. Such results 
support the argument that both provincial legal system and provincial government 
support affect the substantiveness of firms‘ restructuring through shaping the monitoring 
pressure.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines how institutional variation across provinces in China shapes 
firms‘ symbolic restructuring. It contributes to institutional theory in four ways. First, 
most prior studies suggest that symbolic actions are determined by managers‘ power, 
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educational background, network, or experience. Few have provided a mechanism for 
determining whether and how institutions affect firms‘ symbolic actions. This could be 
due to the empirical context in which most prior studies are set—the United 
States—which is characterized by a relatively stable and homogenous set of institutional 
pressures across the whole country. This chapter employs China as the empirical context 
and shows that local institution variation is an important predictor in explaining firms‘ 
symbolic response to state- level institutional pressure. Results show that a strong legal 
system (including contracting and property rights laws) promotes more substantial 
restructurings. Moreover, government support promotes more substantive restructurings 
when laws are well developed, while promoting less substantive restructurings when 
laws are underdeveloped. 
Second, by combining transaction cost theory and institutional theory, the chapter 
has unraveled the mechanism governing how institutions affect firms‘ decisions on 
whether to implement a more substantial restructuring or a more symbolic one. The first 
part of this mechanism shapes the implementation costs of restructuring. Results show 
that a strong legal system helps firms to deal with the high transaction costs associated 
with complexity. Thus, firms with more complexity will benefit more from a 
well-developed legal system and engage in more substantial restructurings. In contrast, 
local government support provides a buffer for inefficiency. Thus, local government 
support promotes more symbolic restructurings among more complex firms. Another 
part of this mechanism shapes monitoring pressure. Results show that internationally 
affiliated auditors serve as a substitutive institution for legal system and both legal 
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system and international affiliated auditors will increase the monitoring pressure and 
promote local government to help firms with more substantive restructurings. 
Thirdly, this study can shed some light on the role of local government in 
facilitating enterprise restructurings. In most large economies such as China, the 
government is often not a single entity; it often has multiple or different interests (Evan, 
Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985), for example, between different levels of local 
governments as in the case of this study. These differences sometimes lead the local 
government to allow some room for its constituents including local firms to 
symbolically implement the central mandate, as it advances the local government‘s own 
interests. In other words, the local government can be an enabler as well as a hindrance 
of substantive change. For example, some empirical studies suggest that local 
government has been an important engine promoting enterprise restructuring (Boisot & 
Child, 1996), whereas other studies show that local governments provide soft budgets 
and allow for inefficient restructuring (Kornai, 1979, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; 
Boycko et al., 1996). Hence, the role of the local government in promoting enterprise 
restructuring is not entirely clear. This chapter shows local government can shape firms‘ 
restructuring behavior by establishing local institutional arrangement: building legal 
infrastructure and acting as a regulator, as well as direct intervening in economic 
activities as a market participator. Our results suggest that building legal infrastructure 
can lead to more efficient restructuring, while the effect of direct intervention depends 
on the quality of legal infrastructure.  
Despite the advances this chapter makes, it is subject to some limitations. First, I use 
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the total number of regulations regulating government behavior to proxy the quality of 
property rights legislation in a province. I also use the total number of laws regulating 
contracting behavior to proxy the quality of local contracting legislation. These 
measures may overstate the extent of local legislation. For example, laws regulating 
government behavior include several sub-categories such as elections, government 
intervention, legislation, the judiciary, fiscal matters, administrative reviews, planning 
and statistics, public affairs, taxation, and urban construction. Laws regula ting 
contracting behavior include laws on trading, competition, real estate, private enterprise, 
business administration, contracting, and quality and technology supervision. Among all 
these sub-categories, not all of them contribute equally to facilitate or regulate firms‘ 
restructurings. Future research should further examine which sub-categories of property 
rights laws and contracting laws are more effective when it comes to encouraging local 
governments and firms to implement substantial restructurings.  
Second, because this study includes only loss-makers in the sample, there might be 
an element of sample bias. Sample bias could lead to a lack of generalizability and 
alternative explanation issues. When loss-makers are used as the sample, restructurings 
are reactive response to the delisting pressure. They have to do restructuring in some 
way. Besides, as loss-makers are lack of internal resources for growth and restructuring, 
local institution where they are embedded in is especially important for the decision and 
the success of substantial restructuring. However, this is not the case for profitable firms. 
For profitable firms, their restructuring are management‘s voluntary decision, rather than 
a reaction to delisting pressure. Their goal could be improving efficiency, reducing risks, 
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or smoothing firms‘ earnings. Examining if the decision on substantial vs. symbolic 
restructuring varies across different motivations could be interesting. Besides, profitable 
firms usually have some internal resources (either financial, knowledge, or network) to 
accomplish the restructuring. The quality of local institutions may have a weaker effect 
on the profitable firms‘ substantial restructuring. In terms of the mechanism that the 
institutions affect profitable firms‘ restructuring decision, supervision pressure may be 
more important than reducing implementation cost. Future research on profitable firms 
could test whether such an alternative experience is borne out in reality.  
Moreover, in this study, low inventory turnover in loss-makers implies more 
obsolescence of assets. Thus it can be used to proxy a higher level of complexity in 
restructuring procedures. In profitable firms, a low level of inventory turnover could 
reflect a planned inventory buildup in the case of material shortages. Low inventory 
turnover cannot be generalized to measure the obsolescence of assets in the case of 
profitable firms. However, I have also used two other measures for complexity, i.e., 
diversified input structure and redundant labor. Those two measures are applicable to 
both loss-makers and profitable firms. They can provide us with relatively robust results.  
Despite its limitations, this chapter provides a number of insights for policy makers 
and investors. For policy makers, some scholars argue that in transitional economies in 
which the legal system is severely underdeveloped, government intervention could be a 
substitutive institutional arrangement for the legal system. However, this chapter shows 
that government intervention may not have the expected effect as, for example, it 
promotes symbolic restructuring and thus perpetuates inefficiency. I attribute it to that in 
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the process of decentralization, local government is delegated the power to promote 
local economic growth. When government acts as a market participant, it has to balance 
its own benefits and costs. In this context, without well-specified legal system or some 
substitutive institutions provided by foreign investors, both business actors and local 
government will act against the central government‘s desire and pursue their own 
short-term interests (by conducting or supporting symbolic restructurings). Hence, a 
legal system developed to an appropriate extent and an appropriate degree of 
decentralization is prerequisites to the implementation of state policy.   
106 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation (Province-level; N=197) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Provincial average substantiveness 
index 
1            
2 subsidy index -0.02  1           
3 credit access index -0.02  0.2787* 1          
4 local protection index 0.12* 0.04  0.39* 1         
5 property law index 0.07  -0.23* -0.45* -0.24* 1        
6 contracting law index 0.08  -0.25* -0.41* -0.17* 0.97* 1       
7 enforcement index 0.06  0.03  0.04  -0.10* 0.16* 0.19* 1      
8 long-term debt ratio -0.03  -0.17* -0.09  -0.05  -0.02  -0.03  -0.18* 1     
9 productivity -0.09  -0.05  -0.27* 0.05  0.21* 0.20* 0.04  0.01  1    
10 province GDP -0.04  -0.19* -0.49* -0.52* 0.43* 0.38* 0.25* -0.06  0.03  1   
11 GDP growth 0.04  -0.13* -0.50* -0.17* 0.42* 0.41* -0.22* 0.05  0.09  0.03  1  
12 off-tax burden 0.09  0.06  0.58* 0.50* -0.53* -0.48* 0.16* -0.08  -0.10  -0.34* -0.56* 1 
 Mean -0.09  6.41  4.55  2.29  4.69  4.40  4.79  0.25  -0.84  0.85  0.13  1.37  
 S.D 0.87  1.54  3.10  2.49  3.77  3.92  2.28  0.28  0.73  1.23  0.07 3.76 
 Min -4.50  2.20  -2.22  -0.87  0.37  0.27  0.00  0.05  -3.00  -0.60  0.02  -5.95 
 Max 1.91  12.14  10.00  14.22  22.87  24.73  10.00  2.55  1.00  6.68  0.61  10 




Table 3.2 Do institutions have an effect on the average substantiveness of 
restructurings? Fixed Effect Models 
The coefficients are estimated using fixed effect model. The dependent variable is the annual 
average substantiveness index for the period 1999 to 2006 in each province. The dependent 
variable is measured in year t. The independent variables are measured in year t-1. Standard 
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F 2.49* 2.19* 2.69* 2.53* 3.24** 3.07** 2.34* 2.26* 
N 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 
F test (u_i=0) 1.61* 1.60* 1.68* 1.73* 1.82* 1.87** 1.72* 1.78* 
Note: *** Significant at .001 level; ** significant at .01 level; * significant at .05 level; + significant at .1 level. Two -tailed 




Table 3.3 Which elements of provincial legal system and provincial government support affect 
the average substantiveness of restructuring? Fixed Effect Models 
The coefficients are estimated using fixed effect model. The dependent variable is the annual average 
substantiveness index for the period 1999 to 2006 in each province. Because two of the three legal system 
indices, i.e., property right law index and contracting law index are highly correlated, they are put into 
models separately. Legal system refers to contracting law in models 5a and 5b, property right law in models 
6a and 6b, and enforcement in models 7a and 7b. The dependent variable is measured in year t. The 
independent variables are measured in year t-1. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
DV: provincial substantiveness 
Contracting law Property right law Enforcement 
Model 5a Model 5b Model 6a Model 6b Model 7a Model 7b 



















































































































































F 2.46* 2.65* 2.82** 2.92** 2.2* 1.72+ 
N 197 197 197 197 197 197 
F test (u_i=0) 1.70* 1.96* 1.81* 2.04** 1.70* 1.62* 





Table 3.4 Robustness Test: Instrumental Variable Estimation 
This table reports the results from IV estimation. The dependent variable is the substantiveness index of each 
loss-maker‘s 1-year restructuring plan. Because two of the three legal system indices, i.e., property right law 
index and contracting law index are highly correlated, they are put into models separately. The dependent 
variable is measured in year t. The independent variables are measured in year t-1. Enforcement, subsidy, 
credit and local protectionism are treated as endogenous variables. Instrumental variables include 
imbalance between budgetary income and budgetary expenditure, province government‘s budget 
income and off-budget income, administration fee, officers‘ salary compared with social average 
salary, number of listed firms in the province, size of government, province GDP in year t-2, growth 
of province GDP from year t-2 to year t-1, and ratio of managers‘ time in dealing with the 
government to their total working hour. All the instrumental variables are measured in year t-2. Due 
to limited space, I only report the second stage of IV estimation. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
 Contracting law Property right law Enforcement 
 Model 8a Model 8b Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b 
Legal system -0.12 (0.15) 0.26 (0.23) -0.17 (0.17) 0.34 (0.27) -0.22 (0.23) -0.64 (1.29) 
Subsidy 0.68 (0.45) 0.99+ (0.53) 0.69+ (0.41) 1.12* (0.53) 0.61* (0.31) 0.17 (2.19) 
Credit -0.29+ (0.17) -0.29 (0.2) -0.32+ (0.18) -0.32+ (0.19) -0.14 (0.11) -0.43 (0.55) 
Local protectionism 0.25 (0.21) 0.31 (0.25) 0.22 (0.21) 0.27 (0.27) 0.3 (0.21) 0.88+ (0.47) 
Legal system*subsidy  -0.06 (0.04)  -0.08 (0.05)  0.05 (0.24) 
Legal system*credit  0.04+ (0.03)  0.04+ (0.03)  0.07 (0.08) 
Legal system* Local 
protectionism 
 -0.01 (0.03)  -0.01 (0.03)  -0.1 (0.07) 
Long term debt ratio -0.96+ (0.52) -0.86+ (0.5) -0.97+ (0.52) -0.86+ (0.5) -0.99* (0.47) -0.83+ (0.46) 
Productivity 0.21 (0.17) 0.23 (0.18) 0.2 (0.18) 0.24 (0.18) 0.29+ (0.18) 0.35* (0.17) 
GDP -0.41 (0.32) -0.39 (0.32) -0.34 (0.32) -0.35 (0.32) -0.5 (0.31) -0.38 (0.39) 
GDP growth 4.24 (3.07) 2.62 (2.62) 4.04 (3.01) 2.15 (2.63) 4.07 (2.77) 2.84 (3.64) 
Off-tax income -0.03 (0.08) -0.1 (0.07) -0.03 (0.08) -0.1 (0.07) -0.06 (0.08) -0.1 (0.08) 
Constant -2.91 (2.32) -5.28+ (2.97) -2.49 (2.21) -5.91+ (3.04) -2.52 (2.08) 0.55 (12.24) 
R squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
OBS 183 183 183 183 183 183 




Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation (Firm-level; N=619) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Substantiveness 1 1.00              
Contracting law 2 0.05  1.00             
Property  right tlaw 3 0.06  0.97*  1.00            
Enforcement 4 -0.12*  0.34*  0.31*  1.00           
Subsidy 5 -0.01  -0.12*  -0.08*  0.15*  1.00          
Credit 6 -0.05  -0.34*  -0.36*  -0.17*  0.13*  1.00         
Local protectionism 7 0.03  0.19*  0.15*  0.01  0.14*  0.23*  1.00        
Herfindahl index 8 -0.01  -0.05  -0.04  -0.06*  0.16*  0.13*  0.02  1.00       
Relative labor  
productiv ity  
9 0.03  0.04  0.02  -0.02  0.00  -0.03  0.10*  -0.01  1.00      
Relative inventory  
turnover 
10 0.05  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.03  -0.03  0.05  -0.01  0.03  1.00     
Local government owner 11 -0.06  -0.15*  -0.15*  -0.04  0.07*  0.08*  -0.05  0.02  -0.08*  -0.02  1.00    
Central government owner 12 0.08*  0.16*  0.12*  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.06  -0.49*  1.00   
Ultimate ownership 13 0.14*  0.07*  0.06  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.08*  -0.08*  0.03  0.10*  0.22*  1.00  
Dual position of CEO 14 -0.07*  -0.08*  -0.08*  -0.02  0.01  0.03  -0.07*  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04  -0.08*  
International affiliated  
auditor 
15 0.01  -0.07*  -0.07*  0.08*  0.10*  0.08*  0.02  0.04  -0.05  -0.03  0.03  0.03  0.12*  
ROA 16 0.12*  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.03  0.0716*  -0.05  0.06  0.20*  0.01  0.07*  0.09*  
Debt ratio 17 -0.15*  -0.04  -0.06  0.02  0.00  -0.06*  -0.05  -0.02  -0.04  -0.13*  0.04  -0.07*  -0.06  
Size  18 0.13*  0.10*  0.10*  0.04  0.10*  -0.09*  -0.05  -0.02  -0.16*  0.04  0.04  0.15*  0.20*  
Regulated industry  19 -0.03  0.03  0.04  0.01  -0.05  0.04  -0.05  -0.06  0.12*  -0.02  -0.09*  0.09*  -0.06  
Age 20 -0.09*  0.07*  0.06  0.06  0.03  -0.25*  -0.23*  -0.12*  0.06  -0.03  -0.12*  -0.07*  -0.36*  
ST 21 -0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.03  0.08*  -0.04  -0.03  0.00  0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.10*  
Negative recommendation 22 0.08*  0.14*  0.13*  0.03  0.00  -0.05  0.01  0.00  -0.03  -0.02  0.01  0.04  0.03  
2nd year after loss 23 -0.11*  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.03  0.01  -0.03  0.01  -0.07*  0.07*  -0.02  0.04  
GDP 24 -0.04  0.26*  0.27*  0.41*  -0.11*  -0.35*  -0.63*  -0.03  -0.10*  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.05  
No. of listed firms 25 -0.09*  0.44*  0.37*  0.70*  0.07*  -0.30*  -0.12*  -0.05  0.02  0.01  -0.04  0.03  0.05  
Mean  -0.01  5.68  5.76  5.62  6.47  4.08  2.14  0.18  0.97  0.90  0.53  0.17  37.78  
Std. Dev.  1.40  4.39  4.17  2.30  1.69  3.11  2.36  0.12  0.18  0.57  0.50  0.38  16.24  
Min  -4.85  0.27  0.37  0 2.20  -1.49  -0.87  0.04  0.57  -5.21  0.00  0.00  1.97  
Max  2.73  24.73  22.87  10.00  12.14  10.00  14.22  0.74  2.43  11.05  1.00  1.00  84.97  
Note: * significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation (Cont’) (Firm-level; N=619)  
  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Dual position of CEO 14 1.00             
International affiliated  
auditor 
15 0.01  1.00            
ROA 16 -0.03  0.05  1.00           
Debt ratio 17 0.08*  -0.04  -0.56*  1.00          
Size  18 0.02  0.17*  0.18*  -0.08*  1.00         
Regulated industry  19 0.04  -0.01  0.03  -0.06*  0.01  1.00        
Age 20 0.08*  -0.05  -0.06*  0.15*  -0.05  0.12*  1.00       
ST 21 0.07*  0.09*  -0.03  0.32*  -0.23*  -0.07*  0.11*  1.00      
Negative recommendation 22 -0.03  -0.03  0.03  -0.03  0.10*  0.03  0.03  -0.05  1.00     
2nd year after loss 23 0.07*  0.07*  0.10*  0.12*  -0.09*  -0.02  0.09*  0.13*  0.00  1.00    
GDP 24 -0.03  0.00  -0.04  0.03  0.10*  0.02  0.20*  0.01  0.01  -0.02  1.00   
No. of listed firms  25 -0.07*  0.02  -0.06  0.06*  0.08*  -0.04  0.12*  0.02  0.02  -0.02  0.65*  1 
Mean  0.13  0.03  -0.09  0.68  20.68  0.20  9.96  0.12  0.02  0.55  17.57  5.13  
Std. Dev.  0.34  0.17  0.17  0.50  0.94  0.40  3.32  0.32  0.16  0.50  0.87  3.69  
Min  0 0 -1.75  0.01  17.71  0 2 0 0 0 14.14  0.26  
Max  1 1 0.20  8.50  24.45  1 21 1 2 1 19.23  12.72  
Note: * significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 3.6 What types of firms are more affected by provincial legal system? 
Heckman Selection Models (OBS: 1000, Censored: 381, Uncensored: 619) 
The coefficients are estimated using Heckman selection models. The dependent variable is the 
substantiveness index of each loss-maker‘s 1-year restructuring plan. Institution refers to province 
contracting law index in models 8a and 8b, p rovince property right law index in  models 9a and 9b, and 
province enforcement index in models 10a and 10b. Other than the control variables listed in the table, 
I also control the industry dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 
 Contracting law Property right law Enforcement 
 Model 11a Model 11b  Model 12a Model 12b Model 13a Model 13b 
Legal institution 0.01+ (0.01) 0.06 (0.07) 0.02+ (0.01) 0.17+ (0.09) -0.01 (0.03) -0.21 (0.14) 
Government support -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Herfindahl index of input  4.1* (2.02) 6.16** (1.85) 4.12* (2.01) 
6.75*** 
(1.86) 
4.19* (2.03) 2.65 (2.21) 
Squared Herfindahl index -6.08* (2.55) -7.5** (2.52) -6.09* (2.54) 
-7.99** 
(2.47) 
-6.17* (2.57) -6.35* (2.47) 
Relative labor 
productivity 
0.27 (0.34) 0.41 (0.61) 0.27 (0.34) 0.87 (0.64) 0.26 (0.34) -0.34 (0.72) 
Relative inventory 
turnover  
0.02 (0.07) -0.21 (0.27) 0.02 (0.07) -0.1 (0.28) 0.02 (0.07) -0.27 (0.37) 
Legal system* relative 













































-0.17+ (0.1) -0.18* (0.09) -0.17+ (0.09) -0.16+ (0.09) -0.16+ (0.1) -0.17+ (0.1) 
Ultimate ownership 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 
Dual position of CEO & 
board director  
-0.44* (0.2) -0.46* (0.2) -0.45* (0.2) -0.46* (0.2) -0.44* (0.2) -0.41+ (0.21) 
International affiliated 
auditor  
-0.14 (0.48) 1.22* (0.62) -0.14 (0.48) 1.09 (0.67) -0.14 (0.48) 0.97 (1.05) 
ROA 0.3 (0.66) 0.4 (0.66) 0.3 (0.66) 0.39 (0.67) 0.31 (0.65) 0.38 (0.63) 
Debt ratio -0.24 (0.21) -0.22 (0.21) -0.23 (0.21) -0.21 (0.21) -0.24 (0.21) -0.25 (0.2) 
Size  0.15** (0.05) 0.11* (0.05) 0.14** (0.05) 0.1* (0.05) 0.15** (0.05) 0.14** (0.05) 
Regulated industry 0.09 (0.56) 0.13 (0.6) 0.07 (0.57) 0.27 (0.68) 0.12 (0.58) 0.12 (0.48) 
Age  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
ST 0.04 (0.22) 0.02 (0.22) 0.04 (0.22) 0.02 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.02 (0.21) 
Negative recommendation 0.39 (0.43) 0.41 (0.4) 0.39 (0.43) 0.41 (0.41) 0.42 (0.43) 0.39 (0.42) 
2
nd
 year after loss -0.2* (0.09) -0.23** (0.09) -0.2* (0.09) 
-0.22** 
(0.09) 
-0.2* (0.09) -0.19* (0.08) 
GDP -0.03 (0.11) -0.03 (0.11) -0.04 (0.11) -0.03 (0.11) -0.04 (0.11) -0.05 (0.11) 
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-0.04* (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 
Constant -2.78 (2.2) -2.28 (2.26) -2.68 (2.19) -2.83 (2.27) -2.49 (2.17) -1.13 (2.28) 
Log pseudo likelihood -1659.12 -1651.92 -1659.13 -1652.65 -1657.00 -1654.42 
Wald test (rho = 0) 5.92*  4.86*  5.90*  4.47*  4.19*  4.34*  
First stage: Restructuring 
Legal system 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.05+ (0.03) 0.05+ (0.03) 
Herfindahl index -0.5 (0.33) -0.49 (0.33) -0.51 (0.33) -0.5 (0.33) -0.4 (0.33) -0.41 (0.33) 
Relative labor 
productivity 
-0.09 (0.3) -0.09 (0.3) -0.09 (0.3) -0.09 (0.3) -0.12 (0.31) -0.13 (0.31) 
Relative inventory 
turnover  
0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 
Government support 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Local government owner 0.04 (0.1) 0.04 (0.1) 0.04 (0.1) 0.04 (0.1) 0.06 (0.1) 0.06 (0.1) 
Central government 
owner 
0.11 (0.14) 0.11 (0.14) 0.11 (0.14) 0.11 (0.14) 0.12 (0.14) 0.12 (0.14) 
Ultimate ownership 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Dual position of CEO & 
board chairman 
-0.2 (0.14) -0.2 (0.14) -0.2 (0.14) -0.2 (0.14) -0.21 (0.13) -0.21 (0.13) 
International affiliated 
auditor  
-0.24 (0.26) -0.24 (0.26) -0.24 (0.26) -0.23 (0.26) -0.27 (0.25) -0.27 (0.25) 
ROA -0.1 (0.36) -0.1 (0.36) -0.1 (0.36) -0.1 (0.36) -0.1 (0.36) -0.1 (0.36) 
Debt ratio -0.08 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) 
Size  -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 
Regulated industry -0.08 (0.1) -0.08 (0.1) -0.08 (0.1) -0.08 (0.1) -0.07 (0.1) -0.07 (0.1) 
Age  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
ST -0.23* (0.12) -0.23* (0.12) -0.24* (0.12) -0.24* (0.12) -0.24* (0.12) -0.24* (0.12) 
Negative recommendation -0.04 (0.18) -0.04 (0.18) -0.03 (0.18) -0.04 (0.18) -0.03 (0.19) -0.03 (0.19) 
2
nd





0.23** (0.07) 0.23** (0.07) 
GDP 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) -0.04 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) 
Prior restructuring by 
other firm 
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 












Constant -0.05 (1.75) -0.06 (1.76) -0.07 (1.75) -0.08 (1.76) 0.82 (1.69) 0.83 (1.69) 
Note: *** Significant at .001 level; ** significant at .01 level; * significant at .05 level; 
+ significant at .1 level. Two-tailed tests for all variables.
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Table 3.7 What types of firms are more affected by provincial government 
support? Heckman Selection Models (OBS: 1000, Censored: 381, Uncensored: 
619) 
The coefficients are estimated using Heckman selection models. The dependent variable is the 
substantiveness index of each loss -maker‘s 1-year restructuring plan. Institution refers to subsidy in 
models 14a and 14b, credit access in models 15a and 15b, local protectionism in models 16a and 16b. 
Other than the control variables listed in the table, I also control the industry dummies and year 
dummies. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 Subsidy Cred it Local protectionism 
 Model 14a Model 14b Model 15a Model 15b Model 16a Model 16b 
Government support -0.01 (0.03) -0.24 (0.18) -0.02 (0.02) -0.21* (0.09) -0.03 (0.04) -0.2 (0.18) 
Legal system 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.01 (0) 0.01 (0) 0.01 (0) 0.01 (0) 
Herfindahl index of 
input 
3.95* (2) 3.01 (2.34) 4.09* (2) 3.45 (2.26) 3.96+ (2.07) 4.13* (2.02) 
Squared Herfindahl 
index 
-5.91* (2.53) -6.28* (2.62) -6.08* (2.54) -7.76** (2.73) -5.92* (2.59) -5.38* (2.65) 
Relative labor 
productivity 
0.28 (0.33) -0.81 (1.08) 0.28 (0.34) -0.37 (0.4) 0.28 (0.34) -0.18 (0.49) 
Relative inventory 
turnover  
0.02 (0.07) -0.26 (0.47) 0.02 (0.07) 0.09 (0.08) 0.03 (0.07) -0.12 (0.21) 
Government support* 
relative inventory 










































-0.18+ (0.1) -0.17+ (0.1) -0.17+ (0.1) -0.15 (0.1) -0.19+ (0.1) -0.18+ (0.1) 
Ultimate ownership 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01* (0) 0.01+ (0) 
Dual position of CEO & 
board director  
-0.43* (0.2) -0.43* (0.2) -0.44* (0.2) -0.42* (0.2) -0.45* (0.2) -0.46* (0.2) 
International affiliated 
auditor  
-0.13 (0.5) 0.68 (1.62) -0.14 (0.49) -1.17* (0.58) -0.18 (0.48) 0.41 (0.7) 
ROA 0.29 (0.66) 0.36 (0.68) 0.29 (0.66) 0.36 (0.66) 0.32 (0.67) 0.51 (0.7) 
Debt ratio -0.23 (0.21) -0.23 (0.22) -0.23 (0.21) -0.22 (0.22) -0.23 (0.22) -0.18 (0.23) 
Size  0.14** (0.05) 0.14** (0.05) 
0.14** 
(0.05) 
0.1* (0.05) 0.14** (0.05) 0.12* (0.05) 
Regulated industry 0.05 (0.55) 0.09 (0.59) 0.06 (0.56) -0.14 (0.34) 0.07 (0.52) 0.02 (0.48) 
Age  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 





0.38 (0.43) 0.38 (0.42) 0.39 (0.43) 0.38 (0.43) 0.37 (0.43) 0.37 (0.42) 
2
nd
 year after loss -0.2* (0.09) -0.2* (0.09) -0.2* (0.09) -0.22* (0.09) -0.2* (0.09) -0.21* (0.09) 
GDP 0.01 (0.09) 0 (0.09) 0.01 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08) -0.06 (0.14) -0.07 (0.13) 








-0.04* (0.02) -0.04* (0.02) 
Constant -3.32+ (1.98) 
-1.8 (2.27) -3.41+ 
(1.92) 
-1.55 (1.91) 
-2.36 (2.52) -1.24 (2.74) 
Log pseudo likelihood -1658.65 -1657.71 -1658.77 -1653.65 -1652.51 -1649.79 
Wald test (rho = 0) 4.65*  4.67*  5.33*  3.49+ 5.99*  4.06*  
First stage: Restructuring 
Government support 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0 (0.02) 0 (0.02) 0.1*** (0.03) 0.1*** (0.03) 
Herfindahl index 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0 (0.01) 0 (0.01) 
Relative labor 
productivity 
-0.43 (0.33) -0.43 (0.33) -0.4 (0.31) -0.4 (0.31) -0.45 (0.33) -0.45 (0.33) 
Relative inventory 
turnover  
-0.1 (0.31) -0.1 (0.31) -0.1 (0.3) -0.1 (0.3) -0.1 (0.3) -0.1 (0.29) 
Government support 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 
Local government 
owner 
0.05 (0.1) 0.05 (0.1) 0.05 (0.1) 0.05 (0.1) 0.06 (0.1) 0.06 (0.1) 
Central government 
owner 
0.13 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 
Ultimate ownership 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Dual position of CEO & 
board chairman 
-0.2 (0.14) -0.2 (0.14) -0.19 (0.14) -0.19 (0.14) -0.16 (0.14) -0.16 (0.14) 
International affiliated 
auditor  
-0.22 (0.26) -0.22 (0.26) -0.21 (0.26) -0.21 (0.26) -0.25 (0.26) -0.24 (0.26) 
ROA -0.09 (0.36) -0.09 (0.36) -0.09 (0.36) -0.09 (0.36) -0.11 (0.35) -0.11 (0.35) 
Debt ratio -0.09 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) -0.1 (0.06) -0.1 (0.06) 
Size  -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) 
Regulated industry -0.09 (0.1) -0.09 (0.1) -0.1 (0.1) -0.1 (0.1) -0.1 (0.11) -0.1 (0.11) 
Age  -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
ST -0.26* (0.12) -0.26* (0.12) -0.25* (0.12) -0.25* (0.12) -0.26* (0.11) -0.26* (0.11) 
Negative 
recommendation 
-0.08 (0.19) -0.08 (0.19) -0.08 (0.19) -0.08 (0.19) -0.02 (0.2) -0.02 (0.2) 
2
nd
 year after loss 0.21** (0.07) 0.21** (0.07) 0.21** (0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.22** (0.07) 0.22** (0.07) 
GDP -0.05 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05) -0.06 (0.05) -0.06 (0.05) 0.14* (0.06) 0.14* (0.06) 
Prior restructuring by 
other firm 
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 










Constant 1.42 (1.49) 1.42 (1.49) 1.58 (1.36) 1.56 (1.36) -2.06 (1.61) -2.06 (1.62) 
 
Note: *** Significant at .001 level; ** significant at .01 level; * significant at .05 level; + significant at .1 level. Two-tailed 





Performance of Substantial vs Symbolic Restructuring in Emerging Economies  
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate restructuring involves firms making changes to their portfolios and 
their organizational and financial structures, and is often conducted through a 
sequence of asset divestment, asset acquisition, asset swapping, and ownership 
restructuring. It is one of the most important aspects of transitional economies because 
the extent of the restructuring and its effect on firm performance is a fundamental 
determinant of economic growth (Djankov & Murrell, 2002).  
A significant body of research has been undertaken to explore the reasons for the 
success or failure of corporate restructurings. For example, some studies point to the 
mismatch between acquirers and their target companies as one of the reasons for poor 
performance after corporate restructurings (Hubbard, 1999; Machhi, 2005; Weber & 
Camerer, 2003). Some studies show that managers may make wrong decisions 
because of agency problems, CEO hubris, and diversification mistakes (Chandra, 
2001; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hariharan, 2005). However, these studies 
attribute the failure of corporate restructurings to factors specific to the enterprise. 
Institutional factors—especially government intervention—seldom form part of the 
analysis, because the empirical context of these studies is a developed market with a 
mature legal system that facilitates market operations. In such a context, restructuring 
performance depends on managers‘ decisions and market discipline, and government 
is of little importance in facilitating corporate restructurings.  
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However, the situation is different in transitional economies. In transitional 
economies, the government—particularly the local government—is an important 
engine that boosts the corporate restructurings. One theoretical argument from 
institutional theory and the transaction cost view is that in the absence of a codified 
legal system, the local government can provide the institutions necessary for 
facilitating restructurings and promoting efficiency (Li, Meng, Wang & Zhou, 2008). 
An opposing argument from the ―soft-budget‖ view is that governments or 
government officials may have ―personal‖ goals such as providing economic security 
for enterprise employees, supplying social services (Kornai, 1979, 1980), or meeting 
politicians‘ private needs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). 
Therefore, the government may bail out firms when their revenues do not cover costs. 
Government bailout measures may discourage firms from making the fundamental 
changes necessary to improve efficiency (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). Hence, studies 
on how local government intervention affects the success of corporate restructurings 
provide inconsistent theoretical predictions and empirical evidence.  
An endogeneity issue arising from the traditional research design adopted in this 
field of study further obscures the real effect of government intervention on success in 
corporate restructuring. Most existing research directly investigates the relation 
between government intervention and post-restructuring performance (Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002). However, the relation between government intervention and corporate 
performance can work in both directions (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). On the one hand, 
government intervention may cause good or bad performance after a corporate 
restructuring. On the other hand, it may be firm performance that dictates government 
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action. Poor performance among firms may predict more government intervention 
because only poorly-performing firms, and not successful firms, need to be bailed out. 
Researchers have addressed this problem in various ways. The methods adopted 
include consideration of pre-restructuring levels of dependent variables (Claessens & 
Djankov, 1997), the use of statistical techniques such as simultaneous estimation 
models (Claessens & Peter, 1997), adopting instrumental variables such as incentives 
of decision makers (Earle & Estrin, 1997), and the use of cohorts of firms with similar 
levels of performance before restructuring (Roberts, Gorkov, & Madigan, 1998). 
However, none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory (Djankov & Murrell, 
2002). 
This study thus attempts to establish the real causal relation between government 
intervention and corporate restructuring performance. To tackle the reverse causal 
relation, this study focuses on both theoretical and empirical aspects of the nexus. 
Theoretically, this study seeks to unravel which mechanisms governments use to 
intervene in corporate restructurings. However, due to data availability, it is difficult 
to look directly into how governments intervene in corporate  restructurings. Instead, 
this study follows an indirect route by looking at the differing nature of various kinds 
of restructurings. The argument is that firms restructure to a differing extent: some 
engage in substantial restructurings to bring about fundamental change in inefficient 
internal routines; others pursue symbolic restructurings with the sole objective of 
manipulating their short-term accounting performance and do nothing to address their 
basic routines. Firms restructure different aspects of their operations: some seek to 
improve property right arrangements, whereas others look to optimize their business 
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portfolio. Consequently, by looking at what types of restructurings can be successful 
with government support, this study will be in a position to unravel the mechanisms 
governing the success or otherwise of restructuring initiatives.  
Empirically, listed firms that report a negative net profit in their annual financial 
report (loss-makers hereafter) are used as the empirical context. Thus I can have a 
cohort of poor-performers that have similar opportunities to obtain government 
support. Moreover, these loss-makers are located in 31 provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions. Although they are subject to the same state-level laws in China, 
they are also subject to different local institutions including the local legal system and 
local government intervention. This heterogeneity in institutions provides an 
opportunity to test the effects of institutions on corporate restructuring performance.  
To test the theoretical concern, I first differentiate substantial restructuring from 
symbolic restructuring. Given that the nature of restructuring itself is endogenous to 
the firm‘s decision, a non-random sample selection issue might arise due to the 
possibility that firms‘ own characteristics determine whether or not they engage in 
substantial restructurings. I therefore use propensity score matching to obtain a 
matched symbolic restructuring as the counterpart for each substantial restructuring. I 
examine whether the efficiency scores of the matched pair after restructuring diverge 
using the difference- in-difference approach. The empirical findings confirm the key 
prediction of institutional theory and transaction cost theory on post-restructuring 
performance: substantial restructuring results in a greater improvement in efficiency 
when there is a well-developed legal system. The substance of a restructuring can 
therefore be taken as an indicator of institutional dependence.  
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I next use the substance of restructurings to understand how local government 
financial support affects post-restructuring efficiency improvement. I argue that local 
government support can either help substantial restructuring among firms by acting as 
an institutional substitute or help symbolic restructuring among firms by acting as a 
cash provider. I find that firm efficiency improves to a greater extent when local 
government support helps with substantial restructurings than when it helps with 
symbolic restructurings. 
I further uncover the performance-enhancing mechanisms of local government 
support by dissecting substantial (symbolic) restructurings into two sub-categories: 
substantial (symbolic) business restructurings and substantial (symbolic) ownership 
restructurings. Substantial (symbolic) business restructurings refer to restructurings 
involving more (less) of an emphasis on refocusing the business portfolio. Substantial 
(symbolic) ownership restructurings refer to restructurings that involve more (less) of 
an emphasis on the transfer of control power. Results show that greater efficiency 
improvements can be achieved when local government support helps to implement a 
substantial ownership restructuring than when it helps to implement a symbolic 
ownership restructuring. However, local government support for substantial business 
restructurings does not promote efficiency improvements.  
HYPOTHESES 
Substantial/Symbolic Restructuring and Efficiency 
Prior studies suggest that firms implement change to differing degrees. The first 
type of change is radical change (also known as revolutionary or frame-breaking 
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change) (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Tushman, Newman & Romanelli, 1986; Damanpour, 
1991). Such radical change brings fundamental shifts in the activities, technology or 
structure of the organization. It represents a clear departure from existing practice. 
Radical change is positive because it creates the momentum required to overcome the 
inevitable inertia that builds up over time (Miller & Chen, 1994). In this study, radical 
change is deemed to occur when a firm restructures to bring about substantial change 
in internal routines that hurt the firm‘s efficiency. For example, a firm involved in 
acquisitions and divestitures may refocus its business portfolio (Singh & Chang, 1992) 
to bring about fundamental change in its inefficient operations. The firm reshapes its 
organizational structure, including its management team and ownership structure, to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of management (Bowman & Singh, 1993). 
Substantial restructuring thus can be expected to improve productive efficiency.  
The second type of change is incremental change (also called evolutionary or 
frame-bending change) ( Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Tushman, Newman & Romanelli, 
1986; Damanpour, 1991). Such change results in minor modifications to existing 
practices. In this study, incremental change is deemed to occur when a firm engages in 
symbolic restructuring. To manipulate its earnings and meet the requirements of 
external stakeholders including debt holders, investors, and regulatory agencies, a 
firm can simply participate in peripheral asset swaps, asset sales, or asset disposals, or 
can rearrange its debt. This type of change allows the firm to increase investment 
revenue gains (Lee & Xue, 2004; Haw, Qi, Qu & Wu, 2005) or non-operating income 
(Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002; Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007; Lee & Xue, 
2004; Haw, Qi, Qu & Wu, 2005). However, it does not involve a departure from 
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inefficient internal routines such as obsolete operations or ineffective governance, and 
cannot bring about any real improvement in efficiency. The following hypothesis is 
therefore proposed:  
H1: Substantial restructuring can bring about a greater improvement in efficiency 
than symbolic restructuring. 
Legal System 
Different degrees of restructuring are associated with different levels of costs. 
Prior studies suggest that radical changes are much harder to undertake (March, 1991; 
Tushman & Nelson, 1990) because firms that seek to overcome inertia not only need 
to bear the high sunk cost of withdrawing existing resources, but also have to make a 
significant investment in initiating new projects. For example, when a firm conducts a 
substantial restructuring to improve an inefficient business portfolio, it needs to cut 
obsolete production lines, shed labor, and rid itself of unproductive assets. The firm 
also needs to introduce new product lines, processes, and technology, and will require 
new investments. This means that the firm will need not only financial support and 
technology, but also professional managers with good judgment of investment 
opportunities and adequate incentives. All these resources are quite beyond the 
internal capacity of any firm. In contrast, incremental changes, or symbolic 
restructurings, are much less costly. The firm needs only adjust some aspects of its 
operations that are peripheral to the organization, such as by selling some peripheral 
assets or investments (Green, 2004).  
Therefore, to obtain the resources it needs to complete the restructuring initiative, 
the firm has to turn to external markets such as the property rights market, the labor 
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market or the capital market. To complete the restructuring process through these 
external markets, the firm has to enter into a series of contracts to carry out 
transactions such as mergers and acquisitions, asset sales, and asset swaps. According 
to institutional theory and transaction cost theory, the efficiency of the contracting 
process depends on the quality of the institutions governing transaction processes in 
the market. These institutions include the codified legal system providing for the 
resolution of transaction-related issues. For example, rules and regulations on 
corporate governance arrangements, financial accounting and auditing rules, debt 
covenants, and bankruptcy procedures are established to govern transactions in 
financial markets. Regulations on the tenure profile of wages, dismissal rules and 
procedures, and regulations governing collective action are established to resolve 
disputes in the labor market. With a well-developed legal system to govern 
contracting processes in external markets, there will be more symmetrical information, 
orderly agencies responsible for valuing assets, and a clearer template for contracting, 
business implementation, and dispute resolution (Ricardo & Mohamad, 2000). These 
institutions allow for corporate restructurings to be completed at a lower cost.  
Prior studies have shown that the institutional environment is especially 
important for more institutionally-dependent organizations or activities (Blanchard & 
Kremer, 1997; Konings, 1998; Konings & Walsh, 1998; Recanatini & Ryterman, 
2000). For example, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) hypothesize that the need for 
contractual enforcement is most critical for enterprises with more complex input 
requirements. Such enterprises perform relatively poorly after abandoning contractual 
enforcement through planning but before the creation of an effective alternative. 
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Recanatini and Ryterman (2000) find that growth is lower in enterprises that 
previously received the highest level of institutional support from central planning, 
one interpretation being that this variable is a proxy for some institutional need. In this 
study, as substantial restructurings are more dependent on external resources to reduce 
cost than are symbolic restructurings, I argue that with a better legal system, 
substantial restructuring outperforms symbolic restructuring to a greater extent. I 
therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
H2: Substantial restructuring outperforms symbolic restructuring to a greater extent 
in a better legal system. 
Government Support 
Next, I examine how local government support affects post-restructuring 
performance.  
In transitional economies such as China, local government plays an important 
role in corporate restructuring. Institutional theory and transaction cost theory suggest 
that in the absence of a codified legal system, local government may act as an 
alternative institution provider to facilitate transactions in two ways (Allen, Qian, & 
Qian, 2005; Boisot & Child, 1996; Clarke, 1991). First, local government can fulfill 
the role of a contracting institution. Local government can provide information, help 
find restructuring partners, or provide a platform to facilitate equity exchange. It can 
give firms preferential access to financial resources. Local government can also 
alleviate the problems of labor redundancies by providing subsidies or assigning 
redundant workers to other firms. Second, local government can use its executive 
powers to facilitate contractual enforcement, thereby alleviating a problem caused by 
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the weakness of the court system (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2008). By these means, local 
governments can reduce transaction costs associated with restructurings, leading to 
more significant post-restructuring efficiency improvements.  
Soft budget theory suggests that to enlarge politicians‘ own political constituency 
or to provide economic security for enterprise employees and supply social services,  
local governments can act as cash providers and bail out firms when the their 
revenues do not cover their costs (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Kornai, 1979, 
1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). There is some evidence of local governments acting 
as cash providers, either through directly injecting funds or in some indirect ways. For 
example, Chen, Lee, and Li (2003) show that local governments directly provide 
fiscal subsidies to help firms polish their financial reports. Wu (2001) shows that to 
protect local interests, local governments push local auditing firms to overvalue focal 
firms‘ assets, thus enabling such firms to falsify their financial reports by selling 
assets at an unfairly high price.12 Whether provided in a direct or indirect manner, 
local government support promotes more symbolic changes and is unlikely to lead to 
post-restructuring efficiency improvements.  
Hence, I propose that whether local government support promotes more 
significant efficiency improvements depends on the way in which the government 
intervenes in a restructuring. As there is not a means of establishing the exact channel 
of local government intervention for the focal firm, I indirectly examine the types of 
restructurings with which local government helps. When the local government helps 
                                                                 
12
 Wu (2001) examines a typical example in h is study. In the restructuring of Qiongminyuan Company, 
there was a distinct difference between four valuations of total assets and net assets, ranging from 0.98 
billion yuan to 1.669 b illion yuan and from 0.73 b illion yuan to 1.069 billion yuan, respectively. This 
great discrepancy did not seem to be explained by operating methods. 
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with more substantial restructurings that rely to a significant extent on institutions, it 
acts as an institution provider and promotes more significant efficiency improvements. 
In contrast, when the local government helps with less substantial restructurings, its 
role is that of a cash provider and it will tolerate inefficiency. I therefore propose the 
following hypothesis. 
H3a: Local government support will lead to more significant efficiency improvements 
when the local government helps with substantial restructurings than when the 
local government helps with symbolic restructurings. 
Local governments may intervene in various aspects of firm restructurings. For 
example, they may help to improve property right arrangements by facilitating the 
transfer of shares. They may also help with firms‘ operating issues by participating in 
the selection and reshaping of the firm‘s business focus.  
However, like any organization, government has its own core competencies and 
weaknesses. Core competencies are defined as activities that provide a strategic 
advantage to an organization. Qian (2000) proposes the core competencies of 
government including the provision of public goods, regulation, and the allocation of 
power. Waddell (2002) gives a more comprehensive description of government 
competencies. He suggests that the public sector possesses resources such as 
regulatory and taxation powers, enforcement apparatus, specialized policy-impact 
knowledge, and government reputation. Based on these resources, the public sector 
has core competencies in areas including rules- focused activity, creation of a ―level 
playing field‖, redistribution of benefits, infrastructure development, public policy 
development, enforcement skills, and government agency networks. On the other 
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hand, he also notes that government has some weaknesses including inflexibility in 
the application of rules, slow decision-making, complexity of jurisdictions/levels, 
difficulty in internal coordination, and a desire to control other sectors. These core 
competencies and weaknesses imply that government is more capable and effective in 
some aspects of its activities than it is in others.  
I argue that competencies in areas such as the allocation of power and 
government agency networks allow the government to tackle property rights issues 
effectively and maintain a political balance. First, in China, if control power is to be 
transferred from the government to a non-state entity, the ownership restructuring plan 
must be authorized by the local government. If a firm can get support from the local 
government, it can utilize the local government‘s networks to facilitate the approval 
process. Second, substantial ownership restructurings are often associated with major 
changes in upper-level management. Participation of the local government will reduce 
resistance to restructuring among top managers, who have often been appointed by or 
have connections with the local government (Qian, 1996). Therefore, local 
government can promote more thorough and efficient ownership restructuring.  
In contrast, acting as a market participant by leading business operations is not 
one of the core competencies of the government. Government officials are not 
professionals when it comes to dealing with market issues. They are not as sensitive 
as business professionals in understanding the commercial environment and 
technological possibilities. In addition, some government weaknesses make things 
worse. For example, government is slow to complete the decision-making process. 
The participation of government in business operations will make the organization 
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less responsive to market competition. The government has sovereignty over business 
actors. It has an incentive to exploit its power while bypassing market rules. Local 
government support for a fundamental business restructuring will not be as effective 
as local government support for property rights issues in promoting efficiency. I 
therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
H3b: Local government support will lead to more significant efficiency improvements 
when the local government helps with substantial ownership restructuring than 
when it helps with substantial portfolio restructuring. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data 
I use listed firms that report a negative net profit in their annual financial report 
(loss-makers hereafter) as the empirical context. Thus I can have a group of 
poor-performers that have similar opportunities to obtain government support. 
Moreover, these loss-makers are located in 31 provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions in mainland China. Although they are subject to the same 
state- level laws, they are also subject to different local institutions including the local 
legal system and local government intervention. This heterogeneity in institutions 
allows us to investigate how the institutions affect corporate restructuring 
performance.  
All the corporate restructuring information is obtained from the China Stock 
Market Accounting Research database (CSMAR), China Center for Economic 
Research (CCER) database and the retrieval system of Chinese listed firms 
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(http://220.194.35.3:8080/zq/ggcx/ggcx.htm). I examine the sample loss-makers‘ 
restructuring announcements in the two years following the loss year. The 
restructuring announcements in each year are together viewed as a one-year 
restructuring plan. The data on province institutions are obtained from the CSMAR 
region economy database, NERI Index of Marketization of China‘s Provinces (Fan & 
Wang, 1999 & 2006) and China Law Info Database. Financial data, corporate 
governance data, market performance data and state pressure data are collected from 
the CSMAR database.  
Variables 
To test the performance divergence between substantial restructuring and 
symbolic restructuring, I use the two technical efficiency scores after restructuring. 
Technical efficiency is a typical operational performance. It refers to the ability and 
willingness of an economic unit to produce the maximum possible output from a 
given combination of inputs and technology, regardless of market prices of outputs, 
inputs and demand (Farrell, 1957). It is composed of pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency. Pure technical efficiency refers to a firm‘s technological ability to use 
the available resources. Scale efficiency refers to a firm choosing its production level 
when the marginal cost equals the output price.  
To calculate technical efficiency scores, I adopt an input-oriented Data Envelope 
Analysis (DEA) because of the excessive production inputs (e.g. excessive staff and 
excessive obsolete assets) in many Chinese loss-makers (Zheka, 2005). I use DEAP 
version 2.1 to run the standard constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to 
scale (VRS) models. To run the DEA analysis, output and input of the firm need to be 
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used. Following previous studies (Zheka, 2005), I measure output as sales revenue 
(adjusted by change in final product inventory) minus total material costs in RMB 
using log values. I measure labor input as the log of the number of employees in the 
firm. I measure capital input as the log value of fixed assets in RMB. The DEA 
generates three efficiency scores: technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency scores. The procedure of DEA is introduced in more details in 
Appendix 1. I use pure technical efficiency score (PTE) and scale efficiency score (SE) 
as the performance indicators.  
I use substantiveness indices to differentiate substantial restructuring from 
symbolic restructuring. To obtain the substantiveness indices of one-year corporate 
restructuring plan, factor analysis is conducted on the changes of internal routines to 
obtain two components: symbolism of business portfolio changes and symbolism of 
ownership restructurings. I summate the two factor scores as the index to indicate the 
symbolism of the restructuring procedure. The factor analysis is presented in 
Appendix 3. The symbolism indices are continuous. The larger they are, the more 
symbolic (or the less substantial) the restructuring is. I multiply the indices by -1 and 
form the three indices for the substantiveness of a restructuring: substantiveness index, 
substantive ownership restructuring index, and substantive business restructuring 
index. Thus, the higher the substantiveness indices are, the more substantial the 
restructuring package is.  
Based on the continuous substantive indices, I create three dichotomy variables. 
Substantive restructuring is coded as 1 when the substantiveness index is higher than 
the sample mean, and 0 when the substantiveness index is lower than the sample mean. 
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Substantive ownership restructuring is coded as 1 when the substantive ownership  
restructuring index is higher than the sample mean, and 0 when the substantive 
ownership restructuring index is lower than the sample mean. Substantive business 
restructuring is coded as 1 when the substantive business restructuring index is higher 
than the sample mean, and 0 when the substantive business restructuring index is 
lower than the sample mean 
To predict the likelihood of firms choosing to perform substantial restructurings 
vs. symbolic restructurings, several firm indicators are included. New bank loan is 
measured by the standardized amount of new bank loan obtained by the loss-makers 
in the restructuring year. Ultimate controller‘s ownership is the shareholdings held by 
the ultimate controller of the firm. Dual position is a dummy indicating if the same 
person holds the CEO and board chairman positions. International auditor is measured 
by a dummy coded as 1 if the auditor is an international affiliated auditing firm. It is 
coded as 0 if the auditor is a domestic auditing firm. International affiliated auditing 
firms are those having an international Big 4 audit firm (KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and Ernst & Young) 
as the joint venture partner. Debt ratio is defined as total debt divided by total assets. 
Firm age measures the calendar years since each firm‘s IPO. Firm size is measured by 
the log of total assets. Firms‘ connections with local and central government are 
proxied by three dummy variables: provincial and below-province government owner 
dummies and the central government owner dummy. The ST dummy is coded as 1 
when the firm is labeled as ―special treatment‖ by the restructuring year. Negative 
recommendation is the count of negative recommendations from financial analysts 
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obtained by the firm. The second year after loss is coded as 1 when the restructuring is 
conducted in the second year after the firm reports loss, and 0 otherwise. The 
regulated industry dummy is 1 if the firm primarily operates in the fields of natural 
resources (the mining, metal, or petroleum industries), public utilities, finance, 
transportation, electricity or the telecommunications industry, and 0 otherwise (Li, 
Zhang, & Zhou, 2005).  
In order to examine the importance of institutions (including legal systems and 
local government support) to a firm‘s restructuring and its subsequent 
post-restructuring performance, I rely on China Law Info Database to measure the 
provincial contracting legislation. I examine the objects of local laws, rules and 
regulations and categorize those regulating business actors‘ contracting process as 
contracting laws. As local regulations are established based on and to support the state 
legal system, a larger count measure indicates that the local laws are better specified 
according to the state legal system. I thus use the count of contracting laws in the 
province to classify provinces into two types: provinces with low-level legal systems 
and provinces with high- level systems.  
Local government can provide support in many ways. I focus on support 
provided through preferential credit access. This is because given the large market 
share of state-owned banks in China (71.4% in 2000 and 51.0% in 2006), the local 
government often allows loss-makers to access credit from the state owned banks 
(Gao & Schaffer, 1998). To measure the individual firm‘s preferential access to 
finance, I follow Abdelati and Claessens (1996) and Coricelli and Djankov (2002) and 
trace back the amount of new bank loans the loss makers received after they reported 
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financial losses. In the sample, among 598 loss-makers, only 170 firms obtained new 
bank loans in the 2 years after reporting losses. I obtain a dummy variable coded as 1 
when the firm obtained a new bank loan during the restructuring year, and 0 when the 
firm did not obtain any new bank loans.  
Other than providing new bank loans, financial support can be traced back to the 
prior long-term debt because politically- favored firms typically have greater access to 
long-term bank loans (Fan, Morck, Huang, & Yeung, 2008; Fan, Rui & Zhao, 2006). 
Hence, I use the superior access to the long-term debt (Fan, Rui & Zhao, 2006) as 
another proxy for government support. Long-term debt ratio is measured by long-term 
debt over total assets. I thus constitute an index to indicate such superior access by 
comparing the focal firm‘s long-term debt ratio to the provincial long-term debt ratio. 
Thus, superior access to the long-term debt is coded as 1 if a firm‘s financial leverage 
is above the average leverage of all firms in the same province, and 0 otherwise.  
Then I use both the new bank loan dummy and the superior access to the 
long-term debt to classify the sample into two sub-samples: firms with high and low 
government support.  
The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented in table 4.1.  
************Insert Table 4.1 around here************ 
Difference-In-Difference Estimation and Propensity Score Matching Methods 
In order to more solidly identify the move (the restructuring) as being directly 
responsible for the efficiency improvement, I turn to a ―difference- in-differences‖ 
research design. Difference- in-difference allows us to distinguish between the 
components of the post-move efficiency improvement that are more likely due to the 
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―treatment‖ (attributable to the restructuring) from the component that is instead due 
to ―selection‖ (attributable to the kind of loss-makers that is more likely to move). 
This comparison, however, remains vulnerable to problems of non-random 
sample selection -- that is, the possibility that the treatment (the implementation of a 
substantial restructuring) is selected by the loss-makers‘ own characteristics. In order 
to address this selection issue, I have calculated the propensity score of substantial 
restructuring using a Probit model, and constructed a matched pair between the treated 
group (consisting of substantial restructurings) and the control group (consisting of 
symbolic restructurings). 
The idea behind propensity score matching can be explained as follows: the 
control group is so similar to the treated group that their possibilities to do substantial 
restructuring are almost the same. As I can determine which firms belong to a 
―treatment group‖ that conduct a substantial restructuring plan, the main issue is how 
to construct the ―control group‖ that is most similar to the treatment group. In order to 
resolve this issue, I first must define what I mean by ―similarity‖. Each firm in the 
dataset has many observable characteristics that may influence the substantial 
restructuring decision. Therefore, in order to compare different firms, a single 
dimensional similarity metric must be constructed from a multi-dimensional 
characteristic vector. The propensity score is a well-defined construct that satisfies the 
qualifications for such a similarity measure. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), ―the propensity score is the conditional probability of assignment to a 
particular treatment given a vector of observed covariates. Both large and small 
sample theories show that adjustment for the scalar propensity score is sufficient to 
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remove bias due to all observed covariates.‖ The propensity score used in the study is 
calculated via the predicted probability from the following Probit estimation for the 
substantial restructuring: 
ititit Xy    
 
in which yit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the restructuring plan is a 
substantial one, and 0 otherwise; Xit is a vector of observable characteristics for firm i 
in year t that includes firm age, firm size, ownership structure, financial leverage, 
CEO dual-position, ST, second year after loss, international auditors, negative 
recommendations and a regulated industry dummy; ε it is the error term, which is 
assumed to be normally distributed; and Φ(•) is the cumulative normal distribution 
function. 
After matching based on the predicted probability, I track the changes in Pure 
Technical Efficiency Score and Scale Efficiency Score for the three years after 
restructuring, and compare the changes since the restructuring year between the 
treatment group and control group. I then divide the sample into high/low legal 
system and high/low government support firms and apply the same methodology to 
evaluate the hypotheses. 
RESULTS 
Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity scores are estimated by running Probit regressions on a set of 
observed covariates. Table 4.2 shows the Probit regression result of the estimation of 
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substantial restructuring using 874 observations over the 1998-2004 period based on 
the loss-makers in the A-share market in China. Three dichotomy variables -- 
substantive restructuring, substantive ownership restructuring and substantive 
business restructuring, respectively – are used as the treatments. I estimate the Probit 
models using whole sample, high/low legal system sub-samples, and high/low local 
government support sub-samples respectively. Despite being run on different samples, 
these regressions show remarkably consistent results with one another. Therefore, I 
report the models using whole sample. Model 1 reports the coefficients from the 
regression using substantive restructuring as the treatment. Model 2 reports the 
coefficients from the regression using substantive ownership restructuring as the 
treatment. Model 3 reports the coefficients from the regression using substantive 
business restructuring as the treatment.  
************Insert Table 4.2 around here************ 
In model 1, it turns out that when a loss-maker has lower financial leverage, or is 
younger or larger, it will most likely conduct a substantial restructuring. If the 
loss-maker is controlled or owned by the local government, it is less likely to conduct 
a substantial restructuring. If the loss-maker is labeled as ―Special Treatment‖, the 
firm is more likely to do substantial restructuring. If the restructuring is conducted in 
the second year after the firm reporting loss, the restructuring is less likely to be 
substantial.  
In model 2, it turns out that the older the loss-maker is, the more likely it is to 
conduct a substantial ownership restructuring. If the loss-maker is controlled or 




In model 3, it turns out that the lower the financial leverage, the more likely a 
loss-maker is to conduct a substantial business restructuring. If the restructuring is 
conducted in the second year after the firm reporting loss, the business restructuring is 
less likely to be substantial.  
I then impose a caliper matching method to obtain the matching sample for each 
substantial restructuring plan. For each loss-maker‘s substantial restructuring plan, the 
caliper matching estimator searches for its closest control match in terms of the 
propensity score but only if the control‘s propensity score is within a certain distance 
(caliper). Imposing a caliper works in the same way as allowing for replacements. Bad 
matches are avoided and hence the matching quality rises. After imposing the 
matching condition of propensity score caliper being 0.01, there are 283 cases of 
symbolic restructurings matching as the counter factual value for 309 substantial 
restructuring cases. Figure 4.1a, 4.1b and 4.1c plot the kernel densities of the 
propensity score before and after matching. As can be seen, while kernel densities 
show significant differences before matching, they are more similar after matching.  
************Insert Figure 4.1 around here************ 
Performance Improvement after Substantive vs. Symbolic Restructuring 
I then employ the difference- in-difference method to compare the performance 
after substantial restructuring and symbolic restructuring based on the matching 
samples. Table 4.3a shows the results from the difference- in-difference estimation, 
which captures the differences in the pure technical efficiency estimates for 
substantial restructuring plans and symbolic restructuring plans. The results 
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demonstrate that in the first year after restructuring, the symbolic restructurings, on 
average, enjoy a 0.61% greater increase in pure technical efficiency than the 
substantial restructurings with similar observed characteristics. However, this estimate 
is not significant. Two years after restructuring, the difference increases to 2.82%, 
significant at 0.01 level. Three years after restructuring, the difference decreases to 
0.99%, but is not significant.  
************Insert Table 4.3 around here************ 
I further examine the difference in the scale efficiency score between substantial 
restructuring and symbolic restructuring over three years in table 4.3b. The results 
demonstrate that in the first year after restructuring, the substantial restructurings, on 
average, enjoy a 0.3% greater increase in scale efficiency than the symbolic 
restructurings with similar observed characteristics. However, the difference is not 
significant. Two years after restructuring, the symbolic restructurings enjoy a 0.13% 
greater increase in scale efficiency than the substantial restructurings, but the 
difference, again, is not significant. Three years after restructuring, the symbolic 
restructurings enjoy a 1.02% greater increase in scale efficiency than the substantial 
restructurings, significant at the 0.05 level. 
All these results are contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis 1. They suggest that 
substantial restructuring leads to greater increase in pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency than symbolic restructuring. However, this can be attributed to the fact that 
substantial restructuring is more costly than symbolic restructuring in transition 
economies, where the institutions are not yet perfectly established.  
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Relationship to the Legal System 
To test the argument that substantial restructurings under-perform when 
compared to symbolic restructurings because of underdeveloped institutions, I further 
investigate the efficiency improvement in subsamples of well developed and poorly 
developed contracting legal systems.  
Table 4.3a also shows the pure technical efficiency differences between the 
substantial restructurings and symbolic restructurings in subsamples of well 
developed and poorly developed legal systems. The substantial restructurings enjoy 
1.53%, 0.99% and 2.70% greater increases in pure technical efficiency than symbolic 
restructurings in environments with well-developed legal systems in the first, second 
and third years after the restructuring. The differences in the first and third years are 
significant at the 0.05 level. However, in environments with underdeveloped legal 
systems, symbolic restructurings enjoy 1.42%, 1.82% and 1.22% greater increase in 
pure technical efficiency than substantial restructurings in the first, second and third 
years after the restructuring. The differences in the first and third years are significant 
at the 0.1 level. Such results support Hypothesis 2, which suggests that substantial 
restructuring can bring about greater improvements in pure technical efficiency than 
symbolic restructuring when the contracting legal system is well developed, but that 
substantial restructurings will under-perform when compared to symbolic 
restructurings in improving pure technical efficiency when the contracting legal 
system is underdeveloped.  
Table 4.3b also shows the scale efficiency differences between substantial 
restructuring and symbolic restructuring in subsamples of well developed and 
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underdeveloped legal systems. For the sub-sample of well-developed legal systems, 
substantial restructurings enjoy a 0.73% greater increase in scale efficiency than 
symbolic restructurings in the first year after the restructuring, significant at the 0.05 
level. However, symbolic restructurings enjoy a 1.25% greater increase in scale 
efficiency than substantial restructurings in the second and third years after the 
restructuring. These differences are significant at the 0.05 level. For the sub-sample of 
underdeveloped legal systems, symbolic restructurings enjoy 0.06%, 0.71% and 2.00% 
greater increases in scale efficiency than substantial restructurings in the first, second 
and third years after the restructuring. The difference in the third year is significant at 
the 0.05 level. Such results do not lend support to hypothesis 2. They suggest that 
symbolic restructuring can bring greater scale efficiency improvements than 
substantial restructuring. This could be attributed to the fact that improving scale 
efficiency is relatively less costly, and therefore less dependent on institutions than 
improving pure technical efficiency. The quality of the legal system is not critical to 
facilitating substantial restructuring to improve scale efficiency.  
Relation to Local Government Support 
I then examine whether local government support is an effective tool in 
contributing to the success of restructurings.  
Table 4.3a also shows the pure technical efficiency differences between the 
substantial restructurings and symbolic restructurings in subsamples of high and low 
levels of local government support. Two indicators, namely new bank loans and 
superior long-term debt, are used to separate samples. When using new bank loans to 
separate samples, results show that for the firms that obtain new bank loans, their 
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substantial restructurings enjoy 4.06%, 4.70% and 6.59% greater increases in pure 
technical efficiency than symbolic restructurings in the first, second and third years 
after restructuring. These differences are significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. In 
contrast, for the firms that did not obtain new bank loans, symbolic restructurings 
enjoy 1.12%, 2.63% and 2.45% greater increases in pure technical efficiency than 
substantial restructurings in the first, second and third years after restructuring. The 
differences for the second and third years are significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels. 
Such results imply that local government support through providing access to 
financial assistance does help firms undergoing substantial restructuring to improve 
their pure technical efficiency. The results also support Hypothesis 3a, which suggests 
that local government support leads to greater efficiency improvements when helping 
with substantial restructuring than when helping with symbolic restructuring.  
Table 4.3a also shows that for the firms that obtain superior long-term debt, the 
increase in pure technical efficiency of substantial restructuring and symbolic 
restructuring does not differ significantly in the first, second and third years. In 
contrast, for firms that have not obtained superior long-term debt, symbolic 
restructurings enjoy 1.84%, 3.68% and 4.97% greater increases in pure technical 
efficiency than substantial restructurings in the first, second and third years after the 
restructuring. These differences are significant at the 0.05 level. Such results do not 
support hypothesis 3a. However, they suggest that without financial support from the 
local government, substantial restructurings cannot improve scale efficiency more 
than symbolic restructurings. 
Table 4.3b also shows the scale efficiency differences between substantial and 
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symbolic restructuring in subsamples of high and low levels of local government 
support. For the firms that obtained new bank loans, substantial restructuring shows a 
0.29% greater increase in scale efficiency than symbolic restructuring in the first year, 
but this differences is not significant. Symbolic restructuring enjoys a 0.78% and 3.86% 
greater increase in scale efficiency than substantial restructuring in the second and 
third years, with this difference being significant at the 0.1 level in the third year. In 
contrast, for the firms that did not obtain new bank loans, the increase in scale 
efficiency after symbolic restructuring and substantial restructuring do es not differ 
significantly in any of the three years. For the firms that have or have not obtained 
superior long-term debt, the increase in scale efficiency of the substantial 
restructuring and symbolic restructuring does not differ significantly in the first, 
second or third years. Such results suggest that local government support through 
providing access to financial assistance does not help substantial restructuring to 
improve scale efficiency any more than it does symbolic restructuring. The results fail 
to support hypothesis 3a. 
Substantial Business Restructuring or Substantial Ownership Restructuring 
Next, in tables 4.4 and 4.5, I investigate Hypothesis 3b: in which areas does local 
government support help to improve efficiency? I use substantive ownership 
restructuring and substantive business restructuring as treatments, estimate the two 
propensity scores and obtain the matching samples respectively. Tables 4.4a and 4.4b 
show the difference- in-difference analysis of pure technical efficiency and sca le 
efficiency based on matching samples. Tables 4.5a and 4.5b show the 
difference-in-difference analysis of pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
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based on matching samples.  
************Insert Table 4.4 around here************ 
************Insert Table 4.5 around here************ 
Table 4.4a shows the difference- in-difference analysis of pure technical 
efficiency of substantial ownership restructuring and symbolic ownership 
restructuring. For the whole sample, symbolic ownership restructuring enjoys a 1.62% 
greater increase in pure technical efficiency improvements than substantial ownership 
restructurings in the third year, significant at the 0.1 level. Table 4.4b shows symbolic 
ownership restructuring enjoys 0.41% higher increase of scale efficiency than 
substantial ownership restructuring in the first year, significant at the 0.1 level.  
Table 4.4a also shows that for the firms obtaining new bank loans, substantial 
ownership restructurings enjoy a 1.98% greater increase in pure technical efficiency 
than symbolic ownership restructurings at the 0.1 level. For firms not obtaining new 
bank loans, symbolic ownership restructurings enjoy a 1.54% greater increase in pure 
technical efficiency than substantial ownership restructurings in the third year at the 
0.1 level. For firms who have obtained superior long-term debt, substantial ownership 
restructurings enjoy a 3.33% greater increase in pure technical efficiency than 
symbolic ownership restructurings in the second year at the 0.1 level. For firms who 
did not obtain superior long-term debt, symbolic ownership restructurings enjoy 2.30% 
and 4.20% greater increases in pure technical efficiency than substantial ownership 
restructurings in the second and third years at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. Such results 
suggest that when the local government uses financial support to help with substantial 
ownership restructuring, there will be a greater improvement in pure technical 
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efficiency than when the local government helps with symbolic ownership 
restructurings.  
In table 4.4b, for firms obtaining new bank loan, substantial ownership 
restructurings enjoy 2.07%, 1.85% and 2.33% greater increases in scale efficiency 
than symbolic ownership restructurings in the first, second and third years at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.1 levels. For firms who have or have not obtained superior long-term debt, 
there is no difference in the increase of scale efficiency between substantial ownership 
restructuring and symbolic ownership restructuring in any year. Such results suggest 
when the local government provides new bank loans to help substantial ownership 
restructuring, scale efficiency can be improved more than when the local government 
helps with symbolic ownership restructuring.  
In table 4.5a, for the whole sample, the increase in pure technical efficiency 
between the substantial business restructuring and symbolic business restructuring 
does not differ significantly. Moreover, for both the firms obtaining new bank loans 
and the firms not obtaining new bank loans, the increase of pure technical efficiency 
between the substantial business restructuring and symbolic business restructuring 
does not differ significantly. For firms who have obtained superior long-term debt, 
symbolic business restructurings enjoy a 3.14% greater increase in pure technical 
efficiency than symbolic business restructurings in the second year at the 0.1 level. 
For firms who have not obtained superior long-term debt, symbolic business 
restructurings enjoy a 1.24% greater increase in pure technical efficiency than 
substantial business restructurings in the first year at the 0.1 level. Such results 
suggest that when the firms conduct more substantial business restructuring, local 
145 
 
government support through providing access to financial assistance does not help to 
improve pure technical efficiency.  
In table 4.5b, for the whole sample, the increase in scale efficiency of substantial 
restructurings is higher than that of symbolic restructurings at the 0.1 level in the first 
year. For the firms obtaining new bank loans, symbolic business restructurings enjoy a 
1.56% greater increase in scale efficiency than substantial business restructurings in 
the first year at the 0.1 level. For firms not obtaining new bank loans, substantial 
business restructurings enjoy a 0.42% greater increase in scale efficiency than 
symbolic business restructurings in the first year at the 0.1 level. For firms who have 
obtained superior long-term debt, symbolic business restructurings enjoy a 2.13% 
greater increase in scale efficiency than substantial business restructurings in the 
second year at the 0.1 level. For firms who have not obtained superior long-term debt, 
the increase in scale efficiency does not differ significantly between symbolic 
business restructuring and substantial business restructuring in any year. Such results 
suggest that when the firms conduct more substantial business restructurings, local 
government support through providing access to financial assistance does not help to 
improve scale efficiency. 
Therefore, results in tables 4.4 and 4.5 together lend support to hypothesis 3b.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Despite the importance of government intervention in determining the course of 
corporate restructurings and economic growth in transitional economies, theoretical 
and empirical studies that seek to examine how government intervention affects 
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corporate restructuring performance still show inconsistent results. These inconsistent 
results are further complicated by the fact that the research design traditionally 
adopted cannot satisfactorily deal with the reverse causal relation between 
government intervention and performance after a corporate restructuring. I suggest 
that to tackle the reverse causal relationship, we need to unravel the mechanisms 
through which the government intervenes in corporate restructurings.  
As it is difficult to look directly into how the government intervenes in corporate 
restructurings, I first introduce the nature of restructurings.  I show that some firms 
conduct restructurings to bring about substantial change to their internal routines to 
improve efficiency, while others merely polish their figures superficially without 
implementing fundamental changes. Given the theoretical prediction that substantial 
restructuring leads to greater efficiency, it is interesting to examine why many firms 
choose symbolic restructurings over substantial restructurings. The results show that 
substantial restructuring leads to less improvement in terms of pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency. I attribute this to the fact that substantial restructuring 
is more dependent on the existence of adequate institutions. In transitional economies 
where institutions are underdeveloped, substantial restructurings are associated with 
higher costs. 
To test the institutional dependence argument, I further show that a good legal 
system is important to the success of a more substantial restructuring. I find that given 
the existence of a well-developed contracting legal system, substantial restructuring 
leads to a greater improvement in pure technical efficiency than does symbolic 
restructuring. However, in the presence of an underdeveloped contracting legal system, 
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substantial restructuring underperforms symbolic restructuring in improving pure 
technical efficiency. This supports my argument that substantial restructurings are 
more dependent on institutions than are symbolic restructurings. This result is 
consistent with those of previous studies, which show that institutions are more 
important to activities that involve higher transaction costs (Blanchard & Kremer, 
1997; Konings, 1998; Konings & Walsh, 1999; Recanatini & Ryterman, 2000). The 
substance of restructurings thus can be taken as an indicator of institutional 
dependency.  
I then show that local government can act as an alternative mechanism 
promoting efficiency improvements. When a loss-maker obtains more local 
government support in, for example, the form of new bank loans, substantial 
restructuring leads to a greater improvement in pure technical efficiency than does 
symbolic restructuring. When a loss-maker does not obtain local government support, 
such as where it is denied a bank loan or superior long-term debt, substantial 
restructuring will underperform symbolic restructuring. This suggests that local 
governments act as institution providers and reduce the transaction costs of substantial 
restructurings. However, local governments may also act as cash providers. They may 
bail out firms by simply promoting symbolic restructuring. In this situation, local 
governments will bring about less substantial improvements in pure technical 
efficiency than when they help with more substantial restructurings.  
Finally, I show that local government support for substantial ownership 
restructurings facilitates greater improvements in pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency than those achieved when local government supports symbolic ownership 
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restructurings. However, local government support does not alleviate the negative 
effects of substantial business restructuring on efficiency improvements. These results 
suggest that local government has its own core competencies in areas including the 
allocation of power (Qian, 2000) and government agency networks (Waddell, 2002). 
Helping with the settlement of property rights arrangements is within the scope of the 
government‘s core competencies, while participating in operational decisions is 
beyond the ambit of the government‘s key skills.  
This study thus unravels the mechanisms through which local government 
participation leads to the success or failure of corporate restructuring. It contributes to 
the literature on government intervention and corporate restructuring in transitional 
economies. 
Moreover, this study contributes to the literature on corporate restructuring in 
China. Prior studies suggest that in China, some firms engage in corporate 
restructuring to bring about fundamental changes in their operations and 
organizational structures, thus helping to improve efficiency. However, more firms 
restructure to manipulate their accounting performance or stock market price. With 
the expectation that substantial restructuring leads to higher efficiency, a question 
arises: why do so many firms choose symbolic restructuring over more substantial 
restructuring? I answer this question by showing that substantial restructuring has a 
negative effect on efficiency when institutions are underdeveloped, as has often been 
the case in China.  
This study also has practical implications for both policy makers and managers. 
For policy makers, I first show that firms choose to engage in less rather than more 
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substantial restructuring due to institutions being underdeveloped. Therefore, I 
conclude that to regulate symbolic restructuring in China effectively and promote 
efficient restructuring, the government needs to provide better institutions to help 
reduce the cost of restructuring. Second, my results provide evidence that the 
contracting legal system has an impact on the success of corporate restructuring. In 
the absence of a proper contracting legal system, local government intervention is an 
alternative mechanism through which corporate restructuring can be facilitated. This 
suggests that there might not be a definitive institutional model for promoting 
economic growth. If it takes a long time to establish and give effect to a codified legal 
institution in transitional economies, depending on local government intervention may 
be a viable solution (Allen & Qian, 2008; Boisot & Child, 1996; Clarke, 1991; Xu, 
1997). Third, I show that local governments are more effective at dealing with 
property rights arrangements than they are at participating in business operations. 
Thus, I imply that governments should position themselves appropriately when 
engaging in economic activity. My results also suggest that managers may reduce the 




Figure 4.1a Propensity Scores of Treated (Substantial Restructuring) and 













Figure 4.1b Propensity Scores of Treated (Substantial Ownership Restructuring) 













Figure 4.1c Propensity Scores of Treated (Substantial Ownership Restructuring) 
















Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation (OBS: 592) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Substantial restructuring  1                 
2 Substantial ownership 
restructuring 
0.18* 1                
3 Substantial business 
restructuring 
0.59* -0.23* 1               
4 New bank loan 0.03 -0.03 0.03 1              
5 Negative recommendation 0.04 -0.02 0.06* 0.07* 1             
6 Ultimate ownership 0.10* 0.00 0.06* 0.01 0.00 1            
7 Dual position -0.07* -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07* 1           
8 International auditor 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.10* 0.00 0.10* -0.03* 1          
9 Debt ratio -0.12* -0.01 -0.10* -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.03* 0.00 1         
10 Log(age) -0.12* 0.06* -0.08* -0.06* 0.04* -0.38* 0.01 -0.01 0.03* 1        
11 Size 0.11* 0.04 0.04 0.18* 0.02* 0.19* -0.05* 0.29* -0.08* 0.16* 1       
12 Below provincial government 
owner 
-0.08* -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04* 0.11* -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 1      
13 Provincial government owner -0.06* -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.07* -0.05* 0.03 -0.01 -0.10* 0.03 -0.16* 1     
14 Central government owner 0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.07* 0.05* 0.19* -0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.10* 0.13* -0.14* -0.23* 1    
15 ST 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05* 0.00 -0.06* 0.03* 0.01 0.26* 0.16* -0.15* -0.01 0.05* -0.03 1   
16 2nd year loss -0.10* -0.03 -0.10* -0.02 -0.04* -0.03 0.06* -0.05* 0.03 0.19* -0.13* -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.15* 1  
17 Regulated industry 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.06* 0.02* -0.09* -0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.06* 0.11* -0.07* -0.06* 0.02 -0.03* 0.01  1 
 Mean 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00 37.81 0.12 0.07 0.58 1.88 20.98 0.09 0.21 0.17 0.04  0.61  0.16  
 Std. Dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 1 0.07 16.18 0.32 0.25 7.52 0.67 1.05 0.29 0.41 0.38 0.21  0.49  0.37  
 Min 0 0 0 -0.18 0 1.06 0 0 -0.127 0 12.31 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Max 1 1 1 23.87 2 84.97 1 1 877.26 3.22 29.65 1 1 1 2 1 1 














 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
New bank loan -0.69 0.59 1.06 0.65 -0.71 0.6 
Ultimate ownership 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
Dual position of CEO -0.18 0.14 -0.09 0.14 0.06 0.14 
International auditor  -0.16 0.27 -0.37 0.27 0.22 0.27 
Debt ratio -0.36** 0.13 0.06 0.1 -0.46** 0.14 
Log(Age) -0.25+ 0.15 0.32* 0.14 -0.23 0.14 
Size 0.13* 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 
Below provincial government owner -0.49** 0.17 -0.27 0.16 -0.23 0.16 
Provincial government owner -0.32** 0.12 -0.14 0.12 -0.15 0.12 
Central government owner -0.19 0.14 -0.24+ 0.14 0.05 0.14 
ST 0.35* 0.15 0 0.15 0.21 0.15 
Negative recommendation 0.10 0.29 -0.1 0.29 0.38 0.29 
2
nd
 year after loss -0.22* 0.1 -0.08 0.1 -0.2* 0.1 
Regulated industry 0.05 0.12 -0.13 0.12 0.02 0.12 
Constant -1.97+ 1.16 -1.44 1.15 0.3 1.15 
LR chi2 47.79***(14) 17.53(14) 35.71**(14) 
Pseudo R2 .05 0.02 .03 
OBS 743 743 743 




Table 4.3 Efficiency Improvement After Substantial vs Symbolic Restructurings  
4.3a PTE at time t (%) and its changes over time (%) 
Whole Sample Well-developed contracting law Under-developed contracting law 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Substantial 57.81 2.41 3.11 5.77 Substantial 58.52 3.44 3.68 5.69 Substantial 57.51 2.50 4.91 8.07 
Symbolic  57.72 3.02 5.93 6.76 Symbolic  59.66 1.91 2.69 2.98 Symbolic  56/85 3.92 6.74 9.29 
ATT 0.10 -0.61 -2.82** -0.99 ATT -1.14 1.53* 0.99 2.70* ATT 6.65 -1.42+ -1.82+ -1.22 
S.E. 0.49 0.72 1.01 1.36 S.E. .94 1.06 1.16 1.50 S.E. 5.98 1.13 1.44 1.93 
# Matches 592 592 592 592 # Matches 237 237 237 237 # Matches 328 328 328 328 
     New bank loan No new bank loan 
     Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 57.22 4.85 4.35 7.61 Substantial 58.38 1.89 3.20 5.50 
     Symbolic  57.51 0.79 -0.35 1.02 Symbolic  57.66 3.01 5.83 7.96 
     ATT -0.29 4.06* 4.70** 6.59** ATT 0.72 -1.12 -2.63* -2.45+ 
     S.E. 1.44 2.09 2.09 2.26 S.E. 0.58 0.78 1.11 1.59 
     # Matches 77 77 77 77 # Matches 505 505 505 505 
     Superior long-term loan No superior long-term loan 
     Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 57.89 2.38 4.68 7.86 Substantial 57.51 1.18 2.51 5.18 
     Symbolic  55.99 3.33 8.96 8.06 Symbolic  57.62 3.02 6.19 10.16 
     ATT 1.90 -0.95 -4.28 -0.20 ATT -0.11 -1.84** -3.68** -4.97** 
     S.E. 1.25 1.90 2.89 3.19 S.E. 0.61 0.86 1.35 2.17 





4.3b SE at time t (%) and its changes over time (%)  
Whole Sample Well-developed contracting law Under-developed contracting law 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Substantial 97.04 0.37 0.10 -0.55 Substantial 97.07 0.82 -0.36 -0.17 Substantial 96.93 0.34 -0.17 -0.78 
Symbolic  96.48 0.07 0.23 0.47 Symbolic  96.71 0.09 0.89 1.09 Symbolic  96.29 0.40 0.54 1.21 
ATT 0.57* 0.30 -0.13 -1.02* ATT 0.36 0.73 -1.25* -1.25* ATT 0.64 -0.06 -0.71 -2.00* 
S.E. 0.36 0.36 0.48 0.62 S.E. 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.78 S.E. 0.45 0.53 0.74 0.85 
# Matches 592 592 592 592 # Matches 237 237 237 237 # Matches 328 328 328 328 
     New bank loan No new bank loan 
     Year T t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 97.71 0.17 -0.26 -3.25 Substantial 96.79 0.14 -0.14 -0.81 
     Symbolic  97.36 -0.12 0.52 0.62 Symbolic  96.41 -0.29 -0.20 -0.20 
     ATT 0.35 0.29 -0.78 -3.86+ ATT 0.38 0.43 0.06 -0.61 
     S.E. 0.87 0.93 1.02 2.92 S.E. 0.42 0.38 0.53 0.69 
     # Matches 77 77 77 77 # Matches 505 505 505 505 
     Superior long-term loan No superior long-term loan 
     Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 95.71 0.16 -0.79 -2.03 Substantial 97.12 0.36 0.36 -0.29 
     Symbolic  96.88 -0.75 -1.17 -1.35 Symbolic  96.61 0.14 0.61 0.13 
     ATT -1.16 0.90 0.37 -0.67 ATT 0.51 0.23 -0.25 -0.42 
     S.E. 1.07 1.03 1.40 2.12 S.E. 0.49 0.47 0.55 0.89 





Table 4.4 Efficiency Improvement after Substantial vs Symbolic Ownership Restructuring  
4.4a PTE at time t and its changes over time (%)  
Whole Sample New bank loan No new bank loan 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Substantial 58.43 2.45 3.89 5.62 Substantial 56.10 3.92 3.57 4.82 Substantial 58.47 2.22 3.85 5.91 
Symbolic  57.66 2.73 5.03 7.24 Symbolic  58.35 1.94 3.04 7.05 Symbolic  57.53 2.38 4.53 7.45 
ATT 0.77* -0.28 -1.14 -1.62+ ATT -2.25* 1.98+ 0.53 -2.22 ATT 0.95* -0.17 -0.68 -1.54+ 
S.E. 0.47 0.68 0.91 1.24 S.E. 1.23 1.83 1.95 2.60 S.E. 0.53 0.69 0.97 1.43 
# Matches 592 592 592 592 # Matches 85 85 85 85 # Matches 505 505 505 505 
     Superior long-term loan No superior long-term loan 
     Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 57.29 4.51 9.07 7.08 Substantial 57.65 2.07 2.80 4.74 
     Symbolic  57.25 3.81 5.74 7.16 Symbolic  57.99 2.85 5.10 8.94 
     ATT 0.04 0.71 3.33+ -0.08 ATT -0.34 -0.78 -2.30* -4.20** 
     S.E. 1.34 1.78 2.90 2.49 S.E. 0.60 0.98 1.23 2.00 
     # Matches 146 146 146 146 # Matches 388 388 388 388 
4.4b SE at time t and its changes over time (%) 
Whole Sample New bank loan No new bank loan 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Substantial 96.96 -0.09 0.06 -0.03 Substantial 96.44 1.88 1.66 1.50 Substantial 96.87 0.11 0.23 -0.14 
Symbolic  96.61 0.31 0.15 0.02 Symbolic  97.33 -0.19 -0.18 -0.84 Symbolic  96.49 0.04 0.12 0.15 
ATT 0.35+ -0.41+ -0.09 -0.05 ATT -0.89 2.07** 1.85* 2.33+ ATT 0.38 0.08 0.11 -0.29 
S.E. 0.33 0.32 0.45 0.60 S.E. 1.03 0.83 1.08 1.46 S.E. 0.36 0.34 0.49 0.59 
# Matches 592 592 592 592 # Matches 85 85 85 85 # Matches 505 505 505 505 
     Superior long-term loan No superior long-term loan 
     Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 96.28 0.32 -0.70 -0.42 Substantial 96.86 -0.27 0.50 0.26 
     Symbolic  96.23 0.48 -0.88 -1.91 Symbolic  96.86 -0.09 0.03 -0.54 
     ATT 0.05 -0.17 0.17 1.49 ATT 0.00 -0.18 0.47 0.80 
     S.E. 0.95 1.01 1.34 1.83 S.E. 0.37 0.45 0.48 0.76 




Table 4.5 Efficiency Improvement after Substantial vs Symbolic Business Restructuring  
4.5a PTE at time t and its changes over time (%) 
Whole Sample New bank loan No new bank loan 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Substantial 58.08 2.58 4.13 6.24 Substantial 58.19 6.11 5.96 8.63 Substantial 58.02 2.22 4.49 6.60 
Symbolic  58.02 2.63 4.97 6.93 Symbolic  56.59 3.39 4.69 5.23 Symbolic  58.16 2.76 5.06 7.46 
ATT 0.06 -0.05 -0.84 -0.68 ATT 1.60 2.73 1.27 3.40 ATT -0.14 -0.54 -0.57 -0.86 
S.E. 0.48 0.67 0.95 1.29 S.E. 1.62 2.96 2.72 3.07 S.E. 0.54 0.75 1.11 1.59 
# Matches 592 592 592 592 # Matches 83 83 83 83 # Matches 505 505 505 505 
     Superior long-term loan No superior long-term loan 
     Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 57.78 3.79 4.44 7.18 Substantial 57.92 1.86 3.88 6.96 
     Symbolic  57.21 4.04 7.58 6.39 Symbolic  57.88 3.10 4.21 5.93 
     ATT 0.57 -0.25 -3.14+ 0.79 ATT 0.04 -1.24+ -0.33 1.03 
     S.E. 1.14 1.84 2.47 2.94 S.E. 0.57 0.94 1.27 1.80 
     # Matches 143 143 143 143 # Matches 388 388 388 388 
4.5b SE at time t and its changes over time (%) 
Whole Sample New bank loan No new bank loan 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Substantial 96.86 0.24 -0.10 -0.42 Substantial 97.44 -0.03 0.45 -0.18 Substantial 96.81 0.20 -0.21 -0.69 
Symbolic  96.71 -0.13 0.19 0.13 Symbolic  96.72 1.53 0.30 0.22 Symbolic  96.49 -0.22 -0.15 0.03 
ATT 0.15 0.37+ -0.29 -0.55 ATT 0.72 -1.56+ 0.14 -0.40 ATT 0.32 0.42+ -0.06 -0.71 
S.E. 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.60 S.E. 1.15 1.35 1.14 1.51 S.E. 0.39 0.35 0.55 0.67 
# Matches 592 592   # Matches 83 83 83 83 # Matches 505 505 505 505 
     Superior long-term loan No superior long-term loan 
     Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 
     Substantial 96.81 0.16 -0.25 -2.10 Substantial 97.00 -0.12 0.42 -0.10 
     Symbolic  96.51 0.18 -0.64 0.04 Symbolic  96.85 -0.09 0.46 0.04 
     ATT 0.30 -0.02 0.39 -2.13+ ATT 0.16 -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 
     S.E. 1.00 0.69 0.88 2.04 S.E. 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.76 





Despite of the popularity of the symbolic restructurings in both developed and 
developing economies, relatively less attention has been directed to how the 
institutional environment shapes firms‘ symbolic restructuring choice and its 
implications on post-restructuring performance. This dissertation contributes new 
insights to understanding this issue by investigating when and how local legal system 
and local government support shape the decision and performance of firms‘ 
substantial and symbolic restructurings. Based on a comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical analysis, I find that both the legal system and local government support 
shape firms‘ substantial/symbolic restructuring choice by affecting implementation 
costs and supervisory pressure. The local legal system promotes more substantial 
restructurings among firms that have more complex issues involved in restructurings 
and less independent auditors. In contrast, local government support promotes more 
substantial restructurings among firms with less complex issues involved in 
restructurings or when there is a well-developed legal system. Thus, I show that the 
choice between substantial and symbolic restructurings is actually driven by a 
combination of legitimacy and efficiency concerns.  
I also find substantial restructurings cannot lead to more efficiency improvement 
than symbolic restructurings unless there is enough institutional support. Such 
institutional support could come from a well-developed legal system or local 
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government intervention. Furthermore, when local government acts as institutional 
provider to help with firms‘ substantial restructurings, it does not always lead to 
efficiency improvement: it leads to more success when helping with fundamental 
changes in property right arrangement, while it leads to failure of corporate 
restructurings when helping with fundamental changes in business operations.  
By adopting a holistic approach which examines both the legal system and local 
government support, our study cautions the single use of policy tools to implement 
central policy, such as regulating symbolic restructuring, and provides abundant 
implications for policy-makers in emerging economies about how to build effective 
institution package by combining both the codified legal system and uncodified 
government intervention at the same time.    
I see the study as advancing our understanding of the relationship between 
institution and symbolic actions, and I propose several extensions for future research. 
For example, as the dimensions of corporate restructuring are not specified 
beforehand, I cannot follow prior studies by examining how many dimensions have 
been implemented to measure the symbolism/substantive of restructuring. My 
solution is to identify several internal routines that decide firms‘ e fficiency, such as 
ultimate control, inefficient portfolio, timing, related party transaction, and so on. 
Then I examine whether the restructuring affects these internal routines. This is 
because I believe these are the fundamental internal routines that lead to the 
inefficiency in Chinese listed firms. If restructurings do not change these internal 
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routines, efficiency cannot be improved substantially. In the future research, there is 
an opportunity to enrich the symbolism/substantive measure by bringing more internal 
routines that could affect listed firms‘ efficiency. Furthermore, such a framework can 
be employed to measure other forms of continuum symbolic actions, such as an 
important type of organizational restructuring pressed by regulation -- the adoption 
and implementation of independent directors. For example, to measure the symbolism 
of independent directors, we may identify whether independent directors have some 
negative opinions on decisions that are pertinent to the important internal routines.  
Another extension could be to investigate how the organizational factors interacted 
with local institutions shape their response to central government. This may be 
particularly useful for identifying the underlying process through which managers 
manipulate local government to help their firms circumvent central authorities.  
Given the importance of institutions and the firms‘ growth through restructuring, 
I believe that additional studies linking these two topics and enriching our 
understanding in any of these directions would represent contributions to strategic 




APPENDIX 1 CLASSIFICATION OF CENTRAL, LOCAL AND SHARED TAXES 
 Classification of Central, Local and Shared Taxes 
Central revenue Customs duty 
 Consumption tax 
 Value added tax and consumption tax collected by custom houses 
 Income tax on centrally managed enterprises 
 Income tax on local banks, foreign banks, and banking corporations  
 Business tax, income tax, and urban maintenance and construction tax 
collected via railway authorities, banks headquarters, and insurance 
companies 
 Income tax on the interest on bank savings  
Local revenue Business tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, and personal income 
tax (excluding central revenue as listed in the previous box)  
 Income tax on locally managed enterprises (excluding local banks, foreign 
banks, and banking corporations in the previous box)  
 Urban land use tax 
 Tax on taking farming land for non-agricultural 
 purposes 
 Land value added tax 
 Housing tax 
 Urban real estate tax 
 Vehicle use tax 
 Tax on vehicle plates 
 Stamp duty tax 
 Contract tax 
 Slaughter tax 
 Banquet tax 
 Bequest tax 
Shared revenue Value added tax (the central government 75%; local governments 25%) 
 Natural resources tax (tax paid by ocean oil corporations belongs to the 
central government)  
 Negotiable securities transaction tax (yet to be collected) 
Source: Jin Renqing, ed., A Reader on Tax Knowledge for Leaders (Beijing: Chinese Finance 
and Economy Press, 2000), p. 116. 
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APPENDIX 2 CALCULATION OF EFFICIENCY SCORES USING DEAP 2.1  
I use data envelope analysis (DEA) to compute efficiency scores including the 
technical efficiency score, the pure technical efficiency score, and the scale efficiency 
score. DEA can be roughly defined as a nonparametric method of measuring the 
efficiency of a decision-making unit (DMU) with multiple inputs and/or outputs. In 
DEA, there are n decision-making units (DMUs) to be evaluated, each of which uses 
different amounts of m inputs to produce s different outputs. DEA is aimed at 
identifying which of the n DMUs can be used to determine an envelopment surface. 
This envelopment surface is called the empirical production function or the efficient 
frontier. By comparing each DMU to the envelopment surface, their relative 
efficiency scores are calculated. Units that lie on the surface are efficient, whereas 
those that do not lie on the surface are inefficient. Under the DEA method, a firm with 
an efficiency score of unity (100%) is located on the efficient frontier in the sense that 
its inputs cannot be further reduced without decreasing its output. A firm with an 
efficiency score of below 100% is relatively inefficient.  
Similar to the approach taken by Zheka (2005), I adopt an input-oriented DEA 
because of the excessive production inputs (e.g. excess staff) in many Chinese 
loss-makers. I use DEAP version 2.1 to run the standard constant returns to scale 
(CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) models. The use of the CRS specification 
when not all DMUs are operating at the optimal scale will result in TE measures that 
are confounded by scale efficiencies (SE). The use of the VRS specification permits 
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the calculation of TE devoid of these SE effects. Many studies have decomposed the 
TE scores obtained from a CRS DEA into two components: one due to scale 
inefficiency and the other due to ―pure‖ technical inefficiency. This may be done by 
conducting both a CRS and a VRS DEA upon the same data. If there is a difference in 
the two TE scores for a particular DMU, then this indicates that the DMU has scale 
inefficiency and that the scale inefficiency can be calculated from the difference 
between the VRS TE score and the CRS TE score. This calculation is incorporated 
into DEAP 2.1. It was developed by the Centre for Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis (CEPA) and can be downloaded freely from the Internet. Coelli (1996) gives 
a more detailed introduction to the calculation method.  
Ideally, output should be measured in physical units. Because the sample 
includes different sub-industries, using physical units would make it difficult to 
compare firm outputs across sub- industries. Hence, following previous studies (Zheka, 
2005), I measure output as sales revenue (adjusted by change in final product 
inventory) minus total material costs in RMB using log values. Labor is computed as 
the log of the number of employees in the firm. Capital stock is computed as the log 




APPENDIX 3 FACTOR ANALYSIS: MEASURE OF SYMBOLISM OF 
RESTRUCTURING 
As firms often conduct a series of restructurings, I look at one-year restructuring 
packages to define the symbolism index. I choose several items and conduct factor 
analysis on the characteristics proposed in section 1.3.3. The items include:  
Item 1: the ratio of business restructuring without a refocusing.  
To calculate the ratio, I read the original announcement of the restructuring plan. 
I code the restructuring as a refocusing if the firm stated it was concentrating on its 
core activities in the restructuring. In the announcement, the refocusing was addressed 
by all means such as:  
(1) Enhancing an existing product line to concentrate on core activities. For 
example, on May 8, 2005, Nanjing Zhongbei bought 100% of the equity of Jingong 
Industry held by Nanjing Gas and Oil. Thus, Nanjing Zhongbei was able to expand its 
core business and increase its market share of taxi operations in Nanjing;  
(2) Introducing a new product line or entering a new industry as the new core 
activity. For example, Zhejiang Yingte swapped its assets relating to the textile 
industry for the equity of Zhejiang Yingte Medicine Ltd. held by Zhejiang Hualong. 
Thus, its main business transitioned from traditional textiles to pharmaceuticals (Dec. 
30, 2001);  
(3) Exiting an existing industry to concentrate on core activities. For example, on 
July 23, 2003, Zhongyuan Huanbao sold its 90% equity stake in Guangdong Danbaoli 
Yeast Co., Ltd. to Ersha Industrial Co., Ltd. Through the restructuring, the company 




I code the restructuring as not involving a refocusing if the firm did not mention 
the above types of information at all, but mentioned that the firm would increase cash 
flow through the restructuring by selling idle or peripheral assets to help the firm out 
of financial distress, discharge a debt or resolve a bad debt problem to improve its 
capital structure, or to resolve the problem of an ultimate controller embezzling firm 
assets. I then sum up all the restructurings with a refocusing statement and obtain a 
count variable. The refocusing ratio is calculated as: 
Non-refocusing ratio=
ingsrestructur business ofNumber 
statement refocusing with ingsrestructur business ofNumber 
1  
Item 2: the ratio of ownership restructuring without a control transfer.  
I identify the identity of the ultimate controllers before and after the ownership 
restructuring. If they are the same entity, I code the restructuring as one without a 
control transfer. If they are different entities, I code the restructuring as one with a 
control transfer. The ratio is calculated as: 
Non-control transfer ratio = 
ingsrestructur ownership ofNumber 
 transfercontrol with ingsrestructur ownership ofNumber 
1  
Item 3: the ratio of business restructurings conducted between related parties  
I code a business restructuring as one conducted between related parties if the 
transaction partner is a previous shareholder, an affiliate, a subsidiary or a TMT 
member (including directors, supervisors or managers) of the firm. The ratio is 
calculated as: 
Related business restructuring ratio =
ingsrestructur business ofNumber 
parties relatedbetween  conducted ingsrestructur business ofNumber  
Item 4: the ratio of ownership restructurings conducted between related parties  
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I code an ownership restructuring as one conducted between related parties if the 
buyer is a previous shareholder, an affiliate, a subsidiary or a TMT member (including 
directors, supervisors or managers) of the firm.  
 
ingsrestructur ownership ofNumber 
parties relatedbetween  conducted ingsrestructur ownership ofNumber 
  
Item 5: the ratio of business restructurings announced between October and 
December.  
I examine the timing of the business restructurings and identify those conducted 
between October and December. The ratio is thus calculated as:  
Ratio of business restructuring in Quarter 4 
ingsrestructur business ofNumber 
year  theofquater 4th  in the conducted ingsrestructur business ofNumber 
  
Item 6: the ratio of ownership restructurings announced between October and 
December. 
I examine the timing of the ownership restructurings and identify those 
conducted between October and December. The ratio is thus calculated as:  
Ratio of ownership restructuring in quarter 4  
ingsrestructur ownership ofNumber 
year  theofquater 4th  in the conducted ingsrestructur ownership ofNumber 
  
Item 7: the value of the business restructuring.  
I summate the value of all the business restructurings in a year and divide it by 
the total assets of the firm.  
 
Factor analysis is conducted using these items. The items ―related ownership 
restructuring ratio‖ and ―value of restructuring‖ are dropped as they are loaded into 
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two factors. Two factors are finally obtained and presented in Table 2.3. Factor 1 is 
the symbolism of ownership restructuring (Cronbach's alpha = 0.472). Factor 2 is the 
symbolism of business restructuring (Cronbach's alpha = 0.405). As the Cronbach‘s 
alpha values are low, I cannot simply summate the items to represent each factor. 
Thus the factor scores are used as the symbolism indices.  
************Insert Table 2.3 around here************* 
The two factors are combined as the index of procedural symbolism. This shows 
whether the restructuring procedure addresses efficiency aspects. The indices are 
continuous variables. The higher the indices, the more symbolic the restructuring. The  
lower the indices, the more substantial the restructuring.  
At last, an example is given to illustrate how to obtain the items for a firm‘s 
symbolism of restructuring. Zhejiang Int‘l Group Co., Ltd. (000411) incurred losses 
from 1998 to 1999, as shown in Table A. It then conducted a series of restructurings. 
The ownership restructurings are shown in Table B. The business restructurings are 
shown in Table C.  
Table A Net Profit Ratio of Zhejiang Int’l Group Co., Ltd. (000411) 














Table B Ownership Restructurings of Zhejiang Int’l Group Co., Ltd. (1999-2002) 
Table C Business Restructurings of Zhejiang Int’l Group Co., Ltd. (1999-2002) 
Date  Transaction Related Refocus Value (RMB) 
15/6/2000 Acquire 90% equity stake in 
Guangdong Huiyang Taigang 
Rais ing and 90% of Sichuan 
Wenbang Bio Engineering 
Yes  Introducing 
pharmaceutical assets 
142,363,598 
27/6/2000 Sell property No No 45,570,000 
21/11/2001 Zhejiang Yingte swapped its assets 
related to the textile industry for a 
99% equity stake in Zhejiang 
Yingte Medicine Ltd. 
Yes  Transition in main 




9/11/2002 Sell 49% equity stake in Zhejiang 
Int‘l Pharmaceutical to Kunming 
Pharmacutical 
No No  91,483,000 
31/12/2002 Sell 60% equity stake in Zhejiang 
Pharmaceutical Commercial Ltd. to 
Hangzhou Huiyinbi Group Ltd. 
No No 4,440,400 
I obtain the information in Table D based on Tables B and C. I calculate the 
items in Table E based on the information in Table D. These items are used in factor 
analysis. 
























in quarter 4 
Total assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1999 0 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 4.30*108  
2000 2 1 1 0 1.88*108  3 2 1 1 2.92*108  
2001 3 1 2 2 1.63*108  0 0 0 0 5.99*108  
2002 2 0 0 2 9.59*107  2 0 0 0 6.94*108  
Table E Items Used in Factor Analysis 
 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 
 1-(2)/(1) 1-(7)/(6) (3)/(1) (8)/(6) (4)/(1) (9)/(6) (5)/(10) 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 50% 66.67% 50% 33.33% 0 33.33% 187,933,598 
2001 33.33% 0 66.67% 0 66.67% 0 162,775,846 
2002 0 0 0 0 220% 0 95,923,400 
Date Ratio of 
shareholdings  













1 Yes  





13/10/2000 18% Hangzhou State Asset 
Management Bureau 
Sichuan Taigang Bio 
Tech 
1  No  












APPENDIX 4 REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE STATE FROM 2000 TO 2001 
a) Laws regulating restructuring 
June 2000: Regulation of Major Asset Purchases or Sales by Listed Companies 
Circular (CSRC) 
Nov. 2001: Strengthening the Administration of Legal Compliance in the Negotiated 
Transfer of Non-traded Shares of Listed Companies Circular (CSRC) 
Nov. 2001: Absorption of Foreign Capital by Financial Asset Management Companies 
to Participate in Asset Restructuring and Disposal Tentative Provisions (Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and People‘s Bank of 
China) 
Nov. 2001: Several Questions on the Freezing and Auctioning of State-owned Shares 
and Private Legal Person Shares of Listed Companies Provisions (Supreme People's 
Court) 
Dec, 2001: Several Questions Concerning Major Asset Purchases, Sales and 
Exchanges by Listed Companies Circular (CSRC) 
b) Accounting system 
July 2000, revised Accounting Law of the PRC (Ministry of Finance) 
Dec. 2000, new China Accounting System for Business Enterprises (Ministry of 
Finance) 
Jan. 2001, revised some accounting standards and issued new accounting standards 
(Ministry of Finance): debt restructuring, investment, changes in accounting policies 
and estimates and corrections of accounting errors, non-monetary transactions, 
intangible assets, borrowing costs, leases  
Nov. 2001, revised some accounting standards and issued new accounting standards 
(Ministry of Finance): interim reporting, inventories, fixed assets  
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APPENDIX 5 CATEGORIZATION OF LAWS, REGULATIONS AND RULES  
To measure the quality of provincial legislation, I examined the number of laws, 
regulations and rules that are established by the Provincial government and thus are 
effective throughout the whole province. Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), I 
classify laws into two types based on the objectives of regulation. Contracting laws 
refer to the laws, regulations and rules regulating the contracting behavior of business 
actors; property right laws refer to the laws, regulations and rules that regulate 
government behavior, restricting the government from expropriating private 
resources.  
I consulted a Chinese legal counsel about the categorization based on the 
categories provided by China Law Info Database developed by Chinalawinfo Co., 
Ltd.. Contracting laws include laws on trading, competition, real estate, private 
enterprise, business administration, contracting, quality and technology supervision, 
protection of the environment, finance and foreign exchange, accounting and auditing, 
advertisement, pricing, labor, logistics, bill, stock and bonds, company, foreign 
investment, intelligent property, lease and future, and arbitration. Property rights laws 
include laws on elections, government intervention, legislation, judiciary, fiscal and 
administrative reconsidering, planning and statistics, public, taxation and urban 
construction.  
To double check the categorization, I further examined the topic of the 
afore-mentioned laws, rules and regulations themselves, using key words to identify 
the objective of the regulation. Terms such as "local government‖, ―officials‖, 
―legislation‖, ―enforcement‖, ―election‖, ―judiciary‖, ―fiscal‖, ―administrative‖, 
―planning‖, ―public‖, ―taxation‖ or ―urban construction" in titles suggests that the law 
or regulation has been established to regulate government behavior. Otherwise, it is 
established to regulate business or individual behavior.  
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APPENDIX 6 MEASURES OF THE VARIABLES IN THIS STUDY 
Variable  Measure  Calculation  Source 
Substantiveness 






The symbolism of 
business 
restructurings  
Ratio of restructurings with a clear 
industry target  
Coded based on original 
restructuring plan in 
CSMAR, CCER M&A 
database, and retrieval 
system of Chinese listed 
firms 
Ratio of related par ty transactions  
Number of asset restructurings 
announced between October and 
December  
The symbolism of 
ownership 
restructurings  
Ratio of restructurings with a 
control power transfer  
Number of ownership restructurings 
announced between October and 
December  
Legal system index  Provincial property 
right law index  
10×(number of provincial property 
right laws ij – minimum number of 
provincial proper ty right laws 1998) 
/ (maximum number of provincial 
property right laws 1998 – minimum 
number of provincial property right 
laws 1998)  
i: year I; j: province j.  
Provincial property right laws refer 
to provincial regulations regulating 
government behavior.  
1998 is taken as the base year. 
Minimum (Maximum) number of 
provincial proper ty right laws 1998 
refers to the minimum (maximum) 
number of provincial property right 
laws among all the provinces in 
1998. 
China Law Info Database. 
Index is scaled over sample 
years following Fan & Wang 
(2006) 
Provincial 
contracting law index 
10×(number contracting laws ij – 
minimum number  of provincial 
contracting laws1998) /  
(maximum number of provincial 
contracting laws1998 – minimum 
number of provincial contracting 
laws1998)  
i: year I; j: province j.  
Provincial contracting laws refer to 
provincial regulations regulating the 
behavior of companies.  
1998 is taken as the base year. 
Minimum (Maximum) number of 
provincial contracting laws 1998 
refers to the minimum (maximum) 
number of provincial contracting 
laws among all the provinces in 
1998.  
China Law Info Database. 
Index is scaled over sample 
years following Fan & Wang 
(2006) 
 Enforcement index Firms’ perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the judicial system 
in protecting their operations.  
NERI Index of Marketization 
of China’s Provinces (Fan & 




Subsidies  (subsidies for innovation among 
enterprises + subsidies granted for 
policy considerations + subsidies to 
loss-making enterprises) / 
provincial GDP  
People's Republic of China 





Credit access Bank loans to SOEs / total bank 
loans  
NERI Index of Marketization 
of China’s Provinces (Fan & 
Wang, 1999 & 2006)  
 Local protection  Number of trade protection 
measures / provincial GDP 
NERI Index of Marketization 
of China’s Provinces (Fan & 
Wang, 1999 & 2006)  
Complexity involved 
in restructuring 
Input d iversification  Herfindahl index of input sectors China Input-Output table 
2002 
 Relative labor 
productivity 
Log(Value added)/Log(No. of 
employee) scaled by industry mean 
CSMAR accounting 
database 
 Relative inventory 
turnover 








1 if the ultimate owner is the city- or 
county-level government and 0 
otherwise  
CSMAR corporate 
governance database  
 Provincial 
government owner  
1 if the ultimate owner is the 
provincial government and 0 
otherwise 
CSMAR corporate 
governance database  
 Central government 
owner 
1 if the ultimate owner is the central 
government and 0 otherwise  
CSMAR corporate 
governance database  
Internal powerful 
party 
Dual role of CEO & 
board chairman 
A dummy indicating that the dual 
role of CEO and board chair is 
occupied by the same individual to 
measure the power of managers 
CSMAR corporate 
governance database  
 Ultimate ownership  Ultimate controllers’ shareholding  CSMAR corporate 
governance database  
Internal monitoring 
pressure 
International auditor  1 if the auditor is an international 
affiliated auditing firm. I t is coded 
as 0 if the auditor is a domestic 
auditing firm. International affiliated 
auditing firms are those having an 
international Big 4 auditing firm as 
the joint venture par tner. Big 4 are 
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC), and Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, and Ernst & Young. 
CSMAR corporate 
governance database  
Prior restructuring 
experience 
Prior restructuring by 
other listed firms 
Total number of restructurings 
conducted by all listed firms up to 
the focal year  
CCER M&A database  
Prior restructuring by 
the focal firm 
Total number of restructurings 
conducted by the focal listed firm 
up to the focal year 
CCER M&A database  
External pressure  ST dummy  1 if the firm has ever been 
designated “ST” or “PT” in the two 
years window and 0 otherwise  
CSMAR ST firm database  
 Negative 
recommendation  
Number of financial analyst 
negative recommendations 




ROA net profit / total assets CSMAR accounting 
database 
 Debt ratio  ratio of total debt to total assets CSMAR accounting 
database 
 Second year after 
loss 
1 if the restructur ing is conducted in 





reports loss, 0 otherwise  
Other firm 
characteristics 
Size  log of total assets CSMAR accounting 
database 




 New bank loan The standardized amount of new 
bank loan obtained by the 
loss-makers in the restructuring 
year 
CSMAR database  
Province institution  Government suppor t Subsidy index + credit index + local 
protection index 
 
 Legal system index  Contracting law index + proper ty 




Provincial GDP Standardized provincial GDP CSMAR regional economy 
database 
 Number of listed 
firms 
Number of listed firms in a province  CSMAR accounting 
database 
 GDP growth Change of GDP from year t-2 to 
year t-1 
CSMAR regional economy 
database 
 Provincial long- term 
debt ratio  
Average long-term debt to equity 
ratio of all the listed firms in each 
province in each year 
CSMAR accounting 
database 
 Productivity  Total factor productivity of a ll the 







Off- tax burden index  Off- tax burden in province i / sales 
in province i 
Fan & Wang (1999 to 2005)  
Off-budget income Provincial off-budget income / 
provincial GDP 
CSMAR regional economy 
database 
Officers’ salary (Salary of provincial government 
officers) / ( average salary in the 
province) 
CSMAR regional economy 
database 
 Government size  (Number of provincial government 
officers) / provincial GDP 
CSMAR regional economy 
database 
 Budget income (Profit from state-owned assets + 
income from administration fees + 
penalties and confiscatory income 
+ special projects income + other 
income) / provincial GDP 
CSMAR regional economy 
database 
 Intervention Ratio of time managers spend 
dealing w ith the government to their 
total working hours.  
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